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8INTRODUCTION
Privatisation is one of the most complex, closely watched, and controversial processes that is changing
the social system in all post-communist countries. Privatisation in Slovakia, particularly the chance to
acquire wealth without work, has significantly affected the process of change in the society. According to
some analysts, the possibilities of privatisation also had an influence upon the quickening of the process of
splitting up the SFR. 
In the light of the controversy affecting the process and the course of privatisation, we attempted in this
publication to outline and present the course of privatisation to the public in a form as comprehensive as
possible, i.e., to sketch it from its beginnings in 1990 until today. It is a summary of facts, analyses,
opinions, and points of view, as the authors of individual chapters perceived them. 
We are aware that it was not possible to cover in a single publication all what actually happened, and
how we had originally intended. The preparation of the publication was not easy although many things that
are to be found in the book have already been published. Many others, though, will remain covered with a
veil of secrecy for a long time, or, maybe even forever; and definitely not incidentally. But that is also part
of the unique social upheaval, which occurred in former Czechoslovakia and subsequently in Slovakia. 
The initial idea to capture and condense the process of privatisation as a living document occurred when
some interested people met, whom the development of privatisation in Slovakia did not leave indifferent.
This meeting happened in March 1998 in a Bratislava restaurant called the Red Crawfish. 
The authors of the present work are employees of the citizens association M. E. S. A. 10 — The Centre
for Economic and Social Analyses, with the exception of one external collaborator from the Centre for
Economic Development. The work was shaped also thanks to the unselfish willingness of friends - former
or present co-workers - who provided valuable advice, comments, and recommendations. Without their
help the book would not have seen the light of the world, therefore we would like to simply say to them
here: "Thank you". Their names are listed in the alphabetical order: Jozef Dano, Simona
Bubnov—Tauchmannov, Vladimr DvoÞek, Michal Horvth, Eugen Jurzyca, Jn Kelo, Mria
KolaÞkov, Ivan Mikloä, Eva Orn, Juraj Stern, as well as other workers of the institutions, particularly of
the National Property Fund of the SR and the Ministry for Administration and Privatisation of National
Property of the SR, who have not been named, and who provided the necessary materials and information. 
¥ ¥ ¥
Privatisation is one of the major pillars of the economic reform and is briefly documented in the contents
of the first chapter, the Economic reform in the SFR. The beginning recaps the basic differences of
"socialist" and "capitalist" social systems. The author then points to the complexity of the transformation
process and explains the high growth of price levels and the slump in production early in the process. The
frustrated population that expected the transformation process to bring fast and painless prosperity, in
many cases began to reject a radical approach, whereby they legitimised the gradual concept of economic
reform. The final part of the chapter is devoted to the area that privatisation takes in the transformation
process. In his assessment, the author contrasts speed of privatisation as the major requirement and the
subsequent underestimation of its institutional framework.
The subject of the next chapter entitled the Legislative framework of the privatisation process are facts
and the genesis of relevant principal pieces of legislation that rein in the process of privatisation, the
process of restitution, as well as related regulations. 
The chapter on Small-scale privatisation contains characteristics of this part of privatisation and deals
with its most important institutes, such as public auction, the commission for privatisation of national
property, and the action of the participants in the auction, highlighting the course and results and the use
of the resources gained in small-scale privatisation.
The chapter Large-scale privatisation covers general characteristics of the most important part of
privatisation with regard to individual methods, stages, and the voucher privatisation. The purpose here
was to analyse the process. The section of "Statistics" outlines the results and in its further parts points to
new methods of acquiring assets through liquidation and repotrades. It also describes the situation in
redressing privatisation errors in 1999 and gives an outlook for the year 2000. 
The chapter entitled the Consequences of abolishing voucher privatisation and replacing it with the bond
method gives the reader the chronology of the rise and implementation of the so-called bond method of
privatisation. The author gives basic characteristics and the evolution of the relevant legislation, as well as
the ways of using the FNM bond (National Property Fund, FNM) and the development in trading it in the
securities market. He also refers to the ramifications of replacing the original concept of voucher
privatisation with the bonds as they affected citizens and the capital market, its subjects. He also takes note
of the risk of failing to repay bonds by the Fund and evaluates options available for the solution.  
Next chapter - the National Property Fund of the SR - (FNM SR) analyses the changes in the legislative
position of the FNM in the process of privatisation, the relation of the Fund  to the Government and the
National Council of the SR (NR SR), internal structure, responsibilities, and the mutual relations of the
bodies of the Fund. It later looks at the action of the FNM in handling state assets in the process of
privatisation, the economic results of the FNM for the years 1992 - 1998, the current liquidity of the FNM
in 1999 and the financial base for the forthcoming period.
Privatisation of state monopolies, its first section, describes the legislative development of the natural
monopoly and the methods used to privatise state-owned monopolies. The emphasis of the second,
analytical section of the chapter is placed on the causes of the imminent interest of the state to own natural
monopolies. The concluding section deals with the possibilities of devesting of state monopolies,
describing the risks connected with the denationalisation, and attempts to quantify the amount of money
that could be raised through privatisation. It also considers potential areas of using the resources from the
privatisation of these monopolies. 
In the chapter Privatisation of banks, the author gives a concise account of the banking system in the SR
from 1989. He then goes on to discuss privatisation itself of banking institutions with an emphasis on the
largest privatisation affairs (IRB, Slovensk PoisØov¸a, Poätov Banka), and other attempts at resuming
privatisation. In the conclusion, he analyzes the current unpromising state of the banking sphere and its
potential salvation. 
The fact that cities and communities, too, take an important place in the process of privatisation is well
substantiated in the chapter Privatisation of the property of cities and communities. It first introduces the
legislative environment, in which self-Governments in Slovakia operate. It discusses the system of
financing cities and communities and the major problems related to it. It looks at the reasons for municipal
assets sales and also efforts to acquire new assets. A summary of the municipal assets and the methods of
acquiring them then follows. It pays special attention to privatisation of these assets and to the most
important moments that have affected and still affect it. In conclusion the author presents a new option
open to self-Governments in connection with the public administration reform which is being prepared. 
The principal objective of the chapter titled the Lack of transparency and corruption in the
transformation process is to show the impacts that a non-transparent process of privatisation induces on the
overall institutional framework of economy, with an emphasis on the decline of morals and the growth of
corruption. The author also attempts to analyze the environment - informal and formal rules of the
privatisation process that affected the measure of corruption in individual stages of privatisation process,
i.e., the corruption prior to the sale of assets, corruption in the process of decision-making about the
allocation, and post-sale corruption. 
We have decided to include a summary and state the development of major privatisations in alphabetical
order in Appendix 1. They have been processed on the basis of a contents analysis of daily press of most
significant journals and periodicals. Then a summary is given of the most significant events under the title
The chronicle of privatisation process giving also brief quotations of who said what on the subject of
privatisation. 
As the process of privatisation in Slovakia has not yet been published in such a comprehensive form,
and remembering that certain simplifications in its presentation were made, we nevertheless trust that you
will find our recent publication of interest. 
Bratislava, December, 3 1999
Viktor Niì¸anskø and O…ga Reptov 
editors Acknowledgements
M. E. S. A. 10 would like to thank the Open Society Foundation 
- Nadcia obianskej solonosti — for support to make this publication possible.
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The late nineteen-eighties were marked by
sweeping changes: until then the much feared
communist system collapsed and, on the debris,
buds of democratic states began to grow. This
was a time marked with a great dose of
enthusiasm and optimism in the expectation of an
early onset of prosperity as had occurred in
capitalist countries. The only thing yet to do was
to overcome the transformation period from one
social and economic system to another, which
was its direct opposite. The newly formed
Governments of these states began to launch their
economic reforms. 
It was very soon evident that the post-
communist transformation was much more
difficult than even the most pessimistic statesmen
and intellectuals could have imagined. Even if the
communist hierarchical system fell apart
overnight, a consistent reconstruction of the legal,
economic, psychological, and moral system in
a given community needs more time. The
transition period of semi-anarchy allowed not
only irrational conduct but also theft on a large
scale and uncontrollable debts were generated by
state enterprises or newly privatised companies.
This period is characteristic by an unprecedented
economic decline, augmented by stringent
monetary policy, which was focused on
mitigating inflation, necessary after installing
macroeconomic equilibrium - as a result of
accumulated forced savings of the population of
the pervious regime. 
The rapid onset of frustration among 
the majority of the population, expecting an
achievable, quick and painless proSPerity is thus
understandable. Such a population is vulnerable
to manipulation and demagoguery, which is
skilfully employed by mainly those individuals
who have least interest in the future prosperity 
of the country. Consequently, the originally
intended radical transformation concepts are left
behind, there are obstructions placed in their route
and painful but necessary measures are put off,
debts at the expense of future are again incurred,
and the most sensitive and controversial pillar 
of transformation - privatisation - is abused. 
This chapter discusses the phenomenon 
of transformation with an emphasis on the
economic reform in former Czechoslovakia. 
1.1 MARKET ECONOMY VS THE
FORMER SYSTEM, RATIONALE
AND PROBLEMS OF TRANSITION 
The economic system of Soviet-type
communist countries can be characterised by the
following features: 
¥ a leading, totalitarian role of the Communist
Party,
¥ predominance of state ownership,
¥ predominance of bureaucratic over market co-
ordination, and vertical over horizontal co-
ordination,
¥ macroeconomic instability (a shortage
economy),
¥ predominance of soft budget constraints.
The basic philosophy of transition reforms is to
eliminate the above systemic characteristics,
shifting to a system that has proved viable in
advanced countries with market economies and
which may be characterised by the following
features: 
¥ plurality, democratic party system,
¥ predominance of private ownership,
¥ predominance of market co-ordination over
bureaucratic, and horizontal over vertical co-
ordination,
¥ macroeconomic equilibrium,
¥ predominance of tough budget constraints.
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Martin Valentovi
As we could later witness, such a transition was
much more complicated than it would have
appeared at the beginning. The main reason for it
was the enormous influence of the former system
continuing in the economy, the peopleÕs mindset,
and their values. Although we cannot go into
details for reasons of space, we will at least point
out two factors that demonstrate this influence. 
The dominance of soft budget restraints under
communist regime meant that there was no direct
relation between raising the resources and their
efficient use in the microeconomic sphere. The
money would come to the company regardless of
whether it was going bankrupt or not. Such
a system could be relatively stable in the co-
existence with the totalitarian system of a single
party, thanks to tough administrative restrictions
(the management of the companies nevertheless
were limited by party supervision, which would
not permit them to move large financial sums
without restriction to their benefit). That practice,
however, stopped being applied the moment the
communist nomenclature and the associated party
discipline ceased to exist. The economy found
itself in a state of combined soft budget restraint
and soft administrative restraint, which provided
scope for ªasset stripping" and theft of state
enterprise assets. In practice, it meant not only the
stealing and ªasset stripping" referred to above,
but also massive , irresponsible and unchecked
provision of credits on the part of the state banks,
which later resulted in an overall crisis of the
banking system in Slovakia. The authors of this
publication maintain that a quick and extensive
privatisation of banks immediately in the
beginning of the reform process could have
prevented the unpleasant reality referred to above
from occurring. 
Under the communist system, it was the
common citizen who felt the macroeconomic
instability most (or the demand outstripping the
supply) as a result of the dominance of the
bureaucratic co-ordination over the market 
co-ordination. The quality and the quantity of
production was limited. The surplus of money,
which resulted as a consequence of financing the
deficit of public sector could not therefore be
reflected in the increased rate of inflation, which
had been artificially kept low, but in enforced
savings of the population. This phenomenon, when
the supply of money exceeds the demand, is
referred to in specialist literature as so-called
ªmonetary overhang". It in turn resulted in an
extreme growth of the rate of inflation, once the
elements causing the instability have been
removed in post-communist countries through
launching reforms. The price growth alone would
not be problematic. It was, however, combined
with a major slump in the production. And here,
we get to the core of theories which emerged in
different economic and political debates shortly
after the reform process was initiated, and which
attributed the economic decline to the restrictive
monetary policy applied to eliminate the initial
inflation. These theories preferred expansive
policy over a restrictive monetary policy, with the
argument of promoting economic growth. In those
cases where the Governments managed not to
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Group Country
Advanced stage of reform Slovenia*, Poland*, Hungary, Croatia, Yugoslavia, 
(CLI>4) Macedonia, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic,
Upper-intermediate stage of reform Bulgaria, Estonia*, Lithuania**, Latvia*, Rumania, Albania, 
(2.7<KIL<4) Mongolia
Lower-intermediate stage of reform Russia***, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Armenia, Kazakhstan,
(1.7<CLI<2.7) Georgia
Very slow state of the reform Uzbekistan*, Belarus*, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Ukraine, 
(CLI<1.7) Turkmenistan
Table 1
Speed of the reform process in post-communist countries in 1996 by cumulative liberalisation index (CLI) 4
Source: De Melo, Denizer, Gelb, the World Bank 1996
* For years1989-93, ** For years 1989-92, *** For years 1989-91
succumb to similar views, and carried on with the
monetary restriction, the growth in price level
stabilised itself. On the other hand, in countries
where the restriction had been eased and the
Governments struggled to support production with
increased supply of finance, the process of
deflation turned out to be more prolonged.1
This brings us to the classification of the
transformation process into two basic and
conflicting approaches: the slow (gradual, or so-
called "Chinese") model and the fast (radical
model, or the approach of the so-called "shock
therapy").
1.2 ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES 
TO THE SCENARIO OF THE
TRANSITION TO THE MARKET
ECONOMY (SHOCK THERAPY
VERSUS THE GRADUAL MODEL)
If we were to study more closely the individual
approaches in the scenario for transition to
a market economy, we would see that the main
distinguishing factor was speed with which
reforms have been implemented in particular
countries. Accordingly, we can distinguish
alternative approaches of two basic groups. The
first group is represented by those countries,
whose main objective was to establish conditions
of competition within the shortest possible time
period. This approach may be termed the
principle of "shock therapy". It was broadly
endorsed by western experts. It was first
implemented in Poland - its major protagonists
being J.Sachs, Professor of Harvard University
and J. Balcerowicz, then Polish Deputy Prime
Minister and Finance Minister. It is true that the
main weakness of this radical model was high,
greatly understated social costs in the first phase
after effecting the "shock", which was often nor
acceptable for a broad section of population due
to their being unprepared and subsequent
frustration.
As we have noted earlier, the largest parts of
the population supported the anti-Communist
revolutions in the expectation of fast "western"
prosperity, not because of ideological reasons.2 In
many cases the frustration was used by anti-
reform politicians and economists belonging to
the second group and endorsing slow, gradualist
concept, referring to the success of China,
expressible in its economic growth. In contrast to
their liberal thinking opponents, the proponents
of the "Chinese" model have almost never
submitted a comprehensive, clear, conceptually
worked out strategy. 3
Let us be more particular and look at the
situation in speed of reform applied in different
post-communist countries (see Table 1 below).
For the sake of more immediate visibility, we
have grouped the countries in four groups, and
ordered them in a descending fashion, i.e., from
countries with the greatest reform progress
recorded to the lowest progress. 
The table shows that considerable progress has
been made in the reform process in the very
countries that have a realistic chance to accede to
the European Union in the foreseeable future,
which may be explained as the result of efficient
pressure from this institution. Unlike other
countries, the transition in these countries was
linked with political change, as a sign of longing
to get away from Soviet influence, because there
"communists were discredited and stripped of
power, which allowed the application of
exceptional policies with a scope for reforms".5 In
the non-Baltic countries of former USSR, former
communists at the forefront of the political elite
hoped that the newly formed Commonwealth 
of Independent States would grow into a free
federation with continuing financial links.
A relative quickening of the reform process only
occurred after the Russian Federation undertook
issuing its own currency in the end of 1993 and
thus causing the rubble zone to fall apart. In other
words, "a clear idea of where to go, was an
important determining factor of the reform".6
1.3 DISCUSSION AND THE
APPLIED REFORM IN THE SFR
The conceptual dispute about the way 
of economic transformation that was to be
launched in the SFR, took place in the first half
of 1990, mainly at the federal Government level.
The proponents of "gradual concept" were headed
by Walter Komrek, then Deputy Prime Minister 
of Federal Government, while the proponents of
radical transformation were led by Vclav Klaus,
then federal Minister of Finance. Discussions and
debates were held both at political and expert
levels, the radical concept being eventually
adopted. The external manifestation of this
outcome was the resignation of Walter Komrek.
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Two facts were decisive in the setting forth of
Vclav Klaus, then much less influential, both
nominally and realistically. First, the Komrek
group never submitted a comprehensive, realistic,
and sensible concept for transformation. Second,
KlausÕs concept was nothing new, it was only an
interpretation of the concept, that at that time was
already being put in practical life in Poland (see
chapter 1.2.)
The radical model of shock therapy was given
a mandate in the results of the 1990 elections and
took definite shape in the conceptual material
titled the Scenario for the economic reform,
approved by the federal parliament in September
of the same year. According to this material, the
Czecho-Slovak economic transformation was
based on the following priorities: 
¥ price liberalisation,
¥ stringent monetary and fiscal policy,
¥ internal convertibility of currency and
liberalisation of foreign trade,
¥ rapid and extensive privatisation .
The above priorities of the transformation
policy comprised a comprehensive system of
measures that had to be taken, launched,and
ensured simultaneously, and within shortest
possible timeperiod in order that an early change
of the economic environment was induced. By
changing the economic environment, the main
objective of the economic transformation was to
be achieved - effecting change in the conduct of
microeconomic subjects, or companies. Under the
changed conduct, one has to understand rational
behaviour in the terms of increasing the quality of
production, minimising costs, growth in
efficiency, growth in technical and economic
parameters, etc. It is a common knowledge that
under conditions of command economy and state
ownership, such behaviour could not be
conceivable. 
The authors of the concept of radical
transformation assumed the following three
stages of economic development to occur, once it
was put to life: 
¥ the stage of price knock - it was assumed that
in the course of this stage, in response to price
liberalisation and stringent monetary and fiscal
policy, macroeconomic equilibrium will be
installed, i.e., an equilibrium of supply and
demand. In other words, the sellerÕs market
would be eliminated and the buyerÕs market
would be established. It was further assumed
that the stage would be associated with
a relatively fast price growth as a consequence
of the mobilisation of enforced savings, and
that it would last for 3-4 months;
¥ the adjustment stage - a change in the
behaviour and subsequent adjustment of
microeconomic subjects to the altered
conditions was assumed, resulting from 
the influence of macroeconomic equilibrium
and the instalment of criteria-based economic
conditions. For this stage continued
macroeconomic decline was still assumed,
because the reduction of production due to the
altered conditions was still expected to prevail
over the increase resulting from successful
adaptation. The second stage was estimated to
last for 1-2 years;
¥ the growth stage - its onset was assumed for
the second half of 1992, and particularly from
1993. The halting of the economic decline and
the beginning of the economic growth was to
occur as a result of the progress made in
microeconomic adjustment. 
The date for launching the radical concept of
transformation in the SFR was set for January, 1
1991. After some preparatory steps in the second
half of 1990, (preparation and approval of the state
budget for 1991, devaluation of the currency,
technical preparation of the introduction of
internal convertibility, and approval of monetary
frameworks for 1991) the transformation was
actually launched on January, 1 1991. 
1.4 THE PLACE AND 
THE ASSESSMENT OF
PRIVATISATION IN THE
TRANSFORMATION PROCESS
In the transformation process of the post-
Communist countries, the instrument of
privatisation serves to eradicate one of the most
significant systemic characteristics of the
communist system - the high prevalence of state
ownership. Its specificity, unlike the change of all
other systemic characteristics, lies in the fact that
the change of ownership is - as far as time,
technical execution, and political aspect is
concerned - the most demanding, most dangerous
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and most sensitive process. To prove it and
understand it better, let us now look at what the
actual course of transformation process was in the
SFR and later in the Slovak Republic, how it
departed from the anticipated course, which was
briefly sketched in the previous chapter and what
role privatisation played in it. 
The price knock stage ran almost as it had been
assumed. It lasted for about four months, during
which the rate of inflation went up approximately
55 percent. Then the price growth stopped, and,
by the end of the year, the inflation rate rose to
only 63 percent. Roughly from April to May
1991, on the whole, there was a tough , criteria-
based economic environment created in the
Czecho-Slovak economy. A unified tax rate was
introduced, subsidies and grants had been
substantially cut, when compared to the previous
period, credits were only available under
commercial terms, a sellerÕs market turned into
a buyerÕs market, there was macroeconomic
equilibrium in aggregate supply and aggregate
demand. Positive effects of this were expected to
be evident in the advancement of the adjustment
of microeconomic subjects. It turned out,
however, that the progress in adjustment was
slower than expected, which was mainly due to
the insufficient toughness and criteria
enforcement of the economic environment. 
In the opinion of the authors of the economic
reform of the day, the obstacle that hindered swifter
adjustment and restructuring of the economy was
primarily in the significantly prevailing state
ownership.7 That was one reason why, from the
beginning, a non-standard method of voucher
privatisation had been advocated in the former
SFR, which satisfies the criterion of speed best.
If we look at the outcome of privatisation after
ten years, when the majority of companies have
already been placed in private hands, we will
find, that in many cases, not only was there no
progress made in the area of efficient
management of the companies, but the opposite
occurred. The case of VSº (East-Slovakian Iron
and Steel company) is a good illustration when
the new owners brought one of the most lucrative
companies, the flagship of the Slovak economy,
to a significant loss.
Similar development could be seen not only in
the SR but also in many other reform countries,
particularly in those, which are geographically
located to the east. A study of the World Bank,
analysing privatisation in eight post-communist
countries8 has advanced the following conclusions: 
¥ the relation between private ownership of the
company and its restructuring (change directed
at the survival and prosperity in a competitive
environment) is weak or zero; 
¥ only a small change in the behaviour has been
noted between state and private companies;
¥ significant behavioural change occurred only
in those companies that were sold to a foreign
investor; 9
In the above referred countries, but also in other
transition countries, assets got into the hands of
people who had neither the necessary experience,
nor financial resources, and often not even the
will to manage them efficiently. On a large scale,
we have seen manipulation (in standard and non-
standard methods), corruption, or "asset
stripping" (i.e., unauthorised channelling of the
equity of a managed company to another, private
entity). Privatisation, as a tool of transformation,
became an instrument of struggle for the
consolidation of power. Perhaps the best
illustration of this in our country is the struggle
between Prime Minister Vladimr Meiar and the
representatives of the investment funds, the
external manifestations of which was the
abolition of the second wave of voucher
privatisation; the blanket legislative attack on
privatisation funds, which were degraded to the
function of a portfolio investor, and the ensuing
the liquidation of the capital market in the SR;
direct attacks against individual funds (see the
PSIS privatisation-gate). 
To put it in other words, privatisation has
failed. Where should we look for the reasons
why? The critics say we should search in
emphasis placed on the scope and speed of
privatisation, which has already been highlighted
several times, and which was in accord with the
requirements advanced by international financial
institutions. The creation of institutional
protection was underestimated, which though
deemed important was taken to be secondary. The
financial institutions referred to above, together
with the authors of the reform at that time
believed that private ownership alone would
permit sufficient motivation for new owners to
exert pressure upon their management to be more
efficient in managing their companies. 
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The underestimation of the institutional
framework was influenced by the interpretation
of the doctrine of neoliberalism. The reality
showed that capitalism required much more than
just private ownership. It functions on general
compliance with and enforcement of basic rules
that guarantee security, transparency, and
predictability of the results of the exchange. With
the institutions missing that would safeguard
compliance with the above rules, none of the
stakeholders, associated with the privatised
company (employees, management, creditors,
shareholders) is able or motivated to ensure long-
term prosperity of the assets. In such case,
privatisation may lead to stagnation and
decapitalisation, rather than improved financial
performance and increased productivity.10
This is also seen from the statements by Jeffrey
Sachs, Professor of Harvard University, and one
of the major ideologists at the background of
transition reforms, who said, "As an economic
advisor for the region, I preached: Untertake
internal reforms swiftly and seek substantial
international assistance, beware of morals and
demand transparency in action from all parties.
On the other hand, I was too much of an optimist
in relation to possibilities of massive
privatisation, which I deem  faulty now."11 The
quoted statement apparently points to the fact that
massive. i.e., voucher privatisation which is
without capital, cannot bring about the necessary
restructuring or consolidation of economy. 
In this sense, we may say that privatisation or the
achievement of a state where private sector by far
prevails in the economy, together with the
resources it brings, is one of the prerequisites for
a successful adjustment and restructuring of the
economy, thus also a prerequisite for the success of
the entire economic transformation. Before it is
launched, however, there is a need to build an
efficient and enforceable legal and institutional
foundation, capable of ensuring transparency and
fair play. Otherwise, it may have not positive, but
rather, catastrophic consequences.
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In November 1989 a process was started that
we call the economic transformation, based -
apart from other aspects - on rapid and extensive
changes of ownership. This process however,
could not be commenced without clear
legalisation. Our country, but almost all post-
communist countries as well, launched the
process with a substantial part of legislation in
place which was inherited from the communist
period. Although experts realised that the
legislation did not possess the elements of market
economy12, they knew that the sequence of steps -
first the changes in legislation and then the actual
privatisation - could not be sustained if the
emphasis was placed on the speed of the
transformation.
In the years 1990—1991, decisive privatisation
and restitution laws had been approved by the
Federal Assembly of the SFR, Slovak and
Czech National Councils, as well as Government
regulations, ministerial guidelines and directives
that defined the rules and fences in the
privatisation process. 
2.1 RESTITUTION
The process of restitution was part of the
privatisation process in the broader sense, with
laws being passed initially. The purpose of the
laws was to return property nationalised after the
communist coup in 1948 to original owners. The
process of restitution was governed by a number
of laws13 but we will deal in this work only with
the most important ones. They are two laws that
defined clearly the conditions under which the
property was returned to qualified persons, either
physically, or in respect of which compensation
was paid in cash or in securities. We will also
briefly look at the law covering restitution of
agricultural property. 
Circumstances under which restitution claims
concerning nationalised property can be satisfied are
stipulated in the provisions of the Act no. 403/1990
of the Collection of Laws, on mitigation of
consequences of some property wrongs, as later
amended, and the Act no. 87/1991 of the Collection
of Laws, on out-of-court rehabilitation, as later
amended.
Restitution of agricultural property is covered
by Act no. 229/1991 of the Collection of Laws, as
later amended, on the title to land and other
agricultural property. This law was passed to
ensure returning collectivised land and other
agricultural property, whereby consequences of
some wrongs could be mitigated, that were
committed in respect of owners of agricultural
and forest property between 1948 and 1989. By
introducing this law in practice, improved care for
agricultural and forest land was intended through
renewal of original title to the land. 
The Act no. 403/1990 of the Collection of
Laws on mitigating consequences of some
property-related wrongs made provision for
mitigating property related wrongs due to
nationalisation, placing in state ownership on the
basis of rulings by selected sector ministries
12 This was mainly due to the absence of laws on procurement of investments, goods and services, securities, collective
investment, regulations preventing conflict of interests, tax regulations, laws and measures that would preclude using "laundered
money" as well as due to a system of tax returns enabling property and income of individual persons to be tracked down. 
13 List of legal regulations, altering restitution process is in publication: Collective of authors of legal section of MSPNM SR:
Privatization in legal regulations. Open Windows Bratislava, 1993, p. 88-89.
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issued after 1955, and referring to nationalisation
regulations of 1948. The law was denoted also as
the "small restitution act", subject to which the
property was given back to the original owners
and trade licence holders. The claim to obtain the
article surrendered had to be made by the
claimant against the holder of the property, not
later than on May, 1, 1991. Subject to ⁄ 19, par. 2
of the cited law, the organisation was obliged to
return the property not later than May, 31 1991.
The claim to get cash compensation had to be
lodged with the Ministry for Administration and
Privatisation of National Property (further
referred to as MSPNM ) not later than on May, 1
1991, with the claimants covering physical and
private legal entities, whose title to real property
or tangible assets had been withdrawn. In the
event of death of the original owner, the order of
claimants to whom the property was to be
surrendered was determined (e.g. hereditary
proprietor through will, children of the proprietor
and spouse that survived, as of the day of the
effect of the cited law, parents of the proprietor,
siblings, etc.) 
The Act no. 87/1991 of the Collection of
Laws, on out-of-court rehabilitation, was applied
to mitigate the consequences of some property
related and other wrongs which arose through
legal action executed in the period between
February, 25 1948 and January, 1 1990. It was
also referred to as the "large restitution act". The
act made a distinction between whether the title
was withdrawn in accord with the law or at
variance with the then effective legislation. This
distinction was decisive in respect of the way the
claim of the restitution claimant would be
satisfied.
The adopted principle of priority of restitution
claim over privatisation was an important fact,
i.e., the property had to be surrendered to the
claimants prior to privatisation of companies to
ensure that property to which a restitution claim
was applicable was not privatised. 
In those cases where the property could not be
physically returned to the restitution beneficiaries,
financial settlement was applied. Where the small
restitution act was applicable (Act 403/1990) cash
compensation was provided, where so-called large
restitution act was applicable (Act 87/1991),
compensation of up to SKK 30,000 was provided
in cash, with the remaining sum exceeding the
amount claimed provided in securities - shares of a
Special fund (the Restitution Investment Fund), in
which 3 percent of shares of companies earmarked
for voucher privatisation were deposited.  
As we will not deal more closely with the area
of restitution in the next parts of the text, we give
at least some figures that may illustrate the
challenges of the process. In connection with
handling the cases arising from the Act 403/1990,
there were around 17,000 restitution claims
lodged within the stipulated deadline, until April,
30, 1991. There were 5170 claims for cash
compensation registered and until 30 June, 20,
1999, 809 claims had been discharged with the
amount of compensation paid amounting to SKK
227 million. These claims mainly concerned real
estate that could not be surrendered by liable
persons -organisations "in natura," or where the
real estates surrendered were damaged to such an
extent that without instant reconstruction they
could not be used for housing, production or
service provision. There was also cash
compensation granted in respect of land that
could not be surrendered, as it had buildings
constructed in the period after nationalisation by
the Czechoslovak state. Currently there are 400
claims not discharged, the remainder being
rejected as not grounded, or because they were
lodged with other than the relevant authority. 
2.2 PRIVATISATION 
2.2.1 Small-scale privatisation 
From the beginning, privatisation was divided
into so-called small-scale and large-scale
privatisation. The process was governed by so-
called "small-scale" privatisation and "large-
scale" privatisation laws. Small privatisation is
governed by the Act no. 427/1990 Of the
Collection of Laws, on transfer of stateÕs title to
some property onto legal or physical persons, as
later amended. The law stipulated conditions
under which state property which was managed,
as of November, 1, 1990, by state enterprises,
budgetary and contributory organisations,
national committees, is transferred to defined
physical or legal persons. In this way, moveable
and immovable property which was part of
operating units of organisations running services
or involving in trade and other than agricultural
production, could be conveyed. To put it simply,
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it concerned mainly small retail units, tourism
facilities, mainly under the Ministry of Trade and
Tourism, and also service rendering operating
units.  Rights and liabilities related to the tangible
assets being conveyed, were not subject to the
transfer and the transfer was effected in a simple
form of sale, such as a public auction. This
simplification permitted a shortening of the time
necessary for privatisation and establishing 
a competitive environment, at least in a part of the
economy. 
The so-called small-scale privatisation act has
been amended several times:
¥ the Act 541/1990 of the Collection of Laws —
this amendment defines the relation of state
companies, budgetary and contributory
organisations, and co-operatives, to contracts
of lease for non-living space.
¥ the Act 429/1991 of the Collection of Laws —
specifies procedure for public auctioning and
for failing to pay the purchase price for
property auctioned.
¥ the Act 561/1991 of the Collection of Laws —
extends the ban to terminate the contract of
lease of non-living space, in which operating
units are located, to cover also municipalities. 
The basic laws governing the process of
small privatisation include also the Act of the
SNR no. 474/1990 of the Collection of Laws, on
responsibilities of the bodies of the Slovak
Republic in matters of transfer of stateÕs title to
property to legal and physical persons, as later
amended. It stipulated the jurisdiction of
MSPNM, and commissions for privatisation of
national property in areas of transfers of property
to legal and physical persons. It was amended by
the Act of the SNC 501/1991 of the Collection of
Laws in which rights and obligations of
commissions for privatisation of National
Property, district offices and the winning auction
bidders were more specified.
The process of small privatisation was also
regulated by implementing regulations, namely
the edict of MSPNM SR no. 568/1990 of the
Collection of Laws on public auctions in transfers
of stateÕs title to something other than legal or
physical persons and on entry auction fees. It
makes provision for particulars in public
auctioning of operating units, which were
managed, as of November, 1, 1990, by state
companies, budgetary and contributory
organisations and national committees. It was
amended by the edict of the MSPNM SR no.
473/1991 of the Collection of Laws, which
stipulated the procedure for public auctioning,
primarily where the auction of an operating unit
not offered for auction with the real estate, was not
successful. 
2.2.2 Large-scale privatisation 
The principal law governing the process of
large-scale privatisation is the Act no. 92/1991 of
the Collection of Laws on conditions of transfer
of state property to other persons, which was
passed in the Federal Assembly in February 1991.
It contains provisions for several methods of
privatisation of almost all state property, except
for the property which is protected in the
Constitution and defined as property in sole
ownership of the state. It covers natural resources
and raw materials that serve the needs of the
whole society.
The law defines the terms of transfer of state
property, to which the tittle of management
belongs to state companies, state financial
institutions, state insurance companies and other
state-owned organisations, including property
shares in enterprises of other legal persons, and
the conditions of transfer of state stake in these
businesses to either Slovak or foreign legal or
physical persons. The law also defines the
position and obligations of the founding sectors in
the capacity of bidders submitting privatisation
projects to MSPNM SR, the relevant authority of
the state administration responsible for the
privatisation process, the National Property Fund
of the SR, the body implementing the decisions
on privatisation, the Antitrust Office of the SR,
the institution responsible for issues of economic
competition, and the Slovak Land Fund (SLF),
the administrator of agricultural and forest real
property owned by the state. It further stipulates
the methods and forms of privatisation, specifies
the use of investment vouchers within the
voucher privatisation, defines bond privatisation
and touches on the liquidation of state companies.
Since the above laws define the relations 
that were completely new to post-communist
countries, it is quite natural that experience and
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knowledge gained in the privatisation process
gradually called for the adoption of several
amendments. 
The basic Act 92/1991 of the Collection of
Laws has been subjected to a number of changes,
22 in total, (as of September, 30, 1999), of which
19 were amendments and 3 were findings of the
Constitutional Court. We give them in the
chronological order, with a short commentary and
the denotation of the Government in office at the
time the amendments were passed.
The Federal Assembly of the SFR Acts
passed in the period of the rule of the
Government of J. arnogurskø:
The Act no. 92/1992 of the Collection of Laws.
- a new ⁄ 6a is included stipulating that the
privatisation project submitted after February, 29
1992 must include the companyÕs assessment of
environment protection commitments. Other
supplements relate to cases where the
privatisation projects are designed by other
person than the company itself, the obligation of
the company to access such person the relevant
information pertaining to the company being
privatised, the date of effect of the transfer of title
to things of privatised property, and the cases
where companies entering into lease contacts and
other contracts of use of property by other
persons, can do this only for the period until the
property is transferred to the relevant fund. 
The Act no. 264/1992 of the Collection of
Laws. - the change concerns ⁄ 19, which
specified the transfer of title to real property. (The
title is transferred to the transferee on the day it
has been entered in the cadaster of real property.) 
The Federal Assembly of the SFR Acts
passed in the period of rule of the second
Government of V. Meiar in the SR:
The Constitutional Act no. 541/1992 of the
Collection of Laws on dividing up the assets of
the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic - this law
deleted the whole fifth part (⁄ 27 - 40) of the Act
no. 92/1991 of the Collection of Laws , which
related to the Federal National Property Fund.
The Act no. 544/1992 of the Collection of
Laws - the amendment stipulated that
Administrative Procedures were not applicable in
respect of privatisation projects approval and at
the same time it restricted the term during which
the FNM SR guarantees the fulfilment of the
pledge by the assignee of the privatised assets, the
term set at one year since the obligation has been
transferred to the assignee. The amendment also
responded to the prepared split of the SFR by
specifying in more detail part 4 which concerned
investment vouchers.
The Acts of the National Council of the SR
(NR SR) passed in the term of the second
Government of V. Meiar in the SR:
The Act of the NR SR no. 17/1993 of the
Collection of Laws, which changes and amends
the Act of the Slovak National Council (SNR-
predecessor of NR SR) for no. 253/1991 of the
Collection of Laws, on the jurisdiction of the SR
bodies in matters of transfers of state property to
other persons and on the FNM, as later amended,
and the Act no. 92/1991of the Collection of Laws.
The amendment simplified privatisation in
connection with potential restitution claims in a
way enabling privatisation of property affected by
these claims, with the proviso that the assignee of
the property became the liable person in potential
restitution. Where this person becomes obliged to
surrender the property, the law guarantees the
right to compensation from the FNM. In
connection with the guarantee for liabilities of the
assignee of the privatised property, the law
stipulates that the creditor has a right to claim
fulfilment of the obligations from the FNM only
where the claim - its legal reason and amount -
was notified to the FNM within one year and only
after using all legal means against the debtor. For
the event of infringement of legal regulation in the
privatisation, the amendment enshrines the right
of the state to seek indictment with the court to
invalidate the transfer of the privatised property. 
The Act no. 172/1993 of the Collection of
Laws - the amendment stipulated that the state
body, that approved the privatisation project can
change the way of privatisation proposed in the
privatisation project. 
The Act no. 278/1993 of the Collection of
Laws - on administration of state property
changed ⁄ 45 par. 5 in a way that provisions of
par. 1 and 2 were not applicable to the property of
companies of foreign trade and other special
purpose organisations, nor to budgetary and
contributory organisations. 
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The Acts of the NR SR passed in the term 
of the Government of J. Moravk:
The Act no. 60/1994 of the Collection of Laws
- the core of the amendment was to incorporate -
in relation to the rise of the independent Slovak
Republic in 1993 - provisions included in the
SNC Act 253/1991 in the Act no. 92/1991, as
later amended. It is one of the most significant
amendments, which governs also privatisation of
assets managed by the FNM. In addition, 
it provides for:
¥ adds requirements for a privatisation project, 
¥ widens the rights of the Ministry for
Administration and Privatisation of National
Property, 
¥ introduces sanctions in the event of company
failing to notify the necessary information to
other persons drawing up a privatisation
project, specifies more clearly the procedure of
decision making in the privatisation project,
stipulates conditions to be satisfied in the event
of cancelling the decision about privatisation
after the decision has been issued.
¥ notes that the property of the FNM is not in the
state ownership 
¥ gives details for transfer of privatised property
using vouchers. 
The Act no. 172/1994 of the Collection of
Laws - the amendment designates the recipient of
the net proceeds from sale of vouchers (state
budget).
The Act no. 244/1994 of the Collection of
Laws - the amendment widens possibilities to use
the property of the FNM SR also for transfer of
privatised property for the purposes of health,
sickness and pension insurance. 
The Acts of the NR SR passed during the
term of the third Government of V. Meiar:
The Act no. 369/1994 of the Collection of
Laws - one of the most controversial
amendments, a major change to the law, when it
was provided that the Board of the FNM SR at
the proposal of MSPNM SR or the Executive
Committee of the FNM, could issue decisions
about privatisation through direct sale, outside
public tendering or public auctioning, and not
the Government of the SR, as the case had been
until the amendment became effective. The
Constitutional Court ruled that these provisions
were unconstitutional.
The Act no. 374/1994 of the Collection of
Laws - supplements provisions on receipt of part
of proceeds of voucher sale (state budget only on
the basis of the law on the state budget for the
relevant year).
The Act no. 190/1995 of the Collection of
Laws - a principal amendment that abolished the
second wave of voucher privatisation. The
amendment constitutes the climax of gradual
diversion of the ruling coalition from the voucher
privatisation as a method, which offered least
chances to gain economic and thus also political
power. The amendment was a major intervention
in the next course of privatisation also because 
it introduced the institute of mandatory
participation of employees, issuing 10% of
employee stock, or the possibility to acquire a 34-
percent stake in the equity of the assignee. 
It also brought about changes in that the decisions
were issued by the FNM SR, also in relation to old
decisions by the Government or MSPNM SR
(previously, only the body that issued the decision
could change it), the terms of the contract of
purchase were stipulated, and the obligation to back
out of contract in the event of default, the
impossibility to pardon interest for late payment, the
impossibility to lease out assets until the whole
purchasing price has been paid. Further the assignee
is obliged to put up with oversight and control on the
part of the FNM. Other, significant changes
included those related to investing or selling assets
in other trading companies where the FNM had a
34-percent stake, legalisation of the increase of
equity effected by the FNM until April 1993 subject
to the exemption from the Commercial Code, as
well as accessing data of the FNM only to the
relevant National Council Committee.
In compensation for the abolished voucher
privatisation the amendment introduced the institute
of the FNM bond of the nominal value of 10,000
SKK (for further detail, see chapter on the
Consequence of abolishing the voucher privatisation
and replacing it with the bond method). 
The Act no. 304/1995 of the Collection of
Laws - the amendment gives provisions for the
issue of bonds of the FNM and organisation of
trade with them.
The finding of the Constitutional Court of the
Slovak Republic no. 4/1996 of 20 December
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1995 - ruled that the provisions subject to which
municipalities are obliged to accept bonds, was
not consistent with the Constitution. 
The Act no. 56/1996 of the Collection of
Laws — the amendment changed the "obligation"
to ensure participation of employees in
privatisation to the "possibility". At the same time
it introduced the jurisdiction of MSPNM SR to
act when companies were selected for liquidation. 
The Act no. 322/1996 of the Collection of
Laws — the amendment introduces a liability for
FNM in respect of bond holders, who on October,
24 1996 reached 70 years of age to repay FNM
bonds, as of 31 December 1997. 
The Constitutional Court of the Slovak
Republic in its ruling no. 352/1996 of the
Collection of Laws stated that the provisions
subject to which responsibilities for direct sales
were transferred from the Government to the FNM
SR were not consistent with the Constitution. 
The Act no. 210/1997 of the Collection of
Laws — the amendment gave responsibility for
approving direct sales back to the Government of
the SR (after more than half a year since the
ruling of the Constitutional Court fell effective)
and expanded the possibility for the buyers
acquiring assets to pay part of their liabilities
against the FNM or the Slovak Land Fund, by
FNM bonds. 
The Act no. 211/1997 of the Collection of
Laws — the amendment allowed to pardon interest
in instalment sales and expanded the possibility
of using FNM resources, subject to provisions of
other legal norms. 
The finding no. 221/1998 of the Collection of
Laws by the Constitutional Court of the Slovak
Republic decided that the provisions related to
placing a designated group of persons at an
advantage in acquisition of FNM bonds were
unconstitutional. 
The Acts of the NR SR passed during the
term of the Government headed by M.
Dzurinda
The Act no. 253/1999 of the Collection of Laws
— specifies the list of companies having the nature
of natural monopolies and stipulates that the
Government will always decide about their sale
after receiving the position of the National
Council of the SR and gives a list of companies
where a permanent stake of 51 percent must be
retained by the state. 
The basic laws making provision for the
process of large privatisation include also the
SNR Act no. 253/1991 of the Collection of
Laws on the jurisdiction of the SR bodies in
matters of transfer of state assets to other persons
and on the FNM, as well as its amendments - the
SNR Act 501/1991of the Collection of Laws, 
the SNR Act 29/1992 of the Collection of Laws,
and the NR SR Act no. 17/1993 of the Collection
of Laws. 
For the sake of completeness, we give other
legal regulations, which have the nature of
implementing regulations. This category includes
the decrees of the Government, both federal and
national. 
The Decree of the Government of the SFR
no. 383/1991 of the Collection of Laws on the
issue and use of investment vouchers and its
amendment no. 69/1992 of the Collection of Laws.
They were abided by in the first wave of
privatisation. The provisions of the decree were
abolished and related with the Government Decree
of the Slovak Republic no. 134/1994 in connection
with the establishment of the Slovak Republic. 
The Decree of the SR Government no.
134/1994 of the Collection of Laws on the issue
and use of investment vouchers - governs the
issuance and registration of voucher books,
privatisation waves and privatisation rounds, and
also the procedure in ordering stocks or
transferring investments points to investment
funds. The Decree was amended by the SR
Government Decree no. 235/1994 of the
Collection of Laws of Statutes, no. 190/1994 of the
Collection of Laws of Statutes, no. 139/1996 and
no. 77/1997 of the Collection of Laws of Statutes. 
The Government of the SR Decree no.
273/1991 of the Collection of Laws — on
exemption from ⁄ 45 of the Act no. 92/1991 of
the Collection of Laws enabled state companies,
state financial institutions, state insurance
companies and other organisations, with the
exception of budgetary and contributory
organisations, to conclude in addition to usual
economic management, contracts of recompense
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transfer of state property to which they have 
a right of management - where these concern
unnecessary stock, assets of gradual consumption
(up to 5000 KS), basic assets having the net
book value of up to 25 thousand KS, vehicles
older than 5 years, some movable assets located
within the real property, surrendered subject to
the Act no. 403/1990 of the Collection of Laws,
or functionally connected to such a real property.
It was amended by:
- the Decree of the SR no. 430/1992 of the
Collection of Laws, which stipulated that the
price in transfer of apartments to their tenants or
of an apartment house to the apartment tenants,
must be set by an authorised expert; 
- the Decree of the SR Government no.
144/1993 of the Collection of Laws, which
extends the exemption, subject to which contracts
of recompense transfer of state assets may be
concluded, to real property for location of a
consulate office of a foreign state, international
Government organisation or an institution, which
subject to international law, is treated as one
holding diplomatic privileges and immunities,
with a proviso of a prior consent by the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of the SR;
- the Decree of the SR Government no.
151/1993 of the Collection of Laws, which
further extends the exemption from ⁄ 45, by for
instance, a possibility of a company to set up a
limited liability company in the Czech Republic
and to set apart funds totalling 100 thousand KS
for the purpose. It also assigned the ministers and
the top managers of central bodies of state
administration an obligation to submit
applications for granting other exemptions from
⁄45 par. 1 to the Ministry of Finance of the SR for
approval, subject to prior consent by MSPNM
SR, where it concerns the recompense transfer of
tangible assets of the net book value of up to 5
million SKK. Where it concerns a recompense
transfer of agricultural real property, the prior
consent by the Slovak Land Fund is required. In
the remaining cases, the applications had to be
approved by the Government of the SR. 
In order to get a full picture of the legislative
framework defining the rules in the process of
privatisation, we will also touch on some other
relevant legal regulations.
2.2.2.1 Some related legal regulations pertaining to
the process of so-called ªlarge privatisation"
The Act no. 513/1991 of the Collection of
Laws — The Commercial Code — this law defines
the position of entrepreneurs, trading companies,
trading liabilities relations, as well as some other
relations related to carrying out business. 
The Act no. 600/1992 of the Collection of
Laws on securities — defines the system of
securities, the contracts on securities, securities
trade and the protection of the financial market. 
The Act no. 248/1992 of the Collection of
Laws on investment companies and investment
funds - stipulates the activity of investment
companies and funds, the protection of investors,
and the state supervision over investment
companies and investment funds. 
The Act no. 192/1995 of the Collection of
Laws — on securing strategic interests of the state
in privatisation, which excluded some companies
from privatisation. It concerned mainly energy
networks, but also some other enterprises. In
reality, however, the law did not affect
privatisation because the Government excluded
from privatisation only those enterprises, which
they did not intend to privatise. This piece of
legislation introduced the institute of "golden
share", which had not been effective in practice
and it was later confirmed that it was not
consistent with the constitution of the SR. 
A special position among related legal
regulations is held by the Act no. 370/1994 of the
Collection of Laws on repealing the decisions of
the Government of the SR on privatisation of
enterprises, parts thereof, and state share through
direct sale, that were issued by the Government of
the SR between September 6, 1994 and December
21, 1994. Ever since this act was announced, its
unconstitutionality was apparent, which was
confirmed by the ruling of the Constitutional
Court of the SR of May 24, 1995, no. 126/1995 of
the Collection of Laws. The effect in full scope
was repealed on the date of the statement, but the
FNM SR did not implement the decisions which
were originally contained in the cited law. 
Last but not least, we should note that the
process of large privatisation was governed also
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by a number of guidelines, directives, edicts
issued by MSPNM SR and the FNM SR, or the
MF SR These fixed the principles, procedures,
and terms in assessing best bids for public
tenders, procedures for handling assets in
liquidation, and for ways and terms in appraisal
of assets and also gave model auction
procedures. 
The area of privatisation is definitely one area of
economic policy entailing most legislative
changes, which is apparently linked to its role in
the transformation of economy. Perhaps no other
area (except social) has gone through so many
legislative changes as the area of privatisation,
considering the number of legislative amendments
adopted to the principal law on privatisation
process and not insignificant number of associated
implementing regulations. 
This considerable number of amendments and
changes indicates a lack of stability in the
legislative framework. In characterising these
amendments we may note that these have brought
partial or provisional changes of the conditions of
privatisation or the powers of the SR bodies. This
situation has made the decision making of the
potential investors - both domestic and foreign
(though not numerous) - much more difficult
because they had to constantly watch out for them
and evaluate their impact upon their own
intentions. We may put it simply, that frequent
changes to the rules of the game increased input
costs, that became irredeemable.
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3.1 CHARACTERISTICS
On the whole, small privatisation can 
be considered technically, organisationally, and
as to its scope, a less demanding stage of
privatisation. It does not hold that it would be of
less importance. It became a kind of vanguard and
foundation of the privatisation process. It is also a
stage that preceded the process of principal
complex transformation of ownership relations in
state property. It was directed, among other
things, towards creating conditions for the rise of
small or medium size businesses. 
Small privatisation was directed primarily 
at the privatisation of the retail network, services,
and small production facilities. Small privatisation
also ensured transformation of the ownership
relations in respect of basic means and stock,
which comprised a substantial part of the operating
units (OU) being privatised. 
The difference between the small and large
privatisation was in both the subject of
privatisation and the persons, who could
participate in the process. While the subject of
small privatisation was only movable and
immovable objects without the rights and
liabilities being transferred, in large privatisation
the subject of privatisation was the assets of the
enterprises as a whole or a part thereof, including
the rights and obligations. The transferee of the
privatised assets in small privatisation could only
be national subjects, in contrast to the assets
transferees in large-scale privatisation, who can ,
be both nationals, or foreign subjects. 
In implementing small privatisation, the
settlement of obligations and liabilities was tied
to the privatised assets causing problems. The
title to them could not be transferred 
to the transferee under the legislation in force
then (the Act no. 427/90 of the Collection of
Laws), since the subject of small privatisation
were only tangible and intangible things without
the rights and obligations. 
The intent of the process of small privatisation
was also to demonopolise with the objective to
significantly raise the quality of service in areas
serving the consumer. The fact that it had not been
always successfully achieved is seen in frequent
changes of the owners of the operating units, rises
in prices of goods, and the standard of service not
always adequate to the prescribed norms.
In principle, however, the process of small
privatisation is assessed as being very successful
not only in the view of demonopolisation
accomplished of such integrated units as were, for
example, Zdroj, Drogrie, Odevy, Textil (the
process of atomisation of trading and catering
units came under intense criticism by many
"socialist" experts), but, particularly, from the
economic aspect. 
Today, almost ten years after the inception of
the process of small privatisation, one can
encounter also many original privatising subjects
- capable businessmen, who recruit primarily
from the salesmen, hotel keepers, who have
subscribed their lives to this way of doing
business. 
3.2 PUBLIC AUCTION
The sole institute through which assets were
sold in small privatisation, was public auction,
governed by the Act no. 427/1990 of the
Collection of Laws, and the details being defined
in the Decree no. 568/90 of the Collection of
Laws of MSPNM SR on public auctions in
transfers of state title to other legal persons and
on the entry fees to these auctions, with changes
and amendments effected by MSPNM SR Decree
no. 479/1991 of the Collection of Laws. We need
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to note that in making the legal framework, a
model was used which allowed to make use of the
institute of the "Dutch auctions", i.e., with the
participation of minimum five competing bidders,
the auctioneer is gradually decreasing the initial
auction price, always by 10% at a time, but not
more than 50% of the initial auction price, or, in
repeated auctions, not more than by 80% of the
initial auction price.
In the so-called first round of the public auction,
only Czecho-Slovak subjects - physical persons
that proved their national citizenship after February,
5 1948 and also legal persons, whose shareholders
or partners were exclusively such physical persons,
could take part.
3.3 THE COMMISSION FOR
PRIVATISATION OF NATIONAL
PROPERTY
An important element in the process of small
privatisation was played by an umbrella 
body reSPonsible for the organisation and
institutionalisation of this process. The legal
framework of this institute was given in the Act
of the SNR no. 474/1990 of the Collection of
Laws on the jurisdiction of bodies of the Slovak
Republic in matters of transfer of state property
onto other legal or physical persons, with changes
and amendments made by SNR Act no. 501/1991
of the Collection of Laws. The Ministry for
Administration and Privatisation of National
Property, and commissions for privatisation 
of National Property were designated as
competent authorities to act in this process. 
MSPNM SR set up one commission for each
district and also for Bratislava, the capital, and
Koäice. The commissions prepared draft lists of
the operating units (OU) that had to satisfy the
requirements stipulated in the Act 427/1990 of the
Collection of Laws. Transparency was a necessary
component of the process, safeguarded by the fact
that the lists of OU had to be posted 30 days prior
to the date of the public auction. The background
materials to the lists were submitted by the
relevant authorities - in the given case either the
Ministry of Trade and Tourism, Ministry of
Interior , or municipalities. The commissions held
talks with the relevant municipality about the draft
lists. The draft lists were confirmed by MSPNM
SR, subject to prior talks with the founding or
establishing parties of the OU or the Ministry of
Interior. 
As for composition of the commissions,
MSPNM, when pursuing law to appoint members
of the commissions, was guided mainly by the
proposals made by the district offices. Regard was
taken to have primarily district office officials,
organisations associating entrepreneurs, the
Association of Cities and Communities, and
relevant trade union authorities represented on the
commissions. The list had to be posted at the
official bulletin board of the relevant district office.
3.4 THE COURSE OF ACTION 
OF AN AUCTION PARTICIPANT
The auction bidder was obliged to deposit an
auction guarantee, which was set at 10% of the
initial auction price, and this was placed in the
designated account of the relevant financial
institution (in Slovensk sporitel¸a, a.s.), not later
than on the date of the auction. Where the bidder
was successful in the public auction, he was obliged
to pay the price achieved in the auction, with the
auction guaranty being deducted from it, not later
than within 30 days from the date of the auction.
Where the winning auction bidder did 
not paid the price for which he acquired the
auctioned OU within the set period, the transfer of
the title to the auctioned item was rendered void
from the start, and the auction guarantee fell to
the relevant authority, in this case MSPNM SR.
In such case, the OU was put on auction again. 
As the OUs being sold were mostly related to the
area of trade and tourism, stocks had to be
addressed as well. There were not part of the price,
but an obligation was defined to pay for them
within 30 days since the date of the auction. In a
number of cases, manipulation with stocks and the
equipment of the OU occurred, which was made
possible by the law not stipulating an obligation for
the transferee to carry out physical inventory. 
Where the building in which the OU was
located was not part of the auction, the winning
bidder had a right by law to lease the relevant
non-living space for a period of first two, and
later, five years. 
3.5 TIME COURSE AND RESULTS
The process of small privatisation, as well as
the whole privatisation process was accompanied
by stormy discussions already at the time when
the legislative framework had been made, both in
the Parliament and in public. Agitated discussions
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became even more violent when OUs were
publicised or proposed for inclusion in the
privatisation lists. 
Not a day lapsed without potential businessmen
streaming to the ministry for privatisation or
delegations from state enterprises, which were
immediately "touched" by the OU lists. These
groups filed new requests - from the circle of
potential entrepreneurs - for additional inclusions
of OUs in the lists and, on the other hand, from
the ranks of state enterprises delegations, 
for withdrawals from the lists of those OUs,
which might become healthy core for new forms
of "post-privatisation" society. 
It is true that we may argue even today about
some views on the matter, when for example, the
new domestic business stratum in trade sharply
criticised the possibility of foreign capital to enter
this area, on the grounds of so-called protection of
domestic production and price accessibility. This
group would not admit that the scarcity of
domestic capital would eventually entail
technological backwardness of the whole retail
distribution and would not ensure improved
standards of services (e.g. the introduction of bar
coding, packaging of foodstuffs, etc.). 
Officially, the small-scale privatisation
commenced on February, 14 1991 and ended on
March, 1 1994 with the decisions by MSPNM SR
on dismantling the Commission for Privatisation
of National Property, based in Bratislava, and on
ending the process of small privatisation subject
to the Act. 4271990 of the Collection of Laws , as
later amended. 
The transformation of the property in the small
privatisation was connected with negative
phenomena as well, particularly related to
unsettled ownership relations to the property
placed on auctions, to auctions of leases of non-
living spaces, (without real property being
transferred, and securing protection of interest),
and they also stemmed from the imperfect
legislation. The ramifications of the so-called
"gaps" in the law are still handled by the courts
and it is not possible to estimate the time by which
these legal disputes will have been resolved. 
With regard to the above situation, the new
management of MSPNM SR strove to submit an
amendment to the Act no. 427/1990 of the
Collection of Laws in 1999. The purpose of this
amendment was to introduce a term, within which
the winning bidder could still seek to make the
auction act void through court. The proposal,
however, was overruled and many bidders will
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Figure 2 — Aggregate final auction prices in small privatisation in the SR in billion SKK
have to continue bearing the business risk, many
times due to their imperfect decision. 
Within small privatisation, there were 9, 667
OUs sold through public auction, whose net book
value amounted to SKK 12.3 billion and the
overall amount achieved in auction was almost 
SKK 14 billion.
The process of small privatisation mostly
affected state enterprises of the sector of trade and
tourism of the SR, where of the total number of
8,408 OUs, 6,554 OUs, or 74.8%, had been
privatised, 1,854 OUs had been surrendered
within restitution and a part had been abolished.
Within the Ministry of Soil Management, 54 OUs
had been auctioned (of which the major part
concerned bakeries, confectioneries, mills,
breweries, malt plants, soda plants, etc.). In the
sector of the Ministry of Culture 105 OUs had
been auctioned - book shops, 46 OUs had been
surrendered to original owners and 44 shops had
been liquidated. 
A summary survey of auctions (including
Dutch), by individual years, and by former
regions, shows that more than three-fourth of
OUs, i.e., 77.3% had been auctioned in 1992,
22.3% in 1993, and only 0.4 % in 1994. 
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Table 3 — A recap of the financial resources usage from a special account of MSPNM SR in 1996
Source: FNM SR, 1999; own calculations M.E.S.A. 10
Purpose of the use: Financial sum in SKK
Down payment of part of the principal of the loan on 
behalf of Povaìsk Strojrne ( machinery producer) 180, 387, 540.98
Payment of interest on behalf of Povaìsk Strojrne 12, 346, 679.85
State Housing Development Fund 2, 000, 000, 000.00
Down payment of interest yield of the FNM SR bond 166, 445, 787.06
Down payment of part of the principal 
of the bond for half- year 240, 000, 000.00
ZVS Dubnica - down payment of principal 20, 338, 301.40
ZVS Dubnica - dawn payment of interest on the loan 4 ,912, 438.36
Interest yield on the bond — taxation 96, 588, 333.00
Total taxes for interest yields for first half of 1996 46, 417, 784.00
Debts on behalf of ZSNP ( FNM SR guarantee) 362, 709, 000.00
DMD Holding — equity deposit, increased equity 2, 610, 000, 000.00
For promotion of MTZ SPort 225, 100, 000.00
AGROBANKA Prague — transferee of KB 5 ,390 ,077.06
FNM SR bond (for debts of conv. companies) 277, 420, 636.80
Share of interest net for the FNM SR bond against 
KB for 2nd half-year 78, 770, 759.55
Down payment of part of FNM SR bond 
(through DMD Holding) 2 ,146, 050, 000.00
Redemption of part of principal of the bond 
(from term deposit) 400, 000, 000.00
Payment for interest yield through transferor 
of DMD Holding 23, 000, 000.00
Total financial outlays for 1996 8, 895, 877, 338.06
The financial means collected from small
privatisation were revenues of a special account
of MSPNM SR, which was not part of the State
Budget. The Act SNR no. 474/1990 of the
Collection of Laws, as later amended, defined the
following uses for these resources: 
¥ satisfaction of claims, that could not be
satisfied from the proceeds of the liquidation
of state enterprises;
¥ provision of financial payments to claimants,
subject to the Act no. 403/1990 of the
Collection of Laws, as later amended, on
mitigation of consequences of some property
related wrongs (ªsmall restitution" law) ; 
¥ financial provision of activities of privatisation
commissions;
¥ repayment of credits and severance pay which
could be proven as related to the operating
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Table 4 — A recap of the financial resources usage from a special account of MSPNM SR in 1997
Table 5 — A recap of the financial resources usage from a special account of MSPNM SR in 1998
Purpose of the use: Financial sum in SKK
Settlement of liabilities of state enterprise 
Kysuck Drevrske Zvody 164, 821, 000.00
SHDF - reimbursement of the term deposit 690, 000, 000.00
SHDF - reimbursement from repurchase 250, 000, 000.00
State Housing Development Fund (SHDF) 60, 000, 000.00
Raising equity of DMD Holding, a.s. 420, 000, 000.00
Development program - aircraft engine DV - 2 
(Povaìsk strojrne, a.s.) 61, 522, 452.16
Development program ªMTZ of the Slovak sport" 230, 000, 000.00
Development program 
— State Fund of Culture-Pro Slovakia 124, 500, 000.00
Development program — biotechnology, 
Ministry of Soil Management SR 105, 000 ,000.00
Tax transfer for 2-nd half of 1996 43 ,518 ,340.00
Tax transfer for 1-st half of 1997 18, 084 ,646.00
KB bond - principal (payment from REPO SP. a.s.) 240, 000, 000.00
KB bond - interest (payment from REPO SP, a.s.) 102 ,479, 359.08
ZVS Dubnica debt - principal, 
int. II. Q. (from REPO SP, a.s.) 11, 655 ,452.00
Total financial outlays for 1997 2 ,521, 581, 249.24
Purpose of the use: Financial sum in SKK
Ministry of Construction and Public Works 
— State housing development program 500, 000, 000.00
AUTO MARTIN, a.s., — Development projects 
of the automobile production in Martin 100, 000, 000.00
Payment of FNM SR bond yields for debts 
of converted enterprises 88, 136, 651.48
Total financial outlays for 1998 688, 136, 651.48
Source: FNM SR, 1999, own calculations M.E.S.A. 10a
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units transferred in the ownership of other
legal or physical persons;
¥ provision of financial compensation to those
subjects in respect of whom the enterprise had
been liable for faults at the time of the
liquidation of the enterprise;
¥ reimbursement of costs to support transfer of
state property, in compliance with the ªsmall
privatisation law" (427/1990 of the Collection
of Laws).
In accord with the Act no. 92/1991 of the
Collection of Laws, as later amended, the
resources were transferred from special account
of MSPNM SR to the account of the FNM
between 1993 and 1998, at a total volume of
SKK 12.1 billion in the following way:
1993: 7.0 billion SKK
1994: 0
1995: 1.0 billion SKK
1996: 3.0 billion SKK
1997: 0.5 billion SKK
1998: 0.6 billion SKK
In the period between 1991 until February 1996,
the FNM SR had narrowly defined possibilities to
use the resources (⁄ 28, par. 4 of the Act no.
92/1991 of the Collection of Laws, as later
amended), and only the amendment of the Act no.
56/1996 of the Collection of Laws extended the
use. The following table gives an overview of uses
for these resources:
As the above overviews show, the resources
gained from small privatisation have been
effected for the very purposes, defined in 1994. In
most cases, they concern so-called recovery
processes in the economy, which, however, did
not bring the desired effect. (A more detailed
assessment will be given in the chapter on the
FNM SR.) Only in a few cases, or only a small
portion of the resources was used also for the
pursuit of state interests in supporting health care,
culture, agriculture and housing development.
They were not used at all to support and develop
small and medium-size businesses. 
In connection with the use of proceeds 
of small privatisation we need to note that subject
to provisions of the law governing the use of
fundÕs assets, an amount of SKK 1,051.2 billion
was transferred to municipalities over the course
of the years 1993, 1994 and 1999, as a 25% share
in the overall net proceeds of the sale of OUs,
which were in the founding jurisdiction of
municipalities and authorities of local state
administration in individual districts.
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4.1 CHARACTERISTICS
Large-scale privatisation has always been
considered a more challenging part - as to its
technical, organisational aspects, and, last, but not
least, as to the volume of property. With
simplification, people referred to it as the
privatisation of large enterprises. In the right sense
of the word, it was a transfer of property that had
to be clearly and accurately documented through
privatisation projects. The questions of its potential
to raise capital for the development, to ensure
competent management, and in many cases, also
new production program, were also being
highlighted. It was and still is "large" privatisation.
In large-scale privatisation were included all
state enterprises and other state organisations,
such as budgetary and contributory, (which the
law commonly denotes using a generic term
"enterprise"), ownership interest in business of
legal persons, which for this purpose had been put
on the lists, approved by the Government as early
as in 1991. To make the process of large
privatisation smooth and flexible, it was divided
into two waves, with accompanying division of
enterprises into two groups. 
4.2 PRIVATISATION METHODS
In the process of large privatisation standard
methods, a non-standard method and a
combination of a standard and non-standard
method have been used. 
4.2.1 Standard methods
We call them standard because they have been
tested and commonly applied in the world. In most
cases and under normal conditions, they are
characterised by transparency, possibility of gaining
maximum financial effect, possibility to attract
foreign capital, openness to a wide circle of bidders,
and by availability of the same information to all,
equal conditions applicable to all and a necessity to
be carried out in a way which would pursue the
principles of free and fair competition. 
In the process of privatisation following
methods have been and still are being used: 
¥ direct sale (to a pre-designated bidder),
¥ public auction,
¥ public tender.
The selection of a particular method depended
and will still depend upon the intend pursued by
privatisation. Each method possesses its own
specific features. 
4.2.1.1 Direct sale
Direct sale to a pre-designated bidder is such a
form of selling property or a stake, in which sale
is effected on the basis of approval of a
privatisation project by the Government or on the
basis of a decision on privatisation. The very title
of the method conjured up distrust against its
features, which are: high risk of non-transparency
and a low measure of competition. 
For the process of privatisation a principle was
adopted to use this method in the beginnings (we
mean the beginning of privatisation) when there
is not a potential bidder interested in the
privatisation of the given property or enterprise,
using other standard methods. In many cases, this
method has turned into a kind of simplified
system of public tender (submission of competing
projects). It is also evidenced from the material
which was approved and put in practice at
MSPNM SR early in 1992. The methodological
guidelines titled the Rules of procedure in
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selecting partners in the process of large
privatisation were published in the Bulletin of
MSPNM SR no. 1/92 and contained the
assessment criteria for competing projects. 
The method was also applied in cases where the
restitution claimant applied to buy the remaining
part of property, where there was favourable bid
for an entity facing liquidation, or where the sale
concerned small enterprises, or parts thereof, by
employees, or the management in those cases,
where the organisation of other standard methods
would be inefficient. 
An important principle in applying the method
was "setting" the market price in the privatisation
process, in addition to the acquisition price
proposed by the bidder. (This principle, however,
was not upheld in the whole process.) As this
method has its weaknesses as well, which relate
particularly to its non-tranSParency and a
potential for political abuse, and since it ranks
among non-standards methods, it was used very
purposefully by individual Governments.
4.2.1.2 Public auction
A public auction within the process of large
privatisation is a sale of state-owned property
privatised in a public way, at a set date, to 
a non-specified number of bidders. These bidders,
however, have to satisfy conditions which are
defined for participation in a public auction. The
bidders advance their price bids, while the initial
price is equal to the net book value of the
property. The property designated for sale will be
sold by a gavelling of the auctioneer to the
auction bidder offering highest price. 
This competitive method is applied exclusively
in those cases, where the price is one of the most
important privatisation parameters, i.e., when
maximum financial effect is sought. The benefit
of the method is its relatively unchallenging
realisation and speed. A certain disadvantage is in
the possibility to use only one criterion, the price. 
Auctions have been the least frequently used
method in large-scale privatisation. One of the
reasons why they could not be employed in the
sale of large enterprises was the payment of the
auction price within 30 days from the date of the
auction (without a possibility to use payment by
instalments). This reason was also one of the
major problems deciding whether the method
would be used or not in any particular case. 
4.2.1.3 Public tender
The method of public tender is thought 
to be the most transparent and also most
advantageous method, offering competition and
access to a broad circle of entrants. 
The basic principles of public tendering include:
¥ the duty for all participants to follow generally
binding legal regulations in its implementation,
¥ a need to access the same information and
provide equal conditions to all entrants, 
¥ selection of the most suitable bid is done while
upholding the principles of free and fair
competition and equal treatment of all bidders. 
The sale of enterprises by this method has two
stages: 
Before the tender is called, conditions and
criteria of the competition are determined, unless
they are given in the decision on privatisation, 
and at the same time, weight for individual criteria 
is proposed; particulars are given on the
appointment of members of the commission for
recommending the most adequate bid, elaboration
of the "information memorandum" as the basic
source of information on the enterprise or a part
thereof, intended to be sold, including the
information on the enterprise, instructions on
procedures in submitting competitive bids, sample
contract for conclusion of future contract, criteria
and their weight, the appendices, announcement
of tender through a classified advertisement
published in at least two national dailies.
After the tender has been called, arrangements
are made to hand over information memoranda to
the entrants interested in taking part in the tender,
under the terms given in the advertisement calling
the tender; to organise exhibition of the property
to be sold for the bidders; to collect bids; to hold
the session of the commission for recommending
the most appropriate bid and evaluating
satisfaction ofthe terms against the set criteria; to
prepare materials necessary for the bodies that will
make the decision about the result of the tender;
and to announce the result to all bidders. 
4.2.2 Non-standard methods
Voucher privatisation was a non-standard
method of privatisation which was applied in our
country. Under non-standard methods there are
non-existent market institutions, the price
structure is distorted, the function of money is
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restricted, the legal prerequisites are inadequate,
etc. These methods are specifically "tailored" to
particular conditions of a given state. 
The basic idea of the voucher privatisation was
the transformation of a substantial portion of
state-owned enterprises in joint stock companies
and a gratuitous handing over of their shares to
population in return for no money, but rather so-
called investment vouchers. This method was 
opted for mainly on the grounds of its speed øand
low capital intensity.
The most respected principle in the voucher
privatisation was that of equal conditions and, to
a lesser extent, equality in property distribution. It
did not create scope for corruption. (Despite this,
even voucher privatisation was associated with
corruption and incorrect conduct but not directly
in the process of distributing property but in 
the accompanying processes, such as, the
management of property). 
Each participant got 1000 points and he could
apply them in relation to each privatised
company. Nobody knew in advance what the
demand for shares will be of individual joint
stock companies, equally, nobody knew what
their actual market value will be. Thus it was not
possible to gain, in any way, a more privileged
position. 
4.3 THE PRIVATISATION
PROJECT
The transfer of the property is effected either
according to an approved privatisation project 
of the enterprise concerned, or an approved
privatisation project of the property interest of the
state in business activity. The privatisation project
of a company, as an operative instrument of
denationalisation and privatisation, is a sum of
economic, technical, property, time and other
data. MSPNM SR produced a sample privatisation
project. 
The institutor (founder) is responsible for the
elaboration and completion of privatisation
projects. As a rule, the to-be privatised company
prepares the draft privatisation project. It can also
be prepared by another subject. In that case, the
company concerned has to take a stance. 
The institutor could also opt to impose
elaboration of the draft privatisation project on
the company. The draft privatisation project must
be debated with the companyÕs trade union
organisation. 
The institutor evaluates privatisation projects
and, without unnecessary delay, submits them to
MSPNM SR, together with its stance. The
ministry approves the projects and publicises
them in daily press, special publications
designated for the purpose, on television. In those
events where enterprises or parts thereof, were
sold directly, without a public tender or a public
auction, the privatisation projects were approved
by the Government. 
4.4 THE FIRST WAVE 
OF PRIVATISATION 
The first wave of privatisation was
characterised primarily by the application 
of the non-standard method. We can also call it
the wave of voucher privatisation. Subject to the
Large-scale Privatisation Act, the privatisation
wave was defined as a time interval, the
beginning and the end of which was set by the
Federal Ministry of Finance, and during which,
owners of investment vouchers may either
directly, or through investment privatisation
funds, apply their right to buy shares. 
4.4.1 The principles for making lists
of companies earmarked for
privatisation 
The first wave of privatisation began in 1991
and its framework was stipulated in the
Government principles for making draft lists of
companies and ownership interests of the state
earmarked for privatisation (further referred to as
"Principles") of June 1991, which were approved
on the basis of the provisions of the so-called
"large" privatisation law. The principles included
also the periods within which lists were to be
submitted to the Government and the periods
within which privatisation projects were to be
submitted to the relevant authorities. 
The basic principles included:
¥ the principle according to which the lists also
included the enterprises whose operating units
were subject of small privatisation, 
¥ the principle according to which the lists did
not include enterprises proposed by the
institutor for liquidation,
¥ the principle of identifying those enterprises in
which it would be desirable that, after
transformation, the state should keep full or
decisive control, while giving reason for it, 
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¥ the principle of identifying those enterprises
that were in charge of providing material and
mobilisation reserves,
¥ the principle of identifying the basic data the list
should contain (e.g. stipulation of the property
that could not be privatised, stipulation of the
percentage share of property that should be
privatised through investment vouchers, and the
data about the wave of privatisation in which
the company should be included). 
In inclusions of enterprises for individual
waves of privatisation, heed had be made
particularly of the size of the company and the
price of the privatised property, the possibility of
restitution claims lodged by authorised claimants,
territorial distribution , as well as the branch
structure. 
In order to raise the assets of the Restitution
Investment Fund (RIF) a principle was adopted to
set aside 3% of each enterprise proposed for
privatisation for this fund that would then satisfy
restitution claims, with the exception of potential
participation of foreign capital. In the timetable of
terms for submitting the lists of companies and
ownership interests of the state, most important
were the deadlines for submitting privatisation
projects to MSPNM SR or the Government,
namely, 30 November 1991 in respect of the first
wave of voucher privatisation, and July, 31 1992,
for the second wave of voucher privatisation. This
denotation began to be used with respect of
voucher privatisation although they were meant to
cover broader definition, i.e., also use of standard
methods.
Another important principle was to quantify the
volume of assets to be offered in voucher
privatisation, which could be defined using the
form of balance method. This relied in expressing
the value of the enterprise assets according to the
data recorded in statements of accounts, with the
price of land added to it. In the event of a
particular foreign investor showing interest to
enter, it was necessary to enclose an ad valorem
appraisal of the assets, using the so-called market
method. (A precondition for inclusion of an
enterprise in the list of companies earmarked for
direct sale to foreign investor, was submitting a
letter of intent concluded with foreign investor.)  
In order to ensure time, substantive, and
organisational schedule for the first wave of
privatisation, it was also important to specify the
volume of assets designated for privatisation by
the following terms: by August, 31 1991 for the
first and by April, 30 1992, for the second wave. 
The enterprises which did not manage to develop
a realistic co-operation with a potential foreign
investor, or which were not included in the list for
sale to a foreign investor by their institutor, were
streamlined for voucher sales, with at least 30% of
their equity capital. 
4.4.2 The time course 
and the results
To guide the process of large privatisation, on
August, 13 1991, the Government approved the
lists of companies and state ownership interests
included in the first and second waves of
privatisation. The list show that for the first wave
736 companies were selected. A more detailed
specification of October, 4 1991 sets the number
of companies included in the first wave at 751
companies and the value of state ownership
interest at 166.5 billion Czechoslovak crowns,
with the property value of 101.5 billion crowns
earmarked for the voucher privatisation. MSPNM
SR began evaluating the privatisation projects on
5 December 1991.
We will deal with the evaluation of the voucher
method of privatisation in chapter 4.4.3. 
Over the course of the first half of 1992, 181
privatisation projects were approved by the
Government for direct sale to a pre-designated
bidder. As this was a non-competitive form of the
standard method, there was a mechanism in place
at MSPNM SR, which turned this method of
privatisation into a simplified system of public
competition. The simplified method of public
competition contained four principles: 
¥ The principle of free access to the competition
was made possible by allowing each domestic
and foreign entrant, at a set and publicly
announced date, to submit a privatisation
project for direct a sale. The list of companies
on which privatisation projects could be
submitted was made public in advance. 
¥ The second principle was the principle 
of unified and transparent criteria. In early part
of 1992 methodological regulations were
approved at MSPNM SR, titled The Rules of
procedure in selecting partners in the process of
large privatisation. These methodological
guidelines were published in MSPNM SR
bulletin no. 1/92 and contained the criteria for
evaluation of competing privatisation projects.
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There were eleven of them, the most important
of them being the price, investment
commitments, employment commitments,
vocational schools commitments, commitments
related to environment, feasibility, and evidence
of financial coverage and others. 
¥ The third principle was the adoption of so-
called privatisation protocols. Those workers
that evaluated the projects had to sign their
selection in witness of their compliance with
these binding criteria. Their superiors, too,
(section directors, deputy ministers, and also
the minister) had to confirm with their
signature  they had checked compliance with
the criteria and bear responsibility for the
selection made by their subordinates. 
¥ The fourth principle was an obligation to set so-
called market price and express it as a figure. In
September 1991, the Expert appraisal and
assessment standard for the needs of
conveyancing state property to other persons
was adopted, in accordance with the Act no.
92/1991 of the Collection of Laws in the process
of large privatisation. A list of firms authorised
to determine the market price for privatised
companies was also approved and each applicant
in privatisation had to present a document, as
part of privatisation project, that would confirm
that market price was determined. In this way
effort was made to preclude sale for a lower than
the balance sheet value. 
In June 1992, Parliamentary election was held
that changed the Government, bringing with it
also a change in the concept of privatisation.
After June 1992, there remained still 182
unresolved privatisation projects at MSPNM SR,
of which 131 were proposed for standard
methods, mostly not processed due to
deficiencies or incomplete privatisation projects
(mainly in the area of furnishing proof of the way
property had been acquired by the state). 
A new concept was adopted in September
1992, diverging from the original one in the
following ways: 
¥ the voucher method was deemed to be marginal,
¥ standard methods got priority,
¥ powers of founding ministries were strengthened,
¥ in standard methods, a commitment was
declared to use competitive methods and
increase transparency,
¥ readiness of the Government to privatise for
the benefit of attested management,
¥ an effort to restructure companies before their
privatisation ,
¥ speed was no longer emphasised,
¥ the weight of price was reduced and the weight
of investment and employment commitments
was highlighted,
¥ softening of conditions in sales of property by
instalments, when first down payment was
reduced from 30 percent of the purchase price
to 10 - 15 percent, and the period of repayment
was extended from 5 to 10 years, 
¥ possibility to tackle the dubious property 
at the expense of equity capital,
¥ mandatory and common deadlines for
submissions of basic and competing projects
were abolished. 
Just as the beginnings of privatisation process
had critics, so did this concept. The slowing down
of privatisation as a result of the new concept was
pointed out, which proved fully true. On the
whole, the period from June 1992 until March
1994 has been characterised as a period of
stagnation in the process of privatisation. 
The results of the first wave of privatisation,
which took place in the years 1991 - 1993, are
illustrated in the Overview of the overall number
of enterprises and the volume of privatised
property in the first wave of privatisation, which
states that the assets of 678 companies of an
overall value of SKK 169.1 billion was
privatised. 
4.4.3 Voucher privatisation
The first wave of large-scale privatisation was
characterised mainly by the non-standard method
of voucher privatisation. Standard methods were
used to a lesser extent.
The voucher privatisation was expected to
solve the problems of scarcity of capital in
relation to the volume of property offered in
privatisation, to ensure a speedy privatisation
with an emphasis of compensating citizens
through handing out shares free of charge, to
enable acceleration of the rise of the capital
market, and to increase the knowledge of the
population about securities and institutions of the
capital market. In addition, the voucher
privatisation was expected to create a positive
attitude of citizens towards the privatisation
process and, last, but not least, it was intended to
preclude in a systemic way, the corruption of the
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state apparatus and privatisation along party lines.
Since the method had never been successfully
tested, it was actually an experiment. Its weak
aspects included high measure of fragmentation
of the property, a large number of shareholders,
with the ensuing nameless ownership and abuse
by investment privatisation funds. We also need
to note that the voucher privatisation was
favoured always in respect of those state
enterprises, whose management did not have a
clear idea about privatisation by standard
methods by the date privatisation projects had to
be submitted. 
The specificity of the methods lies in a speedy
and massive transformation of designated
enterprises or parts thereof from state ownership
in the hands of population. Regardless of
financial or other status, each adult citizen could
on payment of a symbolic manipulation charge
(1000+ 35 crowns) become holder of a voucher
book. On the basis of market mechanism, in
individual rounds, the vouchers could be
exchanged for shares of particular enterprises,
either directly or through privatisation funds .
The voucher privatisation was conceived at the
federal level. It was decided that it would be run
in two waves, which corresponded to two waves
of large privatisation. Equally, a decision was
made to make the Federal Ministry of Finance
(FMF) responsible for the demand side of
voucher privatisation while ministries for
privatisation of the republics were made
responsible for the supply-side of the voucher
privatisation.
The core of the market mechanism, according
to which individual vouchers worth of the given
number of points were exchanged for shares,
were privatisation rounds having the following
four phases: 
¥ announcing the exchange rate of shares 
of individual joint stock companies offered in
the relevant privatisation round for sale for
investment vouchers,
¥ ordering shares,
¥ collecting and assessing orders,
¥ assessing and announcing the results 
of the privatisation round.
The FMF assessed the results applying 
the following principles: 
¥ where the aggregate demand for shares did not
exceed the aggregate supply, all orders of
shares were satisfied; 
¥ where the aggregate demand for shares
exceeded the aggregate supply by more than
25%, no order of shares was satisfied; 
¥ unless the aggregate demand for shares
exceeded the aggregate supply by more than
25%, the FMF could decide, that the orders
made by investment funds would be satisfied
only partially, relative to the volume of orders
made by individual investment funds. The
investment points corresponding to the
decrease could be used by the investment
privatisation fund concerned in the next
privatisation rounds;
¥ where orders of shares could not be satisfied in
any of the above ways, the FMF decided that
none of the orders was satisfied and these
shares were again offered in the next round. At
the same time, it set new exchange rates and
ensured their publication. The ministry, too,
depending on the development of demand and
supply, could decide on ending the sale of
shares within a given privatisation round. 
Subject to the decree no. 443 of August, 13 1991,
the Government of the SR, with comments,
approved the lists of enterprises and ownership
interests of the state included in the first and second
wave of privatisation, and assigned ministers and
other heads of central bodies to make the lists more
accurate in co-operation with the Minister for
Administration and Privatisation of National
Property. The deadline for approval of privatisation
projects for enterprises of the first wave of
privatisation using voucher method set by MSPNM
was April, 11 1992. Although the registrations of
citizens were in progress from November, 1 1991,
the first wave itself began on May, 14 1992 and was
completed by the end of 1992. 
The FNM SR earmarked assets of 484 joint
stock companies worth KS 90,111,742,000 for
voucher privatisation, while the FNM CR
earmarked 943 join stock companies worth KS
206, 424, 419, 000. In Slovakia, 2, 579, 327
citizens lawfully registered (in CR, 5, 942, 851
citizens). Thus, there were assets worth KS 34,
796 in net book value per one holder of
investment vouchers. 
What was the actual market value per holder of
investment vouchers? According to the analysis
conducted by M.E.S.A 10, assessing the average
acquisition rates of the selected enterprises in
individual privatisation rounds and their average
rates in Prague and Bratislava off-exchange RM-
System, the ratio of the average shareÕs market
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price and its corresponding accounting value was
60.5% in Czech Republic and 35.2 % in the
Slovak Republic. That means that the average
citizen participating in the first wave of
privatisation acquired assets of the market value 
of KS 18,400. 
4.4.3.1 Voucher privatisation and
investment funds
In the year 1992, 169 investment privatisation
funds were established for the first wave of voucher
privatisation. Owing to the confidence of citizens,
the investment funds acquired shares in the nominal
value of around SKK 55 billion, i.e., 70% of the
property privatised by voucher privatisation, which
represented a significant economic power within
the distribution of ownership rights among scores
of small shareholders. 
Accordingly, there was a relatively high risk of
abuse on the part of investment funds, which could
be set up with the aim of speculation or fraud. This
risk may be reduced by good laws for the given
area, or by exercising state oversight on the part of
the Ministry of Finance. Let us give an illustration:
It concerns the second largest investment fund
of the first wave of voucher privatisation in the SR
- Prv Slovensk Investin Privatizan
SpolonosØ Bansk Bystrica (PSIPS: First Slovak
Investment Privatisation Company Bansk
Bystrica). This fund attracted 190 thousand
investment voucher holders, primarily from
among the ranks of pensioners by promising them
to buy out shares which the investment vouchers
holders would acquire on the basis of investing of
the whole voucher book, within one year for 
a sum of 20 000 crowns. Already this promise,
which was not feasible when massively applied,
(at the same time the highest among all funds)
should alert the Ministry of Finance to be more
cautious in supervising the activity of this fund
and its manager. It was not the case, and it was
only on the basis of a control made on July, 11-15
1994, that the MF SR issued a decision to suspend
IF PSIPS from handling property and place it in
receivership. The controls revealed that the
founder of IPF unlawfully billed a reward of
more than SKK 125 million for the management
of assets, and there was a faulty reward
accounted for the management of the fund in the
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First wave of privatisation No of enterprises Assets (mill. SKK)
Enterprises entering privatisation 678 169, 097
Privatisation outputs 1,010 169, 097
Of which:
- assets sale 330 12, 428
- gratuitous transfer 116 2,086
- restitution 7 19
- assets placed in joint stock companies 557 154, 564
of which:
- own equity capital of the joint stock companies 154, 564
of which: basic equity capital 134, 705
contingency and other funds 19, 859
Distribution of stocks in joint stock companies 
- stocks sold by standard methods 3,419
- stocks sold in voucher privatisation 79, 572
- stocks allocated to satisfy restitution 
claims (RIF allocation) 3,797
- stocks in FNM SR portfolio 47, 737
Table 6 — An overview of total number of enterprises (outputs) and the volume of privatised assets in the first wave
of privatisation
Source: MSPNM SR, 1999
year 1993. The fund also paid unlawfully
liabilities of the founder in respect of other
subjects as well.1
The representatives of the economic forces,
formed as a result of voucher privatisation in
investment funds, comprised so-called "new
structures". They were mostly young, market-
oriented people, unburdened with the old regime.
They had to wage a power struggle with the "old
structures", i.e., elements comprising mostly
senior management cadres of the socialist era,
who remained in their positions even after 1989.
Today they are associated in the Association of
Employer Unions and Associations. It is logical
that these components were directly opposing 
the voucher privatisation, which was motivated
by their reluctance to hand over assets they
controlled to any other method, over which they
could not exercise direct control. Vladimr
Meiar, then only an in-coming politician with a
populist rhetoric, gained immediately their
support, as he was speaking up against it ever
since 1991 and also against the participation of
foreign investors (and against the Lustration Act). 
He became their main ally against new structures.
4.4.3.2 Further fate of voucher
privatisation in Slovakia
The victory of Vladimr Meiar and his allies in
Slovakia in the election of June 1992 brought
radical change in the concept of privatisation.
While in the Czech Republic the privatisation
process continued essentially according to the
former rules, in the Slovak Republic, following
split of SFR, a significantly different development
took place. In September 1992, the Government of
the SR approved a new concept of privatisation
which was based, to a large extent, on denying the
hitherto development. The voucher privatisation
was thought to be of marginal importance, with a
greater emphasis on standard methods and
increased powers of sectoral ministries and
branches in the privatisation process.
After Meiar Government was removed in
March 1994, the Government of J.Moravk
again set privatisation process in motion along
similar mechanism as was the case until June
1992. The process of approving direct sales was
accelerated, the preparation of the second wave of
voucher privatisation began.
The registration of citizens for the second wave of
voucher privatisation began on September, 1 1994.
In Slovakia, 3,428,419 citizens registered, which was
1.33 - times the number of those registered for the
first wave. The out-going Moravk Government
announced the beginning of the preliminary round
for 15 December 1994. This was cancelled by the
new Meiar Government. That was the end of the
voucher privatisation in Slovakia. 
A definite end of voucher privatisation,
however, occurred in 1995 when the laws were
passed about its abolition and about restricting the
proportion of the property of investment
companies and the IPF to 10% in one company.
Together with setting the minimum amount 
of equity capital in an investment company at 
20 million crowns and reducing fees for 
fund administration by 50%, a process of
transformation of managed funds into self-
governing ones and abolishing investment
companies began. At the same time, collective
investment in Slovakia was hampered, which the
very voucher privatisation was to encourage. 
There is no doubt that the voucher privatisation
had a number of benefits. Despite this, there are
many critics even among renown economists,
such as Jeffrey Sachs, who said in relation to the
evaluation of ten years since first economic
reforms in our country were launched: "if any of
us now was to decide what to do, I guess he
would not find support for voucher method of
privatisation. There are several reasons for it.
First, I would not push forward handing out
enterprises in the form of vouchers, but 
I would rather sell them directly. Equally, 
I would not feel an urgent need to privatise all at
once, as was the case in 1990 when 
we thought it was necessary to tackle it as quickly
as possible. As it turned out later, the risk was
often greater then the actual benefit. The voucher
privatisation was an experiment and the
Government took little care of the possibility of
abuse, which occurred right from the beginning."2
The voucher privatisation may nevertheless be
assessed as successful noting that it achieved its
objectives: a substantial volume of assets was
transferred in a non-challenging and speedy
method, at a decreased risk of corruption; the
capital market and collective investment were
started and developed; a massive participation of
population was secured whose knowledge about
securities was deepened. Its failure proclaimed
was not in the method as such but in privatisation
as a whole. In a privatisation, which was 
launched on insecure pillars of an unfinished
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institutionalised framework. (We have discussed
this subject in more detail inchapter 1.4, The
place and the assessment of privatisation in the
transformation process.) 
4.5 THE SECOND WAVE 
OF PRIVATISATION 
The second wave of large privatisation started
in September 1993 and was intended to finish 
in 1996. Several essential changes were
characteristic of the second wave. Since they are
tied to particular periods we divided the second
wave into several stages. 
In the year 1993 the privatisation process
slowed down (2% of the total assets designated for
privatisation were privatised). The slowdown was
due to lack of assertiveness of the Government in
decision making about the methods to be used, as
well as the responsibilities distribution between
MSPNM SR and the FNM SR, although in the
concept, priority was clearly given to standard
methods over non-standard methods, and
strengthening of domestic business stratum, thus
discriminating foreign investors. This stage can be
called a stage of stagnation.
The year 1994, particularly the period between
February and March, 14 was just the opposite of
stagnation - it was a period of wild privatisation,
of approvals of projects regardless of compliance
with agreed principles stated in the approved
concept. Despite the existence of the institute of
the so-called working groups, in which were
representatives of individual sections of
MSPNM, the founder, OU, and other
representatives, the number of direct sales rose,
without proposals being discussed in the working
group. On the direct order of the former state
secretary of the ministry (which at that time did
not have the minister) proposals for direct sales
were submitted to the Government and were
approved by the Government in favour of bidders
that he himself designated.
The privatisation process in each period was
under the scrutiny of the public and the media. It
was not otherwise in this period as well, but the
criticism raised on individual cases of this period
did not find response in the parliament and the
media. The actors involved in giving away the
property were not punished in any way. 
Within this short period, the Government
approved 44 privatisation projects. It is worth
noting that despite the vote of non confidence to
the Government of V.Meiar on March, 11 1994,
the Government ignored this act and continued
approving privatisation projects until March, 14.
The period between March, 16 and November
1994 is characterised by the coming in office of
the Government of J. Moravk, which introduced
in the privatisation process efforts to make it
quicker and more transparent, and by the adoption
of decision about the preparation of the second
wave of voucher privatisation. However, many
new problems arose as well. These related mainly
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Table 7 — Output classification by individual methods applied in the first wave of privatisation 
Privatisation method Proportion Proportion
of total numberof
total of outputs (%) assets (%)
assets sales by standard methods 32.7 7.3
gratuitous transfer of assets 11.5 1.2
assets in joint stock 55.1 91.4
physical returning of the assets 0.7 0.1
of which:
distribution of stocks in joint stock companies
- sale of stocks by standard methods 2.5
- permanent and temporary participation of the FNM SR,
including the original offer for voucher privatisation 94.6
- others ( RIF allocation, gratuitous transfer) 2.9
Source: MSPNM SR, 1999
to the diversity of political parties represented in
the Government, which brought about mutual
distrust and thus also increased mutual control,
but on the other hand also restraints and
slowdown of the course of privatisation. 
In this period, practices began to be applied of
incoming new Government cabinets of exposing
previous decisions about privatisation to control
and after finding violation of the law, abolishing
them or abolishing them even without such
findings (in this period 13 violations of the law
had been found). The contravention of the law
was proved mainly in giving inadequate
preference to the buyer. Following were the cases
when privatisation was cancelled: ºOS Vrtky,
ºOS Trnava, Slovensk automobilov doprava
Povaìsk Bystrica, Hubert Sere, Msovø
priemysel Humenn, Polygrafick zvody
Trnava, Vno Koäice, Slovensk lieebn kpele
PieäØany, Vydavate…stvo Tatran Bratislava,
Skloobal Nemäov, Mlyn Pohronskø Ruskov,
Vøskumnø stav jadrovøch elektrrn Trnava,
Zdroj Bansk Bystrica, odätepnø zvod Prievidza
(Government decree No. 283 of March, 29 1994).
The period after 1994 election, namely starting
from November, brought a new dimension into
the process -an amendment was passed according
to which the responsibility in decision making
about direct sales was transferred to the 
FNM SR. The ruling coalition composed of 
the representatives of the Movement For 
A Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), the Slovak
National Party (SNS) and the Workers Party 
of Slovakia (ZRS) nominated solely their
representatives to the bodies of the fund.
This stage can be also termed as a stage 
of the loss of state control over privatisation. The
exercise of supervision over legality in
privatisation by the bodies of prosecution was
made impossible, the ruling coalition "fabricated"
anonymous owners (by introducing unregistered
stock) and permitted uncontrolled handling of the
state property. It is a period of coming into office
or, rather, returning in office of the third Meiar
Government, which can aptly be denoted as a
wild "help-yourselfisation". This state, in which
property was handed out for very law, even
symbolic prices and this all for the benefit of
Government parties proponents or directly party
colleagues, lasted until the end of 1997. The
ruling coalition was thus acquiring greater
economic power. In order to augment it still, the
ruling coalition abolished the second wave of
voucher privatisation in 1995 and replaced it with
the so-called bond method (chapter 5). This gave
them even easier access to the property, excluding
the possibility for other potential investors,
including foreign ones, to participate.
Just as foreign investors, the employees 
of privatised enterprises too, could only be
involved in the process in a limited scope. 
The Principles for participation of workers in the
privatisation of enterprises in which they work,
adopted by the Government, as well as the
amendment of the Large Privatisation Act were
intended to ensure employee participation in
privatisation. In the decision on privatisation, the
transferee could beimposed an obligation to
ensure this participation by the issue of employee
shares or enabling employees to acquire at least
34% of the privatised assets. Since this was not an
obligation stipulated by law but only a possibility,
the intention has not fulfilled the expectation,
particularly on the part of employees. (This fact
has been vivid until today. Many of those who are
concerned, feel to be cheated and damaged by the
privatisation process.) 
Within the period of wild "help yourselfisation",
the year 1996 is of significance - also because the
Government and the FNM announced the date of
completion of privatisation for the end of the first
half of the year 1996. The growing disputes within
the ruling coalition, however, resulted in the FNM
not adopting any privatisation decisions between
the end of February 1996 and August 1996.
Starting from August the tempo of privatisation
decisions approvals was stepped up. 
The year 1996 continued to be a time of
favouritism given to narrow groups closely tied to
the ruling coalition. Contrary to 1995, the
information leakage about the background of
privatisation process was more frequent, as were
leaks about the disputes within, the political
background, family relatives, and also direct
involvement of some parliament members and
other high-ranking party members, in the
privatisation process.
The favouritism in relation to transferees on the
part of the FNM  was evident also in setting
purchase prices and terms of payment. While in
the first wave of privatisation the base for
determining the price was the expert appraisal
and the market price, which could not get under
the balance appraisal, in the second wave, the
price was subject to agreement between the Fund
and the transferee and was often considerably
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lower than the balance appraisal. As for terms of
payment, while in the first wave, the first
instalment comprised 20% of the purchase price,
with the maturity of up to five years for the
remainder of the purchase price, in the second
wave, the first payment in many cases was at the
level of 5-10% of the purchase price, with the
maturity of the remainder of up to ten years. A
possibility to have as much as 50% of the
purchase price deducted in the event of
investment, was a large advantage. 
Many foreign institutions - the European
Commission, the OECD, the International
Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the European
Development Bank - have principally agreed in
their evaluation of the privatisation process when
they alerted the danger of privatising to the benefit
of enterprise management. Simultaneously they
alerted the need for greater transparency which
would give room also to foreign investors. 
The new owners in a privatised firm carried out
in the above described way could not bring the
necessary capital. The methods employed (the
purchase price paid in instalments, indirectly
through the enterprise itself) could not provide
the necessary restructuring of the companies. 
In 1996, the largest "help-yourselfisations" on
the privatisation scene took place, when a 45.9-
percent stake of Nafta-Gbely ( oil storage firm)
was sold for SKK 500 million to an unknown
company, Druh Obchodn. In this sale, the
FNM lost at least SKK 2.7 billion . Another major
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Second wave of privatisation Number Assets 
of enterprises (mill. SKK)
Enterprises entering privatisation 610 136,804
Privatisation outputs 1 ,366 136,804
of which:
- assets sales by standard methods 813 52, 226
of which:
- direct sales 645 45, 072
- public tender 155 7,140
- public auction 13 14
- gratuitous transfer of assets (to municipalities, SPF, funds) 303 2,822
- physical returning of assets 16 22
- assets placed in joint stock 
(returning of state ownership interest) 234 81, 734
Of which:
- equity capital of joint stock. 70, 933
Distribution of stocks in joint stock companies
- assets sales by standard methods 36, 041
Of which:
- direct sale 34, 801
- public tender 1,240
- permanent and temporary participation of the FNM SR, 
including the original offer for voucher privatisation 30 ,317
- gratuitous transfer of shares (to municipalities, SPF, funds) 2,414
- allocation for the RIF 2,161
Source: MSPNM SR, 1999
Table 8 — An overview of the total number of enterprises (outputs) and the volume of privatised assets in the second
wave of privatisation, as of 30 November 1996
scandal was the sale of the most lucrative and
most renown Slovak Spa PieäØany. A 51-percent
stake was sold to an employee joint stock
company, the Company of Spa PieäØany
Employees (Slovak abbreviation: SZPK). The
purchase price was SKK 302 million, with a
balance sheet value of SKK 1.6 billion. (For more
details, see the appendix, Privatisation affairs). 
In order that the above cases of "help-
yourselfisation" could take place it was necessary
to prepare the legislative groundwork. 
It concerned abolishing the mandatory
dematerialisation and subsequent introduction of
the institute of unregistered stock. The original
concept according to which the issuer decided
about the form of securities, was replaced with a
concept of absolutisation of dematerialised
registered form after Meiar Government (1995)
came in office. The purpose was to ensure the
ruling power to have an overview of shareholders
in all privatised companies through the state-
controlled Securities Centre. Over time, however,
the mandatory registered form of securities
encountered with the resistance from the newly
created privatisation groups, as it was not possible
to keep the actual ownersÕ identity secret of
questionably privatised property. Thus, in the end
of 1996, at the initiative of HZDS MPs, it was
successfully enacted that the mandatory
dematerialised form would not be applicable to
the shares that were not publicly traded, (such as
the shares of Druh Obchodn, in connection
with the privatisation of Nafta-Gbely). This made
the rise of the institute of unregistered stock
possible, according to which the ownership of
stock did not have to be compulsorily registered
in the Securities Centre, and the person delivering
the share to the general assembly meeting became
the owner. The number of companies and the
volume of privatised assets of the second wave of
privatisation (until 1996) is illustrated in the
following tables: 
The slump in the privatisation activity in 1997
was due to the finding of the Constitutional Court
of the SR, on the transfer of responsibility from
the FNM SR back to the Government. The
paradox of this period is that the amendment of the
law initiated by the ruling of the Constitutional
Court of the SR, was passed almost half a year
later (on June, 27 1997), the Government did not
make a single decision about any direct sale,
MSPNM SR was not selecting the transferees of
the assets. Everything continued in the previous
uncontrolled manner through the FNM SR.
The year 1997 was also characteristic with 
a growing measure of disadvantage of sales for
the FNM SR and a corresponding growing
measure of advantages for their new owners.
Privatisation along party lines continued together
with the direct involvement in privatisation of
party officials, their family relatives or otherwise
closely-related persons. Cases of revisions of
privatisation decisions appeared, aimed at
repeated sale to the same person but at a lower
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Privatisation method Proportion Proportion
of total number of total 
of outputs (%) assets
assets sales by standard methods 59.5 38.2
gratuitous transfer of assets 22.2 2.1
assets in joint stock 17.1 59.6 
physical returning of the assets 1.2 0.1
of which:
distribution of stocks in joint stock companies
- sale of stocks by standard methods 50.3
- permanent and temporary participation of the FNM SR,
including the original offer for voucher privatisation 42.7
- others ( RIF allocation , gratuitous transfer) 6.5
Table 9 — Output classification by individual methods applied in the second wave of privatisation, as of 30 November 1996
Source: MSPNM SR, 1999
price, with the purpose to involve persons close to
the management of the FNM SR and coalition
parties (such as the case of NAD Trenn, 
an automobile truck carrier). It was not possible
to camouflage the first "big case" direct sale to the
benefit of one of the leading FNM SR
representatives (the case of the mine Ba¸a
Zhorie). 
Public discontent was growing. One of the major
banks (IRB - the Investment and Development
Bank) collapsed. The responsibility for the collapse
is mainly placed with the group of companies
around VSº (East-Slovakian steel maker). The
FNM at that time owned a 35-percent stake and was
not taking action in exercising its shareholderÕs
rights. The number of individual cases of company
asset stripping was growing — as a consequence of
the way privatisation was effected and the number
of non-transparent ownership relations. In October
1997, a partial qualitative change occurred in
relation to the possibility of controlling the FNM,
when the parliament elected Ivan Mikoä, a
representative of the opposition, to the Supervisory
Board of the FNM. 
The privatisation in 1998 continued in the
fashion of preceding years, and was marked with
the impossibility to exercise control over it and a
lack of transparency. It was a year in which no
direct sales took place, and only a few gratuitous
transfers to municipalities. This year of
stagnation in privatisation was marked with the
preparation of autumn parliamentary elections but
was not spared of controversial moments. These
confirmed the existence of the cooperation of
privatisation actors to party top representatives.
The evidence was in the arguments advanced by
the opposition of the day which directly proved
some politicians guilty of theft and "asset
stripping" finances of the privatised assets
(privatisation of aluminium maker, ZSNP ºiar
nad Hronom, part of shares of oil refinery
Slovnaft, and unsuccessful privatisation of
Slovensk poisØov¸a,). 
4. 6 REDRESSING PRIVATISATION
ENCROACHMENTS
The intense discussion about the problem of
redressing the encroachments in privatisation,
which were initiated in the year 1997, culminated
in the year 1998, just before parliamentary
elections. Almost all parties seeking favour of the
electorate stated in their manifestos a
commitment to review the legality of
privatisation, with a possibility of reviewing
privatisation decisions in a way that would
eliminate state losses. After the new Government
came in office, the pre-election rhetoric of the
coalition grouping: the Slovak Democratic
Coalition (SDK), the Party of the Democratic
Left, (SD»,), the Party of Civic Understanding
(SOP), and the Party of Hungarian Coalition
(SMK) was also mirrored in the Government
Statement of Policy and began to be implemented
after the new management of the FNM took
office. "Re-privatisation of property is one
possible option" said Ladislav Sklenr, the
Chairman of the Executive Committee of the
Fund ( in Prca, 9 December 1998), "but only in
cases of the circumvention of the law, failure to
fulfil the terms of the contract, or failure to pay
instalments." Then the property can fall back to
the Fund. We need to ensure its administration
until we select - in a very transparent way,
through competition, - a new privatisation
participant", he added. 
An important role in redressing privatisation
encroachments was played by the legislative
conditions created for reviewing closed
privatisation contracts, potentially contesting
them and with a possibility of making them void,
and transfer the assets back into state ownership.
The amendment of the Act no. 17/1993 of the
Collection of Laws allowed review the contracts
of transfer of the property in state ownership or in
the ownership of the FNM.  
The FNM began the process of reviewing
privatisation decisions which resulted in the
analysis that defined the departure from the law at
the time of privatisation. On the whole, 900
contracts have been examined, in 186 cases
circumvention of the law has been found. The
public expected a swift and uncompromising
action by law enforcement bodies. Nothing
happened in this respect though. M. Machov, the
Minister for Privatisation, announced a rapidly
reduced number of questionable cases of
privatisation arising from formal defects that
could be eliminated on the basis of joint talks.
The information brought doubt and raised a
number of questions in the public. The material
submitted for the Government debate referred to
only 48 cases of challenging privatisation. The
material was withdrawn from the debate on the
grounds that it did not contain proposed solutions
or that solutions proposed were only very general.
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As the management of the Fund was removed
(the President and the Chairman of the Executive
Committee, for failing to tackle the Nafta-Gbely
problem), the Minister for Privatisation maintains
that the completion of the material will not take
long and the material will appear still in this year.
(Reviewing privatisation gets put off again, SME,
November, 18 1999). 
In the words of »udovt Kank, the former
FNM President, under whose leadership the
material was prepared, the reluctance of the
Government to debate the referred material as
soon as possible, is due to the Government
concerns over redressing privatisation because
there is not a good solution available in redress,
only bad and less bad solutions.3
Additionally, we need to note that the year 1999
will be definitely recorded in the history of the
process of privatisation as a year of redress of
privatisation encroachments. The results achieved
in the Nafta-Gbely-gate are indicative of it (a 45.9-
percent stake returned in the account of the FNM ),
as well as the backing out of the contracts with
majority shareholders of the spas - Dudince, Slia,
Kovov and Slovensk Lieebn Kpele
PieäØany, the chemicals maker Istrochem, a.s.
Bratislava, the jewellery company, Klenoty, a.s.,
the shoe maker, Obuv, a.s. Partiznske, and the
aluminium maker, ZSNP, a.sºiar nad Hronom. 
4.7 PRIVATISATION OUTLOOK
FOR THE YEAR 2000
In the view of the unfavourable situation
existing in the liquidity of the FNM recently, and
the commitment to pay citizens 34 billion SKK for
bonds as of 31 December 2000, the new
management of the FNM and MSPNM, on several
occasions have declared their commitment to
continue in the privatisation of the remaining
shares in the FNM portfolio over the course of the
year 1999. Individual steps, as well as materials by
the Government, suggested that strategic
companies would also be privatised (Slovensk
telekomunikcie, a.s.,) banks (Investin a
rozvojov banka, Slovensk sporite…¸a,
Väeobecn verov banka, a.s., , eskoslovensk
obchodn banka), and health care facilities. To
date, it has not been the case, not even in the case
of banks, despite the recommendations and
warnings from the World Bank, which can
probably be attributed to the Government
concerns to bear the risk associated with it.
Government officials and the FNM
representatives continue in their intention to step
up the pace of privatisation process and the year
2000 will have to be, in their opinion, the year of
privatisation. 
As Vladimr DvoÞek, the Section of the
Strategy Director of the FNM, stated for the
journal TREND (December 1, 1999), of 149 joint
stock companies the Fund has currently in its
portfolio, the FNM intend to privatise important
state ownership interests during the year 2000.
This will concern primarily the Bank of Slovakia,
where the process of privatisation is under way,
with an objective to sell a 60-percent stake of the
FNM by the end of next year. In December this
year (1999), according to V. DvoÞek, a financial
and legal advisor will be selected for the sale of
the bank. In addition, the salt making company
Solivary, a.s. Preäov, where the FNM owns a
majority stake at a nominal value of SKK 78
million, should be privatised in the first half of
2000. Another major interest to be sold in 2000, is
the majority stake in Slovensk Plavba a Prstavy,
a.s. Bratislava, [Slovak Shipping and Ports]. 
Subject to the recent amendment of the Act no.
92/1991, falling effective on September, 16 1999, it
is again the Government that shall decide about
privatisation of natural monopolies and some major
financial institutions. At the same time, privatisation
is restricted in the following manner: 
¥ forestry fund, railway transport routes, surface
and ground waters and the post shall not be
privatised;
¥ a 51-percent Governmental stake must be
retained in Slovenskø plynrenskø priemysel
[the Slovak Gas Industry], energy utilities,
crude oil transport company Transpetrol and
Slovensk elektrrne [the Slovak Electricity
Utility]; 
¥ the state shall retain a property stake without
specification in the Slovak insurance company
Slovensk poisØov¸a, and in Slovensk
telekomunikcie. 
In connection with natural monopolies,
privatisation of water and sewer utilities has
frequently been mentioned, part of which has
already taken place under current legislation , e.g.
in the whole Trenn District. The issue of
privatisation of other natural monopolies
(particularly of Slovak gas company SPP, the
Slovak power producer Slovensk elekrrne and
crude oil transport company Transpetrol)
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although resounding in public for quite some
time, still remains open. 
Considerable progress has been made in the
privatisation of a 51-percent stake of ST (Slovak
Telecommunications), when a tender was called
in late November 1999. According to J. Macejka,
the Minister for Posts and Telecommunications,
the sector is going to make every effort to
complete the tender in March 2000. 
Proceeds are also expected of so frequently
cited sales of Slovensk poisØov¸a, Slovensk
sporite…¸a and Väeobecn verov banka, where
the FundÕs interests are still considerable. The
privatisation of VòB has been rendered more
complex due to the unsettled ownership relations
between the FNM CR and the FNM SR, which
were finally resolved in the end of 1999 by signing
of the so-called "zero variant" between the two
funds. The sale of a 24-percent Slovak stake in the
Czecho-Slovak Commercial Bank (SOB) 
is in the process of talks held with a Belgium KBC
Bank, which is already a majority owner of this
bank. The date set for resolution of the problem is
January, 31 2000, which is not certain, as the date
has been put off several times already. According
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Year Book value Purchase price Investment Purchase Investment/
(000) SKK (000) SKK (000) SKK price*/Book Total purchase
value (%) price** (%)
1992 12, 660, 380 12, 254, 724 679, 437 96.80 5.25
1993 4, 205, 361 4, 018, 224 155, 760 95.55 3.73
1994 (up to 16/3) 11, 223, 644 5, 831, 650 5, 706, 000 51.96 49.46
1994 (from17/3) 9, 479, 039 3, 526, 746 886, 485 37.21 20.0
Total (1992-94) 37, 568, 424 25, 631, 344 7, 427, 682 68.23 22.47
1995 37, 278, 070 12, 706, 436 6 ,457,362 34.09 33.70
1996 43, 805, 533 11, 596, 916 4, 841 ,841 26.47 29.45
1997 15, 317, 456 3 ,521, 388 410, 505 22.99 10.44
1998 12, 815, 857 2, 917, 726 1, 254, 000 22.77 30.06
Total (1995-98) 109, 216 ,916 30, 742, 466 12, 963, 708 28.15 29.66
1999 153, 757 17, 500 - 11.38 -
Total (1992-99) 146, 949, 097 73, 873, 810 20, 391, 390 35.92 26.56
Table 10 — The volume of privatised assets in the SR by the signing date of contracts with the FNM SR in the years
1992 — 1998 (standard methods)
Source: Annual Reports of the FNM SR 1992—1997, The Black Paper of Privatisation of the FNM SR,
internal materials of the FNM SR 
* excluding investment, ** including investment
Note: the state, including supplements concluded by 31 December 1998
Fig. 3 — The volume of privatised assets in the SR by
the signing date of the contract with the FNM SR in the
years 1992—1998 (standard methods, thousand SKK)
Fig. M.E.S.A.10
to Jn Onda, spokesman for the National Bank of
Slovakia (NBS) some delay of late was due to the
considerations of the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development involvement.
Reprivatisation of enterprises can also be
considered, in respect of enterprises whose
majority interests were gained by the FNM
through backing out of the contract. This
concerns the following companies: Slovensk
Lieebn Kpele, a.s. PieäØany, Istrochem, a.s.,
Bratislava, Nafta, a.s. Gbely, and ZSNP, a.s. ºiar
nad Hronom.
4.8 STATISTICS
The book value of the assets suitable for
privatisation in Slovakia has been estimated 
at SKK 427.6 billion (OECD Economic surveys,
1996). Of this, SKK 349.4 billion had been
transferred to the FNM SR by 31 December 1998.
By September 1999, SKK 226.7 billion had been
privatised, with SKK 80 billion allocated for
voucher privatisation and SKK 146. 95 billion sold
by standard methods - mainly through direct sales. 
By September, 30 1999, the overall value of the
FNM SR interests amounted to SKK 55.2 billion,
with as much as SKK 21.8 billion. (39 percent)
comprising  majority interests of the state
(Slovensk elektrrne, Slovenskø plynrenskø
priemysel), which cannot be privatised under
current effective legislation.4 Consequently, the
FNM has currently around SKK 20.9 billion of the
property interests in the nominal value (net book
value) available for sale. Their market value,
however, represents only a small part of their
nominal value (according to Ivan Mikloä, Deputy
Prime Minister for economy, it is but one-tenth of
their nominal value), as these are prevailingly
minority stakes, or interests in companies which
are in liquidation or bankrupt. 
Since 1992, when the large privatisation began
in Slovakia, privatisation was affected by, both,
standard and non-standards methods. As can be
seen in the preceding table, in the years 1992 and
1993, the purchase prices in standard methods
were roughly equal to the net book value of the
assets being privatised. 
In 1994, in the period until March, 16 (until the
departure of the second Meiar Government), i .e.
within less than one quarter of the year, assets
three times the volume of the year 1993 had been
privatised. This figure grew mainly in the last
days of the Government in office, when
privatisation took place ªby day and by night".
The figure on investment, included in the
purchase price of the enterprise, is also
interesting, when investment comprised as much
as 49.5 % of the purchase price. The average
purchase price, as a proportion in the net book
value of the assets sold, comprised 68.2%,
without investments ( and as much as 88% with
investment included). 
After coming in office of the third Meiar
Government in 1995, the power to effect direct
sales was transferred to the FNM . Following this
step, a radical drop in purchase prices occurred,
which has not ceased since, in 1998, reaching
only 22.7% of the net book value. Over the period
from 1995 to November 1998, the FNM sold,
through standard methods, assets (state enterprise
assets and shares of joint stock companies of the
FNM portfolio) of the total net book value of
SKK 109.2 billion. The purchase prices (without
investments) comprised only SKK 30.7 billion of
this volume, i.e., only 28.1 percent. In the light of
the schedule of payment, when payment was in
instalments, spread over ten years, as a rule, the
FNM received only SKK 19.7 billion by 31
December 1998, which comprised less than 18
percent of the net book value. This sum includes
also payment with FNM bonds, which totalled
SKK 7.8 billion. 
The apparent (three-fold) drop in the
privatisation activity in 1997 was due to the
constitutional court finding on transfer of
responsibilities from FNM back to the
Government which got published. In 1998, this
trend sustained also due to the approaching term
of September parliamentary election, when the
ruling parties began to fear declining preferences
(mainly of the Workers Party). It was also due to
the overall low volume of what remained to be
privatised. In 1998, the Government did not
approve a single direct sale. 
On the whole, in the years 1992-1999, the
average purchase price without investment
comprised only 38. 14 % of the net book value of
the assets privatised by standard methods. The
total real financial benefit for this period
amounted to SKK 14 billion, from the first wave
of privatisation, and SKK 12 billion, from the
second wave of privatisation, i.e., only 18 % of
the net book value of SKK 146.9 billion. 
In the contracts concluded by the FNM SR,
favourable interest rates have been set, at the level
of discount rate, the terms for employee
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participation in privatisation have not been
formulated clearly, and neither were questions of
employment commitment and investment
activities. The liabilities were paid even less
attention. Contracts of purchase contain a very
soft clause, subject to which only a failure to pay
two consecutive instalments constitutes ground
for backing out of the contract. Despite this, there
are many cases of FNM debtors failing to pay
more than two consecutive instalments, with the
Fund taking no action. 
In 1998, MSPNM SR informed that it would
publicise a public register of privatised assets,
which has not happened over the year 1999 in the
scope it had been previously announced. The lists
are not updated, and the abstracts from the Trade
Register about the new owners of the companies
could not be made public. The year 1999 was a
year of great expectations but also large
disillusionment. (See Redressing privatisation
encroachments, chapter 4.6). 
4.9 LIQUIDATION OF STATE
ENTERPRISES 
The process of liquidation of state enterprises is
an inseparable part of transformation of the state
assets. The reasons for inclusion of enterprises in
liquidation related mostly to their long-term
unfavourable economic results. These poor results
were partly due to setting aside portions of state
enterprises for privatisation and privatising them.
There were also parts of enterprises remaining in
privatisation as outputs that could not be sold,
which were put in liquidation, or remaining after a
transferee of an output backed out of signing the
contract of purchase with the FNM .
The liquidation of state enterprises sometimes
amounts to a greater plunder of state property than
its non-transparent privatisation. It is due partly to
shortcomings in the existing legislation, that
Minister Peter Bisk of Meiar Government was to
eliminate but happened to be also the man giving
final consent to liquidation of any enterprise. He
was assigned by the Government Decree no. 692 of
September, 30 1997 to ensure the amendment of
MSPNM SR Edict no. 140/1996 of the Collection
of Laws. This happened after control authorities
found that the legal regulation does not provide
guaranty for transparent procedure in liquidation of
state enterprises, neither does it unequivocally
defines the powers of all stakeholders of the
process. Low proceeds of liquidation best testified
to it: in industry they comprised 3.6% , and in
agriculture only 3% of the net book value of the
liquidated companies. After liquidation of an
enterprise, sale to a pre-designated buyer followed
at a substantially lower price. The Supreme Control
Office found that this type of sale, originally
intended as exceptional measure, has gradually
become a rule (Pravda, October, 9 1998). 
The obligation to organis public auctions was
successfully avoided, as the Ministry did not
insist on compliance with this publicly
controllable form of state assets sale and almost
in all cases of request for a direct sale to pre-
designated buyer, lodged by the liquidator,
responded positively. The activity of the
commission that reviewed the requests was
purely formal. 
The edict on procedures in liquidation of state
enterprises was violated in three ways: the
application for direct sale was discussed in the
relevant commission after consent was granted by
the Minister, or alternately, the commission did
not discuss the request at all. A third way was
when the consent granted by the minister did not
contain identification of the buyer and the
property was sold to other than the buyer
recommended by the liquidator of the SR.
Roughly 2000 state enterprises had been
proposed for liquidation by their founding
sectors. Of the given number, MSPNM SR issued
4200 decisions, 3 855 of which were approvals of
direct sales, which comprised 91.2 % of cases,
where this method had been preferred over public
auction and other methods (public tendering,
gratuitous transfer). 
The liquidation of the State Printing House of
Transport and Postage Stamps is a good example.
The Ministry of Transport, a as the founder, and
the Ministry for Privatisation wanted first to cash
this enterprise in an auction at SKK 55 million .
There was no bidder. Two weeks later, a firm,
THB, applied, (in which was the son-in-law of
Katarna Tothov, the former deputy Prime
Minster). The liquidator immediately concluded a
contract of future contract with the THB for the
sale of the printing house for SKK 19 million and
asked the Minster to give consent to this "good
deal". A multi-story building in greater centre of
Bratislava was appraised at less than SKK 8
million by an authorised expert. On the same day
the minister granted consent to the direct sale, the
contract of purchase and sale was signed and the
state lost millions more. (Pravda, July, 10 1998). 
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4.10. REPOTRADE 
Until 1997, the repotrades (the trades with the
right of repurchase in which the FNM raised
foreign resources for the transfer of shares from
its portfolio, while the shares are covered by a
lien) served only to bridge temporary problems in
liquidity at the end of a calendar year. In 1997 the
financial crisis of the FNM intensified to such an
extent that in that period it did not have resources
to pay its current obligations. In addition to the
January loan, through a repurchase to pay a
portion of bonds to citizens over 70 years of age,
the Fund needed additional resources. In July
1998, the FNM had serious problems to raise any
resources, it therefore effected other repo trades
with Slovensk PoisØov¸a (SP), in which a loan
was taken at SKK 1.6 billion. The FNM pledged
the lucrative stock (15.93%) of Väeobecn
òverov Banka (VòB), the Restitution
Investment Fund (39.08%), Slovensk Lodenice a
Prstavy (31.43%) and the Interhotel Tatry
(97%). The maturity of this repo trade was six
months (Nrodn obroda, July, 4 1998).
Though in a deal like this, the FNM has a right
to repurchase the stock at a given date, it has no
obligation to do so. Thus there were concerns that
in the event of a lost election, representatives of
the FNM could easily change the terms of the
repotrade in a way which would give SP the stock
irretrievably. The FNM must push this debt
before it due to its low liquidity and it has
problems with raising resources to meet its
obligations. 
A suspicion of potential concealed privatisation
was confirmed after the process of increasing the
equity capital in SP began in July 1998, in which
the state was to lose its majority to the benefit of
private companies headed by VSº Koäice. By
failing to repay the repo trade, the stocks of VòB
and other pledged institutions would have been
privatised. 
In parallel with the repotrade, increase in equity
in Slovensk poisØov¸a took place, for which the
FNM voted but in which it did not participate.
That was the beginning of a concealed
privatisation of not only SP but also VòB and
other institutions through FNM shares it had
pledged in the repotrade. 
In 1998, several largeger stock deals received
attention. The most interesting of them may be
the repotrade of the FNM with 1.3 million shares
of Slovnaft Bratislava, which was undertaken in
late January 1998. These Slovnaft shares were
pledged by the FNM and in repurchasing them it
paid the creditor SKK 757 million (i.e., 560 per
share). On February, 24 1998, the FNM decided
to sell 1.68 million shares of Slovnaft (10.23% of
the equity shares) to a joint stock company
Colorin, ºilina for SKK 620 million, which was
valued at SKK 368 per share (Hospodske
noviny, February 26 1998). This was at a time
when the Slovnaft stocks were not traded under
SKK 800 per share at the Securities Exchange
(BCP) or the off-exchange RM-system Slovakia.
The Fund would have made a better deal if it had
left 1.35 million stocks to the creditor or sold
them at the BCP for a market price. 
The result of reprivatisation in 1999 is its
fulfilment exclusively in the form of stocks 
on the part of the original transferee or by
payment of the instalment in favour of the FNM.
This fact significantly affected the liquidity of the
FNM and therefore, the form of repotrade was
used to raise the needed amount to fulfil
obligations. At present, the FNM had to pledge its
triple A stocks of its portfolio, such as a 97-
percent stake in the Slovak Shipping and Ports
Bratislava, a 60.6- percent stake in spa PieäØany
and also the RIF a.s. Bratislava stocks to address
the situation. The last short-term repotrade was
concluded with the stocks of the joint stock
company Nafta-Gbely. "Despite the repotrades
for these stocks, which the financial institutions
concluded with the FNM under mutually
beneficial terms, theoretically there exists 
a possibility that in the event of shortage 
of liquidity of the FNM , it may lose these stocks.
The only solution might be accelerating
privatisation of these companies. This would
bring about benefit that would serve to pay the
obligation of the Fund to its creditors", said
Vladimr DvoÞek, the Section of Strategy
Director of the FNM in an interview for Trend, on
1 December 1999. 
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chance of being repeated. SME, 19 November 1999, p. 21
3. Slovak Government fear redress of privatisation, claims Kank. SME, 19 November 1999.
4. For more detail, see chapter 7, Privatisation of natural monopolies 
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54Marek Jakoby — CONSEQUENCES OF ABOLISHING THE VOUCHER PRIVATISATION AND REPLACING IT WITH THE BOND METHOD
5.1 THE CHRONOLOGY OF THE
INCEPTION, ENFORCEMENT 
AND THE STRUCTURE OF THE 
SO-CALLED BOND METHOD
ªIt is going to be otherwise and it is going to be
better." In these words, the Prime Minister of the
day, Vladimr Meiar, announced, on June, 6 1995,
the end to any illusions about the implementation of
the second wave of voucher privatisation (VP). The
statement of the Prime Minister followed after eight
months marked with postponing of the promised
start of the second wave of VP, gradual shrinkage of
the volume of the offered assets and an unequivocal
preference for privatisation through direct sales to
pre-designated buyers. 
What is interesting, the pro-Government daily
Slovensk Republika, already on June, 14 1995
noted, that "there is assumption that the works of the
ministry for privatisation on privatisation projects
with a share of stocks for voucher privatisation will
end by the end of June of 1995". According to the
daily, there were 214 privatisation outputs registered
at the ministry worth SKK 32.784 billion.
After a surprisingly short preparatory period, on
July, 12 the same year, the parliament passed the
GovernmentÕs fourteenth amendment of the Act on
conditions of transfer of state property to other
persons (also called the large privatisation law), the
core of which related to the change in the provisions
about voucher privatisation. 
Instead of a possibility to buy stocks for investment
vouchers, the amendment offered citizens, the holders
of voucher books, a possibility of acquiring a non-
negotiable bond of FNM of a uniform nominal value
of SKK 10 thousand , with a five-year maturity - i.e.,
on 31 December 2000. The bond bears fixed interest
at the NBS discount rate, which is, starting from
January, 13, at the level of 8.8 percent. The yields are
due together with the nominal value of the bond. 
Since in this transaction, often there is no change
of the owner of state assets involved, it is difficult
to speak about privatisation, thus it is denoted as
"bond compensation". The amendment stipulated
the ways in which the bond can be used before
maturity, and defined its potential transferees. 
Under the provisions of the law, the bond holder
could use the bond before it was due for the
following: 
¥ contribution into a company that acquired
privatised assets to pay the obligations of the
company in respect of the FNM ,
¥ acquisition of a privatised apartment (including
persons who are close family relatives),
¥ complementary pension and health insurance
(legislation adopted only later - the Act no.
123/1996 of the Collection of Laws On
Complementary Pension Insurance of
Employees),
¥ sale to persons, authorised to acquire the bond by
law, 
¥ purchase of stocks of the FNM assets in the open
securities market,
¥ other purposes, where a special law establishes it. 
The circle of persons, which, subject to the law,
can acquire the bond of the FNM, was defined in
the following way:
¥ physical or legal persons to pay their obligations
in respect of the Fund, relating to the acquisition
of privatised assets, 
¥ owners of apartment houses for the transfer of
the apartment in the private ownership and the
tenants of apartments from close persons, for the
acquisition of the apartment in their ownership,
¥ legal persons carrying out complementary
pension and health insurance,
¥ banks designated for restructuring, subject to a
special law, 
¥ other persons, subject to a special law.
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In reality the actual circle of the transferees has
been narrowed to only the first group, as:
¥ the complementary pension and health insurance
at that time was not legislatively provided for, its
implementation is currently only starting up,
¥ more concrete projects of restructuring banks
appeared for the first time as late as in the year
1998,
¥ purchases of the FNM SR stocks in the open
securities market (RM-S) began to be
implemented as late as July 1997, that is, two
years after the amendment had been passed. The
Fund included in its offer the remaining stocks of
23 enterprises. This possibility in effect elicited
no response. They concerned the "lucrative"
stocks of the enterprises, which in 1996 ended up
in red figures (19 enterprises), two of them were
petitioned for bankruptcy, three were in
liquidation at that time, and in the case of other
four, petitions for bankruptcy or liquidation were
filed. One can understand that the interest in
these stocks was minimal. In the first round, 20%
of the stocks on offer were sold, all stocks of two
of them, and there was no interest whatsoever in
the stocks of nine other enterprises. In the second
round, stock sales of three other companies were
completed. The situation was aptly described 
in the daily Prca, when it wrote, that ª"the
uninformed citizens bought mostly worthless
stocks, that the FNM offered without telling
them what rubbish they were". (Prca, July, 
30 1997) 
The abrupt definite abandonment of the voucher
privatisation project elicited huge criticism mostly
among opposition political subjects. The opposition
parliamentary parties denoted the decision of the
Government unconstitutional and purposeful,
serving only to increase the volume of assets the
ruling coalition wished to privatise through direct
sales. The unconstitutionality allegedly was in the
retroactive changes to the conditions and in the
intervention in legal regulations that arose in the
past on the basis of effective legislation (the
registration of investment funds for the second
wave of privatisation, contracts between citizens
and funds). The decision of the Government was at
variance with the GovernmentÕs Manifesto of
January 1995, where the Government pledged to
"ensure that second wave of voucher privatisation
continue without unnecessary delay". 
Michal Kov, then president, returned the
amendment in late July, together with the bill on
investment companies and funds, and the bill on
strategic enterprises, to be repeatedly debated in the
parliament. The major objection raised by president
concerned the retroactive breaches of contracts. He
raised also an objection against the obligation of
municipalities and housing co-operatives to accept
bonds without  being able to use them before they
mature. All returned amendments were passed
again in September by the parliament in their
original wording. 
In the same month, a group of forty parliamentary
members lodged an instigation with the
Constitutional Court in the matter of the
amendment of large-scale privatisation law as being
inconsistent with the constitution. In December, the
Constitutional Court ruled ⁄ 24, par. 10 of the
amendment, ordering municipalities and housing
co-operatives to accept bonds as payment in
transfers of apartments in citizens ownership, to be
unconstitutional. The Constitutional Court (òS)
ruled that equality of ownership rights was
impeded, since the obligation was not applicable to
all apartment owners, and that the right of exercise
of free decision was restricted, since in sale and
purchase of apartments, the contract cannot be
based on an obligation to accept the bond. The 
òS ruling did not exclude a possibility of using 
the bond for similar purpose, subject to mutual
agreement. The òS rejected the other items of 
the instigation by the parliamentary members.
According to the court, though by changing
voucher for bond privatisation, ownership rights
were restricted, it was done in public interest 
and with adequate compensation , in the form 
of the state bond, with a possibility of buying stocks
later on. 
With this ruling of the òS, the bond
"privatisation" could officially start off. As 
of January, 1 1996, the citizens, registered for the
second wave of voucher privatisation, were credited
bonds at nominal value of SKK 10 thousand in their
personal property accounts at the Securities Centre
(SCPB). In all, there was 3, 329, 630 bonds issued
in this way, which was 200 thousand less than the
original number of owners of investment vouchers
(OIVs) registered, which is related to the fact that 
an equal number of citizens de-registered after the
method was changed, whereby they de facto
declined the bond "compensation". Although
citizens were informed about the possibilities to use
bonds before maturity, a number of related
materials had not been approved at that time -
which were prerequisites for real trade in bonds,
which began only in August. That included
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primarily the amendment of the Government decree
on issuing and using investment vouchers
(139/1996 of the Collection of Laws ) which 
fell effective on May, 9 through publication in the
Collection of Laws, i.e., eleven months after the
bond method was announced. But even this decree
was not legally "clean". 
On June, 6, a group of parliament members
lodged an instigation with the Constitutional Court
to start proceedings in the matter of inconsistency
of the decree with the Constitution of the SR and
some other effective laws in thirteen items. The
principal problem of the decree was the
infringement of equal treatment before law and the
principle of equal rights, restriction of the
ownership right for bondholders, as well as the fact
that the decree gave the FNM powers that were at
variance with the effective legislation and that
could only be provided for by law. That included, in
particular, the power of the FNM to select the
debtors who would be given the chance to pay their
obligations in respect of the FNM with bonds, the
power of the FNM SR to select securities dealers,
authorised to trade the bonds, and the assignment of
the FNM to organise the bond market , when the
Government had only to assign it to one of the
existing public market organisers (i.e., BCP
Bratislava or RM-S). The decree thus clearly placed
selected groups of subjects at an advantage. The
arguments about unconstitutionality were accepted
by the òS, which in its ruling of February 1997,
stated that the Government in its decree1 violated
several provisions of the Constitution of the SR and
a few other laws. The change of the concept of
voucher privatisation into bond "compensation"
was aptly dubbed by Marin Leäko, a journalist of
the daily Pravda, when he, inter alia, quoted Prime
Minister V. Meiar in his interview for Czech
HospodÞske noviny: "The economic situation now
commands to create a domestic business stratum,
distribute assets that they had been creating by their
work among them and other citizens." According to
Leäko, changing voucher privatisation for bonds is
nothing but a change in sharing assets between
"domestic business stratum and other citizens - the
former will get almost everything, the latter a little
more than nothing". (Pravda, 30 December 1995)2
5.2 THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN
THE VOUCHER AND BOND
METHODS FROM THE ASPECT OF
TRANSPARENCY, OBJECTIVITY 
AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 
The voucher privatisation constituted a chance to
participate in privatisation for all citizens under
equal terms. It was therefore contained in the
election manifestos of all major political parties,
including the parties that were later to form the
coalition Government. 
The change of the way of voucher privatisation
came at a time when: 
¥ the preparation of the second wave of voucher
privatisation was in full progress, relying upon the
effective law and the experience of the first wave,
¥ based on the licence by the Ministry of Finance
of the SR, a whole number of investment funds
for the second wave of privatisation arose, which
were registered for the purpose by the Ministry, 
¥ registration of voucher books was under way,
which the Ministry of Finance announced; by
registering the voucher book, its holder became
the holder of the investment vouchers, 
¥ among citizens, or investment voucher holders,
and investment funds, a whole number of legally
established relations arose of different nature -
similar to those known from the first wave 
of voucher privatisation. 
The unilateral change of the rules of voucher
privatisation, effected by the amendment, 
had a retroactive effect upon a large number of
valid legal relations, thus eroding the legal security
of parties to these relations. The legal insecurity is
increased by the fact that that amendment does not
contain any provisions about how the existing
property relations between investment funds and
citizens are subsequently going to be settled. The
legal security is one of the most significant
elements of a state with a rule of law, which,
according to Article 1 of the Constitution of the
SR,3 the Slovak Republic is. 
5.2.1 Loss of the possibility 
to realistically have a share 
in privatised assets 
Voucher holders could gain - directly or through
investment funds - stake in the joint stock
companies put in the privatisation process. In
consequence, with equal chances and for the benefit
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of all of the population interested to enter the
process of voucher privatisation, the general
scarcity of financial resources necessary for a
speedy privatisation of a great volume of state 
property was addressed.4
Apart from several weaknesses, which emerged
in relation to the first wave of voucher privatisation
(fragmentation of ownership, minimum inflow of
real capital, and the decrease in the value of most 
stocks), the voucher privatisation had also
advantages, such as, speed, a blanket effect, and
justice, when it allowed the population to actually
have a share in the privatised assets. Most negative
aspects, mainly those related to the decline in value
of the acquired stocks in the capital market or the
"financial asset stripping" of investment funds,
were not caused by the voucher privatisation 
itself, but rather, by the insufficient regulation of
the capital market and the activities of investment
funds, on the part of the Ministry of Finance. 
The bond "privatisation" was thus hailed 
as a success mostly by those people who had
negative experience from the first wave, particularly
those, who felt to be cheated by investment funds.
Apparently, the impression of a "secure" 10 thousand
crowns was attractive (plus the relevant yield)
without some measure of risk, which in the first wave
was connected with the decision making when
placing investment points with a particular joint
stock company, or an investment fund. 
The bond method de facto stripped most citizens of
their chances to acquire direct share in the privatised
assets. The obvious preference of so-called standard
methods, mainly direct sales, in the further course of
privatisation clearly favoured selected narrow groups
of transferees, with the goal of creating a "strong
domestic capital-generating stratum". 
Even more serious is the fact that the
Government, or the FNM, by pursuing their
privatisation policy, did not raise financial reserves
necessary to meet the bonds. By so doing, they
threw doubt upon fulfilment of their own pledge
and thus ignored the above "security" as well. 
5.2.2.  The possibilities to use 
bonds favoured selected groups 
of persons 
The holder of stocks acquired in the voucher
privatisation, apart from other options, could sell
them in the capital market, without virtually no
restrictions. Although the Act no. 190/1995
assumed several options for using bonds before
they were due, in practice these options were
limited essentially to selling them to ªauthorised
transferees", namely persons having liabilities
against the FNM. 
In April 1998, Viliam Vaäkovi, then an
opposition MP, submitted a draft amendment to the
Large Privatisation Act, aimed to extend the circle
of transferees of bonds by physical persons having
permanent residence in the territory of the SR, and
legal persons, having their seat in the SR. It should
increase liquidity of bonds in the capital market and
make the market price more realistic through
reconciling supply and demand. The restriction of
the circle of transferees entailed a significant excess
of supply over demand, which resulted in even
greater advantage for the benefit of the transferees,
who achieved very favourable prices in purchasing
bonds. 
The amendment also set a maximum period for
payment for bonds, which should not exceed 90
days from the period of maturity. In order to curb
subjective discretion of the fund as regards buyers
of privatised property, the fund was to set a uniform
percentage of the whole amount for privatisers due
in the relevant year that could be paid in bonds.5
But the draft amendment was defeated in the
parliament.  
On 19 November 1996, another amendment of
the Large Privatisation Act, no 322/1996 became
effective, which defined the period of maturity for
persons, who, as of the date the amendment came in
force, had reached 70 years of age and more, and set
it as 31 December 1997. 
Investments funds were fully excluded from the
whole process of the so-called bond privatisation,
while they were acknowledged the right to
"compensation" at a lump-sum of half a million
SKK. It concerned, of course, only those funds
which were set up specifically for the second wave
of voucher privatisation. Only the charges for
issuance of relevant permissions and the mandatory
deposit of equity capital amounted to a multiple of
the lump sum, not to mention the commercial costs
that were incurred in the preparation for the second
wave itself. Discriminatory provisions of the law
were just a continuation of a long-term campaign
against the activities of investment companies and
funds. The funds thus affected included also several
funds set up by foreign subjects, mainly Austrian. 
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5.3. THE RAMIFICATIONS FOR 
THE COMMON PEOPLE
The registration for the second wave of voucher
privatisation began in September 1994. Most
financial institutions, large enterprises, but also
several business people offered their skills in
managing privatised assets. They set up investment
funds. The strongest groups - financially and in
terms of their property - granted citizens not only
loans for the registration of the voucher book, but
also advances for future back purchase of the stocks
or yields. 
On the basis of a contract, a large number of people
pledged themselves to place their points with the
funds, founded by the subsidiaries of the banks, e.g.
Sporite…¸a Fond, VòB Kupn Plus, Ve…kø Fond, and
Fond Dchodcov. The funds established by the
subsidiaries of large enterprises, such as VSº, a.s.
Koäice, Slovnaft, a.s., Bratislava, Slovensk
Elektrrne, a.s. Bratislava were also giving 
a convincing impression. It was, perhaps, due to the
loans and advances provided in respect of future
yields, that more people have registered for the
second wave of voucher privatisation than for the
first, federal one, three years earlier, by 500 thousand. 
In December 1994, two days before the date of
filing points with investment funds, the second
wave of voucher privatisation was suspended and
the following year abolished at the proposal of the
Government of the SR. Ever since, the main method
of privatisation has been the direct sale. Instead of
stocks for the voucher book, citizens received 
a FNM bond of SKK 10 thousand in value. 
Subsequently, investment funds began to recover
money from citizens they had lent money for the
registration in the second wave of voucher
privatisation. The experts estimate the funds loans
to citizens to amount to several billion crowns.
Since the law did not allow the loan to be met by the
FNM bond, the funds began exacting the money
directly from the citizens. Payment orders issued by
the courts and the distraint discharges elicited 
a wave of anger. 
Given the multitude, the cost of recovering 
the fundsÕ receiveables were in hundreds of million
of crowns. The state administration officials were
also to blame for the chaos as their statements
suggested vaguely the obligation of citizens to repay
loans for registration. To their detriment, several
citizens understood the message wrongly from 
state administration officials as instructing them 
not to pay. 
The recovery of debts was an existential necessity
for managers of investment funds in an effort 
to minimise the losses, incurred by them because of
the abolition of the second wave of voucher
privatisation. Experts estimate that funds effected
around 9 billion crowns for the preparation. Much of
it was raised through credits and the failure to pay
them would have ramifications on the bank savings.
Part of the cost associated with the recovery of loans
thus had to be paid by the debtors.6
By changing voucher privatisation in a "bond
compensation", the Government in effect eliminated
the economic activity of politically and economically
independent investment funds (concurrently with the
amendments adopted on investment funds and
securities, the activities of the funds of the first wave
also were restricted) and by allowing new owners to
buy out the bonds, a scope was created for financing
direct sales at an advantage for the circle of persons
politically close to the coalition. For selected
privatisation actors, an option was created to repay
expediently part of their obligations in respect of the
FNM in the form of bonds, acquired for fractions of
their nominal value.
By approving bond "privatisation" the coalition
managed to kill several birds in one stroke: it
divested itself of the commitment before public to
implement the second wave of voucher
privatisation with a pledge of a lump sum of 10
thousand crowns for every investment voucher
owner, and, at least for a time, silenced the voices
of discontent of a part of population for whom
"security" in the form of 10 thousand crowns plus
the interest was more acceptable than the
"uncertainty" of investing through vouchers. 
A very serious drawback of the method is the lack
of conceptual approach, or finding alibi, when
through "cronyism privatisation" at low prices, the
fund did not generate reserves in the following
years necessary to pay for the bonds in the volume
of around 32 billion crowns. When we consider that
the Government in its policy, on the whole, did not
even create conditions for alternative use of bonds,
we may note, that the "security" was but an illusion. 
5.4. THE RAMIFICATIONS FOR 
THE CAPITAL MARKET AND ITS
SUBJECTS
The new potential owners of bonds (transferees of
privatised assets with obligations against the FNM)
created a secondary market for these securities, where
they gained an instrument for expedient price to pay
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portion of purchase price, of course, at full nominal value
of the bond, including an adequate part of the yield. 
As of April, 10 1996, a subsection for
organisation of the bond market of the Fund was
established as part of the Section of non-standard
privatisation and capital market. 
On July, 31 1996, a whole issue no. 880950000526
- Dlhopis FNM SR totalling 3, 329,558 pieces was
despatched in the SCPB. Starting from August, 5
1996, the FNM bond began to be traded in the RM -
System (RM-S).
In the year 1996, the Fund accepted the price in
nominal value of 10, 000 crowns in redemption, the
minimum price in the market was set at SKK 7,500.
There were 72,148 pieces of the FNM bonds traded
anonymously on the RM-S. In direct sales, 287, 737
were traded, at an average price of SKK 8,648. 
1997
In 1997, the Fund accepted the price of SKK
10,748 for the bond, with the minimum price
amounting to SKK 8,160. In direct sales, 381,751
bonds were transacted at a minimum price of SKK
8,160. In RM-S, there were only  4,887 pieces of
bonds anonymously traded at the minimum price.
The Fund sold 317,602 pieces of stocks from 23
issuers in an anonymous auction. In July, bond -
share swaps from the portfolio of the FNM
commenced. Through exchange brokers of the
DLHOPIS, o.c.p., a.s., the FNM sold 3, 718, 951
pieces of stocks of 102 issuers. 
The revenues of the FNM in the bonds for 1997
totalled SKK 4,560 billion, which comprises 49 %
of the overall FNM receipts. The outlays to redeem
the bonds were SKK 4,560 billion. The costs related
to the issue, redemption of FNM bonds and their
yields amounted to SKK 309 million. After
deduction of redeemed bonds issued to the owners
of investment vouchers, as of 31 December 1997,
the FNM was left with having to pay  2,652,512
bonds by the year 2001.  
1998
In January 1998, due to shortage of resources
necessary to redeem bonds of citizens over 70 years
of age, the Fund effected a bill deal, whereby it
borrowed foreign resources in the volume of SKK
2,245 billion for a period of 6 months. As the Fund
did not have sufficient resources to redeem the notes
on their maturity as of July, 13, it covered the needed
funds through a repotrade with Slovensk PoisØov¸a
(for details of both transactions see also the chapter
Large-scale privatisation.
In 1998 the Fund paid 70 year-old persons and
older (including their heirs) the amount of SKK
2,939,469,720. It paid the owners of apartment
houses for the returned bonds an amount of SKK
156,334,104. 
The Board of the Fund approved lists of joint
stock companies (setting also a minimum price per
share) from its portfolio, the stocks of which were
sold directly by exchange for bonds through
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1996 1997 1998 31. 8. 1999 Total
FNM debtors 220,061 390,862 121, 958 732,881
SPF debtors (the 
Slovak Land Fund) 1,085 1, 233 3, 829 6, 147
owners of apartment 
houses (VBD) 9,775 13, 599 9, 309 32, 683
payment for stocks: 54,102 4,949 59, 051
* auction 1, 877 1,877
* exchange brokers
of DLHOPIS 52,225 4, 949 57,174
Pensioners 255, 695 3,807 259, 502
Total 221, 146 455, 972 400, 030 13,116 1, 090, 264
Share in the 
total issue 6.6 % 13.7 % 12 % 0.4 % 32.7 %
Table 11 — The number of bonds returned in the liquidation account of the FNM SR (redeemed) 
Source: FNM SR
exchange brokers of the DLHOPIS, o.c.p., a.s.. The
list was continuously amended. In 1998 the Fund
redeemed bonds at SKK 11,496 with the minimum
price in the market set at SKK 8, 820.
The constitutional court finding of June, 24 1998,
which resulted from the request lodged by 30 MPs,
decided that several provisions of ⁄ 24 of the NR SR
Act no. 92/1991 of the Collection of Laws, on
conditions of transfer of state property to other
persons, as later amended (the Large-scale
Privatisation Act) were not consistent with the
Constitution of the SR, which made them void from
the date of publication in the Collection of Acts, i.e.,
from July, 16 1998. These were provisions that
concerned the possibility of privatised assets
transferees to meet their obligations against the FNM
or the Slovak Land Fund by the FundÕs bonds. 
1999 
After the ruling of the Constitutional Court of the
SR of 1998, subject to ⁄ 24 par.9, only owners of
apartment houses or other persons, where a special
law so provides, could acquire the FundÕs bonds in
their ownership. Equally, the use of the FundÕs
bonds before they were due, was not questioned,
i.e., before 31 December 2000, for the purpose of
acquiring ownership interests of the Fund in the
open securities market. The bond of the Fund could
be used in no other way. The Fund paid for bonds
on a continuous basis only to persons who, at 19
November 1996, reached 70 years of age and more
(including their heirs). The FNM still had to redeem
2, 239, 294 pieces of bonds, which comprised 67.
27 % of the issue. In 1999, the value of the bond
was SKK 12,244, with a tax of SKK 396 ("70-year
old persons" got 11, 496 SKK/piece, with a tax
amounting to SKK 264).
The forthcoming development may take the
shape of the following variants:
A. payment of the nominal value of bonds,
including interest yield as of 31 December
2000,
B. extension of the period of maturity of the
current bonds,
C. purchase of bonds on the part of the FNM
(possibly Dlhopis, a. s., o. c. p.) in the capital
market before bonds are due,
D. exchanging bonds for other bonds (annuity),
E. bond redemption and their exchange for stocks,
F. exchanging bonds for stocks of a "new state
fund",
G. abolition of bond privatisation by law.
A. Payment of the nominal value 
of bonds, including interest yield as 
of 31 December 2000
In the years 1996-1999, 1,090,264 bonds 
of FNM were redeemed, which comprises 32.7
percent of the issue. There still remains then 
to redeem 2, 239,294 more, which at the value of
SKK 14,400 - including yields — comes to around
SKK 32 billion. However, the FNM currently does
not have sufficient financial resources to pay this
obligation. The financial resources needed may be
raised through increasing the FNM debt ( or that of
the state) with a potential Government guaranty.
The resources may come from domestic or foreign
sources. Over the course of the year 2000, the
process of privatisation of strategic enterprises will
begin, which may take approximately two years. A
portion of privatisation proceeds will automatically
be transferred to the FundÕs account, which will
then pay its obligations. Such a solution is feasible
but the process of redeeming bonds will thus
become more expensive. Another aspect of the
problems will be the fact that proceeds of sales of
state assets will have to be used for more acute
needs, i.e., reducing the state debt, financing health
care, education, agriculture, projects in progress,
etc. or possibly capitalisation of the enterprises
concerned. A lump-sum payment of bonds can also
erode the macroeconomic stability, when an abrupt
increase of money in circulation occurs and an
incidental pressure on consumption will be likely. 
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Anonymous dealings Direct dealings
Average price (SKK) 7,814 9,231
Total traded volume (mill. SKK) 292.4 6, 930
Number of bonds 38,550 847,688
Table 12 — Selected parameters of the trade in the FNM SR bonds in RM-S (anonymous dealings: September 96
— February 98; direct dealings: August 96 — October 99)
Source: calculations according to the RM-S statistics
B. Extension of the period of maturity 
of the current bonds 
Any change to the proprieties of the bond can
only be made by changes to the law, which requires
consent of a qualified majority in the National
Council of the SR. Subsequently, changes to the
proprieties of the bond would have to be effected in
the SCPB. If the legislation does not allow to extend
the period of maturity of the bonds, citizens could
get a new bond replacing the current bond, having
the same proprieties (yield at the discount rate,
maturity of yields on expiryÉ) with the maturity
put off for, say 31 December 2005. 
C. Purchase of bonds in the capital
market before bonds are due
The previous experience makes it clear that in the
operations with the bonds privileged securities
dealers "participated", who were buying bonds from
the population for prices in the range of SKK 3,000 -
7,000, while they "moved them on" to the FNM for
their nominal value. This possibility assumes that the
bonds will be publicly tradable in the RM-S, on the
basis of a change made to the law. The fund will
create the demand side by placing orders to buy the
bonds at a given price below their nominal value.
This will also set the minimum price for which
people will be able to sell the bonds. To date this
possibility has not been available. With the average
price of 6,000 SKK per bond, the Fund would effect
around SKK 6 billion for purchasing 1 million bonds,
which - with the nominal value of SKK 10 billion
and the interest yield of SKK 3 billion - constitutes a
saving of more than 50% of the target amount, which
the FNM would otherwise have to redeem in the
maturity period of the bonds. The Fund, of course,
does not have that much cash, but similarly to variant
A, it will have to raise it through borrowing , which
it can subsequently repay from the proceeds of
privatisation of strategic enterprises. Should this
variant be opted for, the taxation of the capital and
interest yields of the Fund or DLHOPIS, a.s., will
have to be resolved, among other, as the current
legislation does not cover the problems of premature
redemption of part of the issue by the issuer.
D. Exchanging bonds for other bonds 
This is a variation of B variant. On maturity, the
existing bonds will be exchanged for new bonds
with a longer period of maturity. The Fund will pay
the annual interest (at the amount of discount rate or
even below). In ten years, the nominal value will be
the same but after converting it in the USD/EUR or
some other real benchmark value, their value will
drop. The assumption is that in the same period the
"dollar" value of the remaining enterprises will
increase. The benefit of this variant is in that it does
not require immediate sweeping privatisation of
state enterprises, which thus may be spread over a
longer period after restructuring has taken place. On
the other hand, a delay in privatisation may lead 
to aggravated management of enterprises not
privatised or to practices dubbed as ªasset
stripping". In real terms, the yields for citizens will
decrease. Instead of getting an equivalent of around
USD 320 in the year 2000, with the assumed rate of
43 SKK/USD, they will be getting an annual yield of
SKK 880 (with the assumption of unchanged
discount rate) and after several years, (say ten
years), they will get about USD 200, at a rate of 50
SKK/US. The benefit for the state is in receiving
annually almost SKK 300 million in tax on interest
yields. For the Fund, this alternative would mean 
a need to secure additional annual revenues 
at around SKK 2 billion to pay the interest yields.
Another variation of this might be a way of
exchanging bonds of the FNM for standard state
bonds, having a longer term of maturity.
E. Bond redemption and their 
exchange for stocks
This option assumes trading bonds for the stocks
of the FNM portfolio before bonds are due, over the
course of 2001 at the latest. In the late 1998, the
FNM President, ».Kank, announced the intent to
implement the exchange of bonds for part of the so-
called strategic enterprises stocks for the first half of
1999. To date, no real decisions in this area have
been made. First the relevant privatisation projects
have to be approved, and the percentage of the stock
for the citizens set. Subsequent algorithm will create
theoretical prerequisite for the demand and supply
and citizens will swap their bond for real stocks of
individual enterprises. It is, however, likely that
immediately on acquiring the shares, citizenÕs prime
interest will be to sell them in the capital market.
Bearing in mind what happened in the first wave of
privatisation, one can reasonably expect them to
wish to do so at once. That can, in turn, be used by
some subjects with strong capital, which will get
larger stakes of stocks at more favourable terms. On
the other hand, the Slovak capital market will gain
momentum to boost trade for two years to come.
The administrative process of setting the algorithm
for determining "the real prices" can take a relatively
long time, around half a year.
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F. Exchanging bonds for stocks 
of a "new state fund"
This option would be a variation of variant E.
Citizens will not be able to trade bonds for
particular shares but the FNM will set up a special
fund, in which it would transfer all shares that will
be earmarked for privatisation by citizens. The
Fund would own, for example, a 10-percent stake in
SPP, a 7-percent stake in Slovensk ElektrrneÉ
Particular stakes of particular firms will be in this
variant the same as under item E, when they will be
based on real privatisation projects. The advantage
over variant E would be in the fact that each citizen
will get an equal stake in the fund, which would
preclude potential speculation. The stocks of the
new fund would be tradable in the public market,
the statutes can stipulate that the Board and other
bodies are appointed by the parliament (or the
Government ) and the general assembly meeting
could not change them. Equally, a term for the fund
can be set - five, ten, or twenty years after which
time the fund would be automatically terminated,
with each shareholder having a share in the
liquidation assets. The liquidation of the new fund
will happen after property interests of its portfolio
have been sold. The fund could be identical with the
current RIF, or a totally new one can be established. 
G. Abolition of bond privatisation 
by law
This is the most advantageous variant for the
state. It is most likely not feasible since a part of
population have already been paid the bonds,
another part having sold them. Thus those citizens
who still keep the bonds in their personal accounts
in the SCPB would suffer. 
We deem a combination of several alternatives
most realistic. It is mainly the concept of bonds
being publicly tradable in 2000, (variant C) with the
bonds - strategic enterprise shares trade (variant E ,
or the "new state fund" variant F. We do not think
the possibility of depositing the bond in the system
of pension or health complementary insurance to be
a relevant alternative, as it does not address the core
of the problem, which relies in the redemption of
bonds on their maturity. 
Given the low liquidity of the Fund, and the risk
associated with an abrupt major increase of money
in circulation for macroeconomic stability, the
maturity of bonds will need to be spaced out (e.g.
extension of term of maturity - variant B), with only
a part of the citizenry being paid their bonds on the
original date of maturity. It can be achieved by
amending the law, and setting new age limits.
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64JANA ERVENçKOVç — THE NATIONAL PROPERTY FUND OF THE SR
6.1. THE ORIGIN AND ITS ACTION
IN THE PRIVATISATION PROCESS 
The National Property Fund of the SR (FNM SR)
was established by the SNR Act no. 253/1991 of the
Collection of Laws on the jurisdiction of SR bodies
in matters of transfer of state assets to other persons
and on the National Property Fund of the SR, falling
effective on June, 28 1991. The position of the
FNM SR is basically defined in the Act of the
Federal Assembly of the SFR no. 92/1991 of the
Collection of Laws on conditions of transfer of state
assets to other persons, as later amended. 
These two fundamental pieces of legislation and
their numerous amendments, and the findings of the
constitutional court over the whole period of
privatisation define the position of the FNM and the
process of privatisation often contradictorily. As for
the position of the FNM and the legislation of the
privatisation process, we need to note that the FNM,
established by a special law, filed in the commercial
companies register, manages the property entrusted
it by law, in its own name, but subject to regulations
defined in the law. Despite being incorporated, it is
not a commercial company subject to the
commercial code, but an entity of private law with
public law elements, to the activity of which mainly
provisions of the Federal Assembly Act no. 92/1991
of the Collection of Laws , as later amended, are
applicable, as well as generally binding legal
regulations, including the Commercial Code, the
Civil Code and the Securities Act, and others. 
The public law elements of the FNM are seen , in
addition to the form of its establishment by law, in
the fact that the National Council of the SR
(parliament) elects and removes members of the
Board and the Supervisory Board, approves the
Statutes of the FNM SR, its budget, the final
statement of accounts, the Annual Report, the
proposals for use of property with an obligatory
notification duty and control empowerment of the
National Council of the SR or its Auspices
Committee. The parliament will decide, through 
a special law, on the termination of the activity of
the FNM , its liquidation and the ways the assets of
the SR will be used.
Although tasks, the jurisdiction, and the position
of the FNM have been subject to changes in the
process of privatisation , essentially, the FNM was
responsible for pursuing the following tasks in
particular:
¥ to ensure implementation of privatisation
projects (conclude contracts of purchase and
sale, organise public tenders and auctions and
the like),
¥ ensure management of property owned by the
fund (particularly management of commercial
interests on short-term and long-term basis),
¥ pursuing other duties stipulated by law (such as
ensuring that claims of authorised persons are
met, subject to the Act 87/1991 of the Collection
of Laws, on out-of-court rehabilitation,
fulfilment of other duties arising gradually
through legislative changes to the original acts of
the Federal Assembly of the SFR no. 92/1991
and the SNR Act no. 253/91 of the Collection of
Laws).
The Fund covers costs incurred through its
activities from its assets, within its budget that is
approved by the parliament. 
A number of amendments have changed the
legislative framework within which the FNM
operates and did so differently, at different time.
The following legislative changes affected the
position of the FNM in the privatisation process
most: 
¥ the NR SR Act no. 60/1994 of the Collection of
Laws , which changed the Act of the FZ SFR
no.92/1991 of the Collection of Laws. on
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conditions of transfer of state property to other
persons, as later amended, and the NR SR Act no.
265/1992 of the Collection of Laws on entries of
the title and other substantive rights to real
property. Subject to ⁄ 11 par..2 and 3 of this law,
it was provided that on the date as of which the a
state enterprise was abolished, or a part thereof
was withdrawn, the privatised state property is
transferred in the ownership of the FNM, i.e., not
in the administration of the state property, 
¥ the NR SR Act no. 369/1994 of the Collection of
Laws, which changed the Large Privatisation
Act, to the effect that all decisive powers were
changed (decision making on privatisation
through direct sale outside  public tendering or
auctioning) was taken away from the Ministry
for Privatisation and the Government of the SR
and granted to the Board of the FNM SR. 
It was particularly during the rule of Meiar
Government in the years 1994 to 1998, that the
legislative changes related to the position of the
FNM in the process of privatisation were often
dubbed as unconstitutional (e.g. the transfer of
privatisation responsibilities from the Government
to the FNM ), the findings of the constitutional court
were not respected by the Management of the FNM
SR (see Mikloä, I.: Privatization in 1996 — A Global
Report on the State of the Society. IPA, 1997.).
Regardless of the formal state of the legislative
status of the FNM in the privatisation process, the
frequent changes to it, the uncertainties, the diverse
interpretation of legal norms by coalition and
opposition parties in different periods, it was
apparent that the FNM was a key body in the
privatisation process - in the implementation
process and in the privatisation decision making.
The fact that the FNM bodies were appointed and
removed by the parliament has made the FNM
bodies a component part of the political and
economic power in the country. It was in the period
between 1994 and 1998, in particular, that
privatisation was under absolute control of the
ruling coalition and the bodies of the FNM, with
only Ivan Mikloä, an opposition representative, for
a brief time, becoming a member of the Supervisory
Board. The activity of the FNM, at that time, in
particular, was characterised by actions, at best, on
the brink of law, but definitely at variance with any
morals or ethics. Despite this, we need to
acknowledge that over the course of privatisation,
the rank and file workers of the Fund have carried
out a great deal of professional work as well. Its
results, however, remain blurred in the shadow of
queries, privatisation cases, and in general
assessment of the FNM as an illegible,
uncontrollable and inaccessible institution. 
6.2. THE BODIES AND
RESPONSIBILITIES 
OF THE FNM SR 
The bodies of the FNM SR are defined in the Act
no. 253/1991 of the Collection of Laws, on
responsibilities of bodies of the Slovak Republic in
matters of transferring state property to other
persons, and on the FNM SR, as later amended.
This law stipulates that the bodies of the FNM SR
shall be: 
a) the Board 
Board is the supreme body of the FNM SR. It
consists of 9 members. The President, Vice-president
and 7 other members are elected by the National
Council of the SR. With the exception of the Vice-
president, Board members are not employees of the
Fund. They are entitled to remuneration for the
performance of the function in the scope stipulated in
the Statutes. The responsibilities of the of the Board
include in particular: 
¥ appoint and remove members of the Executive
Committee,
¥ approve compensation of the Executive
Committee members and the principles of
remunerating other staff of the FNM
¥ submit the draft annual accounts and the annual
report on the activity of the FNM for the
preceding year for approval to the parliament
after it has been discussed in the Government , 
¥ submit the draft budget of the FNM and the
proposal for using property of the FNM for
approval to the parliament after these have been
discussed in the Government of the SR, 
¥ approve the rule of procedure of the Board and
the Executive Committee of the FNM, 
¥ approve organisational principles and
procedures of action connected with fulfilling
tasks of the FNM. 
b) the Executive Committee  
The Executive Committee is a statutory body of
the FNM , it manages its activity and fulfils all tasks
that subject to generally effective regulations and
internal norms fall in its province. It has 11
members, The Chairman of the Executive
Committee being the Vice-president of the FNM,
other 10 members are appointed and removed by
the FNM Board. The members of the Executive
Committee are employed by the FNM. 
c) the Supervisory Board 
The Supervisory Board exercises oversight over
the activity and economic management of the FNM,
its Board and Executive Committee, compliance
with the law, generally binding legal regulations and
the Statutes of the FNM. It has 7 members. The
Chairman and other six members of the Supervisory
Board are elected and removed by the parliament.
The Supervisory Board debate the draft budget, year-
end statement of accounts, and the annual report on
the activities of the FNM before these are referred to
by the Board of the FNM for Government debate.
The Statutes of the FNM SR define in detail the
organisational structure and the activities of the
FNM. It is approved by the parliament subject to
prior debate in the Government. The Statutes also
define the relations between the FNM, the Ministry
for Privatisation and other central bodies of state
administration in the privatisation process. 
6.3. ACQUISITION OF PROPERTY
BY THE FNM SR AND ITS
HANDLING
The property of the FNM includes in particular:
¥ privatised property that were transferred to the
FNM subject to the FZ SFR Act no. 92/1991 of
the Collection of Laws on conditions of transfer
of state property to other persons, as later
amended,
¥ profits of the involvement of the FNM in
business of commercial companies, 
¥ revenues from sale of stocks or property interests
in other than join stock companies, 
¥ shares or property interests which have not been
subject of decision making about privatisation
and which the FNM acquired as a shareholder or
partner, 
¥ the property which fell to the FNM as a result of
backing out of the contract. 
The FNM assets are not part of the state budget and
they can be used only for purposes stipulated by the
Act of the NR SR no.253/1991 of the Collection of
Laws, and subsequent legal regulations. The proposals
about the use of the assets of the FNM are prepared by
the Executive Committee, they are submitted to the
Board, after deliberation in the Supervisory Board and
are subsequently referred to the Government for
debate and to the parliament for approval. 
The property of the FNM SR is used in particular: 
a) in accord with the decision about privatisation
( for ways of privatisation, subject to ⁄ 12 par. 2, for
transfer to the RIF, to cover costs effected by the
transferee to settle ecological commitments that
arose prior to privatisation), 
b) in accord with the Government decision,
particularly for: 
¥ to meet obligations of the enterprises designated
for privatisation, primarily obligations arising
from borrowing that were secured with a lien, 
¥ to strengthen resources of the banks and savings
banks designated to provide credits, 
¥ to fulfil guarantees for loans raised by commercial
companies, in which the FNM has a permanent
stake of at least 34%,
¥ to support development programmes in the
Slovak Republic. 
The book value of the property fit for
privatisation in Slovakia is estimated at SKK 427.6
billion (OECD Economic Surveys, 1996). Of this,
by 31 December 1998, SKK 349.423 billion had
been transferred to the FNM  (the Annual Report of
the Activities of the FNM SR for 1998).
The remainder property that the FNM currently
manages, comprise but an insignificant portion in
the view of the overall amount of property already
privatised. 
Despite this, even a brief overview of economic
management of the FNM so far will unequivocally
show the anomalies in management, which only
confirm the already well known facts about cases of
unreasonable conduct in privatisation. 
Preliminary report on the financial situation
of the FNM for 1999 
It will be evident that the overall volume of
revenues that the FNM has received so far is mainly
affected by the way of privatisation in the period of
1994-1998, when the assets, particularly in direct
sales, were privatised below the price, with the
down payment schedule spread over a long period
and with different additional forms of "condoning"
and relieves. Given the current payment discipline
of the actual debtors of the FNM, it is hard to even
estimate the development in revenues for the
forthcoming period. 
Preliminary report on the financial situation
of the FNM for 1999
Although the FNM manages its assets in a non-
standard way, even a passing glance at the result of
this comparison is startling. Moreover, we need to
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note that these figures do not give a complete
picture of how the property of the FNM is treated:
¥ on the basis of Government decisions, the
revenues of the FNM were used for recovery
processes in the economy that failed to bring the
anticipated effects, were results of political
rather than economic decisions, and made the
economic situation even more complicated (in
the years 1992, 1993 discharging off debts of
companies without complex assessment of the
efficiency of such steps, this often only resulted
in prolonging of the agony in companies and
eventually entailed loss of resources put to this
effect), 
¥ a substantial portion of resources was used to
supply state banks with capital, while these
"financial injections" were not accompanied
with further restructuring processes in the banks,
hence the banks were not professional enough in
carrying out their business, which resulted in the
present staggering sum of classified loans, and
the situation being often worse than before the
banks were supplied with additional capital, 
¥ based on the decisions made by the Government,
the FNM undertook security for credits drawn by
companies, in which it subsequently lost
ownership control, while its obligation of the
security provider persisted. Thus the FNM was
unable to consistently defend its interests in
these companies. This entailed dead capital
invested, and other FNM liabilities. The
decisions made after 1998, have brought about a
partial change, when the FNM resumed property
control over some of these enterprises and hence
also capacity to influence the state of their
activities. 
¥ drawing FNM resources to pay the bonds,
introduced into the privatisation process as yet
another irrational element by virtue of a political
decision, is one of the key faults committed,
¥ FNM funds had also been used to set up
companies with ownership stake of the state
(such as DMD Holding). Currently, in some of
them, the state lost its control, the companies are
often inefficient, and the intention of the state in
founding them cannot readily be identified. 
For the sake of objectivity, we need to say that
part of the FNM funds were used to pursue the state
interest in supporting agriculture, education and
health care. Despite these activities, we may
conclude that the SR Government have squandered
the prevailing part of the FNM resources received
in privatisation by taking ill-advised decisions,
although they handled funds within the framework
of the effective law. 
6.4. THE LIQUIDITY OF THE FNM 
The assessment of the FNM liquidity constitutes a
separate chapter and currently it is the famed Trojan
horse left behind by the last Meiar Government.
Already in the foregoing part, we made reference to
the way and efficiency of economic management of
the FNM based on brief financial results particularly
in the years 1994 - 1998. The resources had been
effected inefficiently, often to cover liabilities of the
companies that were not owned by the FNM and
hence should have been covered from the state
budget. 
The problems with the FNM liquidity were
addressed in the worst possible way at the end of
the last Meiar Government term - by short-term
borrowing at a high rate of interest but due mostly
immediately after the election. Additional costs of
the enormous interest rates have aggravated the
overall financial downfall. Despite borrowing, the
FNM SR was unable to meet its obligations for
1998 and entered the year 1999 with a deficit of
SKK 2.3 billion .
Another, almost insoluble problem, the FNM is
currently facing is the approaching maturity of
bonds that replaced the second wave of
privatisation. Disregarding the macroeconomic
aspect and the issue of what will happen once the
extra-ordinary volume of around SKK 35 billion
has been put in circulation, nobody knows today
what possible and lawful way there is available for
the FNM to tackle the problem. 
The accurate judgement of the development in
the FNM liquidity for the forthcoming years is
floating on estimates since it is impossible to
determine the development in the FNM receivable.
The state still has some limited volume of property,
particularly in the so-called state monopolies and
banks. A rational, efficient and speedy progress in
privatising them might help to resolve the problem
at least partially. Yet it is clear today that without
external financial assistance and new legislative
provisions, the FNM will neither manage to
overcome nor resolve its liquidity problems.
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Revenues 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total
From asset sales 5,971 4,040 7,484 8,817 7,954 3,419 4,534 353 42,572
From dividends 21 412 602 368 246 172 28 1,849
transfers from 
MSPNM SR 7,000 1,000 3,000 500 600 261 12,361
loans 2,245 2,462 4,707
other receipts 50 599 1884 425 729 574 474 142 4,877
financial revenues 6,021 11,660 9,780 10,844 12,051 4,739 8,025 3,246 66,366
revenues in bonds 2,211 4,560 1,402 8,173
TOTAL REVENUES 6,021 11,660 9,780 10,844 14,262 9,299 9,427 3,246 74,539
Table 13 — Revenues of the FNM SR between the year 1992 and September, 10 1999 
Source: Annual reports of activities of the FNM for the years 1992 —1998
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Up to September, 10th 1999
5,754 10,775 10,180 10,119 11,257 9,326 10,196 5,487
Table 14 — Expenditures of the FNM SR between the year 1992 and September, 10 1999 (in mill. SKK)
Source: Annual reports of activities of the FNM for the years 1992 —1998
Receipts Outlays Difference
1992 6,021 5,754 + 267
1993 11, 666 10, 775 + 891
1994 9,780 10, 180 - 400
1995 10, 844 10, 119 + 725
1996 14, 262 11, 257 + 3,005
1997 9,299 9,326 - 27
1998 9,427 10, 196 - 769
Up to September 
10th, 1999 3,246 5,487 - 2,241
TOTAL 74, 545 73, 094 + 1,451
Table 15 — Comparison of revenues and expenditures of the FNM for the period between the 1992 and 10
September 1999 (in mill. SKK)
Source: Annual reports of the activities of the FNM for the years 1992 - 1998
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7.1. LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS 
OF PRIVATISATION OF NATURAL
MONOPOLIES
Under natural monopolies are understood
economic subjects, which in their business
endeavours are not subjected to a long-term
pressure of a competitive environment, while their
position stems from the economic and
technological conditions under which they
operate.1 Natural monopolies play a key role from
the aspect of financial resources, employment and
their political influence upon the Slovak economy.
The issue of privatisation and regulation of natural
monopolies therefore has been resounding in the
Slovak society and has been subject of much
political and economic debate. Currently the issue
of privatisation of natural monopolies is referred to
in connection with the position of the state in
economy. The dominant influence of the state on
the economic management of monopolies is given
by exercising ownership rights in these companies
and regulating their activities. A combination of
executive and regulatory activities leads to
inefficiencies in the functioning of natural
monopolies, which has an adverse effect upon the
economic development. The current effort to
privatise natural monopolies and to set an
autonomous regulatory framework is not just an
attempt to raise efficiency of monopolies. By the
same token, it is the only means to eradicate the
ensuing transformation distortions.
The question of natural monopolies in Slovakia
is very sensitive and none of the Governments
since 1990 have plucked up enough political
courage to trigger off privatisation of natural
monopolies. The notion of monopoly2 had first
been introduced in 1996 in the Act on prices and
the subsequent implementing regulation by the
Ministry of Finance. The ban on privatisation of
natural monopolies was defined in 1995 in the Act
on strategic enterprises. In 1998, concurrently with
the election, a referendum on non-privatisation of
natural monopolies had been called, preceded by a
draft constitutional bill on non-privatisation of 6
natural monopolies. In the summer of 1999, the
president again was submitted a request to call
another referendum on the issue. The referendum
in 1998 was declared void due to insufficient turn
up and the efforts of citizens for a repeated
referendum in 1999 were rejected by the President
as under provisions of the constitution, 
a referendum on the same question can only be
held once in three years. The recent step making
provisions for privatisation of natural monopolies
is the amendment of the Act no. 92/1991 on
transfer of state assets to other persons, which lists
the natural monopolies, in which the state should
keep permanent stake at 51% or which cannot be
privatised (see the next section).
7.1.1 The year 1995 - the Act on
Strategic Enterprises
In 1995 the Government adopted the
controversial Act no.192/1995 of the Collection of
Laws, on securing state interests in privatisation of
strategically important state enterprises and joint
stock companies, which stipulated two groups of
state - or FNM-owned enterprises. The first group
set aside 26 enterprises that could not become
subject of privatisation, among them also all
natural monopolies. In the second group, 45
strategically significant enterprises were included,
in which the state was to retain its influence.
Subject to ⁄2 of the Act on terms and conditions
of transfer of state property to other persons, the
state property administered by state enterprises of
the following branches could not become subject
of privatisation: 
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¥ gas and energy industry (SPP, ZSE, SSE, VSE)
¥ post and telecommunications (SP, ST)
¥ military arms production and general
machinery (6 enterprises)
¥ pharmaceutical production (2 enterprises)
¥ agriculture, forestry and water management (12
enterprises including state forestry enterprises: 
Zpadoslovensk Lesy, Stredoslovensk Lesy,
Severoslovensk Lesy, Vøchodoslovensk Lesy) 
Under the law, the railway transport route, the
Eastern-Slovakian trans-shipments at ierna nad
Tisou and at MaØovce, the shares of the pipeline
operator Transpetrol and Slovensk Elektrrne
(power utility) and the forest land fund
administered by state enterprises could not be
privatised. 
As it later turned out, the law had but a
declarative nature. Though natural monopolies
remained untouched, of the second group of
"strategic" enterprises only 10 remained fully
owned either by the state or the FNM. The
remaining 35 strategically important enterprises had
been privatised 3 under notably unfavourable price
terms4 over the course of the years 1995 — 1998.5
7.1.2 The year 1996 - Natural
monopoly
The term natural monopoly was first
legislatively provided for in the implementing
regulation of the Ministry of Finance of the SR
no.87/1996 of the Collection of Laws, on prices.
Subject to ⁄ 5 par. 3 of the Act on prices, a natural
monopoly denotes technological, organisational
and economic relations in a non-competitive
environment between the seller and the buyer,
which are reason for price regulation. These
relations stem from total or partial linkage through
a technical system (networks), subject to special
regulations, particularly in:  
¥ production, transmission, and distribution of
electricity and heat
¥ production, storage, transmission and
distribution of natural gas 
¥ production of drinking and utility water from
surface and ground sources and its distribution
through 
¥ public water systems and waste water discharge
through public sewer systems and treatment
plants
¥ telecommunication and postal services
¥ operation and use of railway transport routes
¥ other regulated activity, such as oil refining,
operating water works and water transport,
mining and  extraction of raw materials and
fuels, municipal public transport, arms
production, radio communication and cable
television services. 
The act did not stipulate natural monopolies
exactly, it only specified the areas having the
character of natural monopolies. Such a definition
offered considerable benevolence in understanding
the notion of natural monopoly, which often
resulted in its faulty interpretation. 
7.1.3 The year 1998 - The draft
constitutional law on ensuring state
interests in energy and gas industries
At the 49th meeting of the NR SR on July, 9 1998,
deputies did not pass6 the draft constitutional law on
securing state interests in energy and gas industries.
The deputies for KDH ( the Christian Democratic
Movement) and the SMK (the Hungarian Coalition
Party) declined to take a vote on it arguing there was
such a law on non-privatisation of strategic
enterprises already in existence and the ruling
coalition was circumventing it anyway.7
The bill proposed by the deputies for the  Workers
Party (ZSR) would bar privatisation of these enterprises.
Opposition deputies of the house however dubbed the bill
as "one which does not solve anything and is empty"8 The
parliament voted on the bill several times as there were
not sufficient numbers of deputies present in the house.
The bill would preclude privatisation of state
enterprises and some joint stock companies in the
above branches of industry. The proposed version
specified the state enterprises and joint stock
companies that could not be privatised, and whose
assets or ownership interests they had put in other
physical or legal persons could not be privatised either.
7.1.4 The year 1998 - The referendum
on non-privatisation of strategic
energy and gas utilities
Concurrently with the parliamentary elections,
on September, 25-26 1998, a referendum on non-
privatisation of strategic energy and gas utilities
was held. It was called by the Government of the
SR which were also exercising some of
presidential powers, on the basis of a citizens
petition received on August, 13 1998. The
referendum carried a single question. "Are you in
favour of the National Council of the SR adopting 
a constitutional law that would ban privatisation of
the following strategic enterprises: 
¥ Zpadoslovensk Energetick Zvody, ä.p.,
Bratislava (ZEZ) 
¥ Stredoslovensk Energetick Zvody, ä.p.,
ºilina  (SEZ)
¥ Vøchodoslovensk Energetick Zvody, ä.p.,
Koäice (VEZ)
¥ Slovenskø Plynrenskø Priemysel, ä.p.,
Bratislava (SPP)
¥ Slovensk Elektrrne, a.s., Bratislava (SE) 
¥ Transpetrol, a.s., Bratislava
Participants in the referendum could answer
either positively (yes) or negatively (no). Given
the insufficient turn up (44,06 % of registered
voters), the referendum was declared void.10
The referendum on non-privatisation of strategic
enterprises was initiated by the Movement for 
a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS). At the same time,
its members began collecting signatures for the
citizens petition for calling a referendum , which
was signed by more than half a million citizens by
June, 11 1998. The opposition parties perceived
this initiative disconcertingly. Then the deputy
chair of the Slovak Democrtatic Left (SD»),
Brigita Schmgnerov, denoted the petition
campaign of HZDS and the referendum on non-
privatisation of strategic enterprises as a game to
cheat the public.11
Several liberal economists pointed to the necessity
of privatising state monopolies but the opposition
politicians, aware of pre-election pressures, the
reluctance of the electorate for privatisation of
monopolies and, particularly, fearing potential failure
in the elections prepared their own bill on non-
privatisation. The leader of the opposition Slovak
Democratic Coalition, (SDK), M. Dzurinda, first
dubbed the petition as a pre-election populist move,12
but a month later, he himself became a populist when
he together with the deputies for SDK, Viliam
Vaäkovi, Gabriel Palacka and »udovt ernk,
drafted a constitutional bill on securing state interests
in strategic state enterprises and joint stock
companies. The draft excluded from privatisation
state enterprises (ZSE, SSE, VSE, SPP), railway
transport route, and trans-shipment points at ierna
nad Tisou and MaØovce, administered by the ºSR, as
well as forest fund administered by state enterprises.
The above proposal further banned privatisation of
Transpetrol, a.s. which was to be owned at 100% by
the FNM. As V. Vaäkovi said, the objective of the
SDK was to get through the draft constitutional bill in
the parliament immediately after September
elections: "To this effect, SDK will seek support of
the constitutional majority in the new parliament."13
Political analyst G. Meseìnikov maintains that
the purpose of the petition campaign of the HZDS
and the referendum itself was to use the banner of
keeping a strong position of the state in strategic
enterprises to the movementÕs benefit. The
organisation of referendum on the day of
parliamentary elections, in his view, could  be
motivated by an effort to make the election process
more complicated, since the applicable
implementing regulations for the two events differ.14
A number of analysts deemed the initiatives
pursued by opposition and coalition parties of the
day in the summer of 1998 for halting privatisation
in energy and gas industry dangerous.
Conceivably, the encouragement of anti-
transformation mood of a large public just for the
sake of getting their favour could, in the long run,
lead to halting the transformation process. 
Jn Oravec, the President of the F. A. Hayek
Foundation, noted that the initiative for non-
privatisation of strategic companies was tangible
proof of how support of the public can be won
through demagogy even in respect of measures,
which, in the long run, can be damaging to all. In
connection with paying off the bonds at January, 1
200115 and the high insolvency of the FNM, in his
view, any Government in office in 2000 would
happily forget about the "folklore initiatives of the
mid-1998 and, in an attempt to save their neck, will
offer enterprises or industries currently debated for
sale as quickly as possible. In this respect, J. Oravec
maintains, the initiative for non-privatisation of
energy industry seems to be a factor that may have
a very negative influence on the attitudes of the lay
public. "In this respect, it is regretful that the current
opposition has responded to populism with a similar
populism and, in tune with coalition parties, is
creating a united anti-privatisation front. And this,
when at least the SDK has something different
written in its manifesto, but its representatives have
resigned on explaining the actual situation, and
opted for an avenue of least resistance, that is,
courting the prevailing albeit incorrect opinion."16
Numerous public opinion polls have indicated
that citizens regard privatisation of natural
monopolies very negatively and that they would
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vote against privatising them. On the whole, we
may conclude that in a referendum for non-
privatisation of strategic companies at the instance
of then coalition and opposition, more than 50% 
of electors eligible to vote would have
participated, and retaining participation of the state
in strategic companies would have been supported
by more than half of the participant voters, which
should prompt the parliament to pass a
constitutional law banning privatisation of these
enterprises. By the majority of population,
however, its significance was perceived as
secondary. The insufficient turn-out at the
referendum can thus be credited, to a marked
degree, to bad timing when its importance got lost
in the pre-election tumult. 
7.1.5 The year 1999 — Referendum on
non-privatisation 
The efforts to call a referendum on non-
privatisation of strategic enterprises were resumed
again in the summer of 1999, that is, less than a
year after previous referendum had been declared
void. The constitution bans calling referendum
twice in a row within three years on the same
question. Despite this, HZDS did launch another
petition drive, in which along with the languages 
of minorities, it intended to raise the question of
non-privatisation of strategic companies again. 
At July, 2 1999, the petition against privatisation
of strategic enterprises17 had been signed by
367,000 citizens. The President gave a statement
on August, 24 1999 that he had not called
referendum on non-privatisation of strategic
enterprises and on the use of minority languages
because its was at variance with the constitution of
the SR. More than 51% of 500 respondents,
approached by phone by the Agency Polis -
Slovakia, agreed with the decision. The opposition
commented the presidentÕs decision by saying they
expected the president to at least call referendum
on non-privatisation of strategic enterprises.
It is noteworthy that the poll conducted on July,
19-23 1999 by the Agency Taylor Nelson Sofres,
in co-operation with the press agency SITA in
1043 respondents indicated that as much as 76.9%
of population was against privatisation of strategic
enterprises. Grigorij Meseìnikov, the President of
the Institute for Public Affairs, commented the
situation of the referendum in the late 1998 as
follows: "despite the fact that the majority of
citizens is against privatisation of strategic
enterprises, they do not think it necessary to come
and give their view, although they do not agree
with privatisation ."
7.1.6 The year 1999-the amendment of
the Act no. 92/1991 of 16 September
1999
The Government amendment of the Act on
conditions of transfer of state assets to other
persons was approved at the 20th meeting of the
National Council of the SR.18 The amendment
made provision for conditions of transfer of state
property to other persons, bringing some changes
primarily related to the definition of powers in
further process of privatisation.
The Government always decides about
privatisation of an enterprise having the nature of
a natural monopoly, by determining property
ownership of the state in the business of such an
enterprise, or a commercial company and on
privatisation of a joint stock company with state
interest, having a nature of a natural monopoly,
after the discussion about the intention and course
of action in the parliament. The parliament must
give its advice within 30 days since its
presentation. After this period, the proposal is
deemed to have been debated. The amendment
strictly stipulates which enterprises are of a natural
monopoly character. (Table 16) This change
should, in a marked way, increase transparency
and control over the privatisation process by the
parliament. At the same time, however, the
involvement of the parliament in decision making
may significantly block and prolong the
privatisation process. 
Similarly to the Strategic Enterprise Act, the
amendment, too, earmarks the state assets that
cannot be privatised, namely the railway transport
route19, trans-shipment points at ierna nad Tisou
and MaØovce, the forest land fund, constructions
and facilities serving forestry and the shares of
their commercial companies owned by the state20,
unless they are subject to claims, subject to special
regulations, surface and ground waters21 and the
property serving for the administration and
protection of waterways and groundwater and
shares of their commercial companies shares or
property serving to provide postal services
reserved to the state.22
The law brings two significant changes relative
to the preceding legislation. Firstly, it significantly
strengthens the responsibility of the Government,
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and the parliament, in particular, in the
privatisation decisions. Secondly, it designates
energy and gas enterprises in which the state
should retain permanent interest. In decisions on
privatisation of SPP, ZSE, SSE, VSE, SE23 and
Transpetrol, the state or the fund must retain
permanent property interest in the business of at
least 51 percent. Under the Government decision,
the state or the fund will retain some property
interest in the ST.24
At the same time, the amendment repealed the
controversial act of the NR SR no. 192/1995 on
securing state interests in privatisation of
strategically important state enterprises and joint
stock companies, as later amended. 
7.1.7 The Act on large-scale
privatisation has its twenty-first
amendment
After ten years, Slovakia has a law which at
least partially permits to privatise natural
monopolies. It was preceded by a major exchange
of views within parties of the ruling coalition but
also the opposition. It is a law of compromises, in
which, as several experts agree, the post - socialist
spirit won. The three months of political struggle
and search for political consensus resulted finally
in what the Government had declared as one of its
priorities - a framework definition of what will still
be privatised from among the enterprises
understood until recently as strategic. The
compromise took an unbelievably long time to
reach, when SD» constantly blocked the bill and
managed to get through its long-standing declared
objective - to keep majority stakes in energy
utilities in the hands of the state.25 Six energy
companies can only be privatised up to 49 percent
of their property.
The expert commission reviewing the
possibilities of privatisation of natural monopolies,
composed of four members of the ruling coalition
finally identified three possible solutions (table 17).
SD» however got through a fourth, hybrid
alternative substantially restraining the deetatisation
of monopolies.
The liberal platform of SDK advocated a law
that would not define any percentage interest of the
state. On the other hand, SD» insisted on
minimum 51% of the permanent interest in six
energy companies and a 34% stake in the Slovak
Telecommunications. 
7.2. POLITICAL RELUCTANCE 
TO UNDERTAKE PRIVATISATION 
OF STATE MONOPOLIES 
For the purpose of this part of the chapter, the
term natural monopoly will denote state enterprises
having the nature of a natural monopoly. It
concerns, in particular, SPP, SE, ZSE, SSE, VSE,
TRANSPETROL, ºSR, SP and ST.
The functioning of natural monopolies in
Slovakia is considerably restrained by the
interventions of the state, not only in the area of
regulation, but in exercising ownership rights as
well. Over the course of last ten years, natural
monopolies were regarded as the "family silver".
There was a perception of them being untouchable
and beyond privatisation. The society was being
confirmed in the opinion that only the state could
be the proper owner of these companies. This
nationalistic conception of the position of a
monopoly was supported by the ruling parties
from the inception of transformation. 
The preference given to state ownership as
opposed to private ownership was defended by
claiming that the private ownerÕs involvement
would be reflected in the output price of products
and services of the monopolies. The motivation for
functioning of a monopoly, just as in any other case
of enterprise is in achieving profit. The entry of
private capital in these companies would not avoid
changes to final consumer prices. The problem of
establishing consumer prices, however, can be
addressed with correctly set regulatory framework,
whose creation had frozen in 1992 and was
resumed only in 1999. (For more detail, see
Appendix 2 of this chapter). In case of such
institutional shortcoming as a lacking functional
regulatory framework, the benefits following from
the privatisation of natural monopolies can be
seriously marked with uncontrolled price increases. 
The population is very sensitive to increases in
the price level, particularly of those products and
services that were "always", under socialist era,
almost free. For ten years, the idea of the
impossibility of privatisation of natural monopolies
was being fashioned from this very axiom. These
are the assumptions behind the reluctance of
citizens to agree with the denationalisation of these
companies, as is clear from the opinion polls
indicating that more than 75% of respondents
disagree with the idea.
The role of the Government in the Slovak
economy is very closely connected with natural
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monopolies. Natural monopolies, owing to their
influence and strength have become one of the
direct instruments of economic policy. The high
tempo of GDP growths were achieved primarily
because of huge investments of natural
monopolies, whose investment activities were
backed with guarantees for their credits. The low
inflation was achieved owing to inadequately
tough regulatory policy. Natural monopolies
became the largest employers and they undergo
the process of restructuring and rationalisation
with major difficulties. The profits generated by
natural monopolies were progressively dissolved
in the current expenses of the state budget, or
transferred through unfavourable contracts to
private companies or went for financing activities
of political parties. 
Privatisation of natural monopolies would mean
loss of control of the state and the ruling political
parties over a huge package of finances; since a
private owner does not have to be grateful to
anybody for the won election. A private owner
does not have to come and rescue the deficit state
budget or employ in return political and
bureaucratic top officials. He does not 
need to channel finances in loss-generating firms.
He does not have to support advertising agencies.
Moreover, he does not need to cover the cost of
activities of political parties. 
The functioning of a natural monopoly can be
defined by three objectives. Efficiency (Profitability).
Equality (Social function). Stability (Price level). In
the Slovak economic environment thus far, equality
and stability have dominated the efficiency. 
Efficiency of a natural monopoly is the key
prerequisite for its privatisation. The data on sales
and the economic result of natural monopolies
over the course of recent five years indicate that
the efficiency of natural monopolies has been
declining. There is a marked inconsistency
between the growth of sales and the growth of
profit before tax. (Table 19). While in 1994, the
proportion of profit before tax in sales was 25.4%,
the same figure dropped to 4.8 % in 1998. 
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Trade name Abbreviation Legal form Seat
1. Slovenskø Plynrenskø Priemysel SPP state enterprise Bratislava
2. Zpadoslovensk Energetick Zvody ZSE state enterprise Bratislava
3. Stredoslovensk Energetick Zvody SSE state enterprise ºilina
4. Vøchodoslovensk Energetick Zvody VSE state enterprise Koäice
5. Slovensk Poäta [ Slovak Post] SP state enterprise Bansk Bystrica
6. Slovenskø Vodohospodrsky podnik 
[Slovak Water Management Utility] SVP state enterprise Bansk Ætiavnica
7. ºeleznice Slovenskej Republiky 
[Slovak Railways] ºSR state enterprise Bratislava
8. Transpetrol joint stock company Bratislava
9. Slovensk elektrrne SE joint stock company Bratislava
10. Slovensk telekomunikcie ST joint stock company Bratislava
11. Lesy Bratislava [ Forests Bratislava ] state enterprise Bratislava
Lesy Trenn [Forests Trenn] state enterprise Trenn
Stredoslovensk lesy 
[Central-Slovakian Forests] state enterprise Bansk Bystrica
Severoslovensk lesy 
[North-Slovakian Forests] state enterprise ºilina
Lesy Koäice [Forests Koäice] state enterprise Koäice
Lesy Preäov [Forests Preäov ] state enterprise Preäov
Table 16 — Enterprises having the nature of natural monopoly subject to the amendment of the Act no. 92/1991
Source: ⁄10 of the Act No. 92/1991 of the Collection of Laws , as later amended
The alarming situation in the decreasing
efficiency was due to the reluctance of the state to
cede its ownership rights in state monopolies. The
reach of the Government in the management of
state monopolies was absolute and brought clear
benefits to the Government, through which they
could exercise influence on the running of
economy. The effort of some political parties (both
coalition and opposition) to denationalise
monopolies was and still is very low. The exercise
of ownership rights and administration of state
monopolies gives political parties indisputable
advantages: 
¥ power to influence financial flows elicited by
high consumption of the state, which entailed
excessive drain of resources 
¥ power to reward brought about by political
appointments of the management, which was
reflected in the low level of corporate
governance 
¥ power to finance political parties
¥ power to influence economic policy through
pseudo-strategic factors (high employment,
maintaining inflation, GDP growth) 
¥ power to support private economic entities. 
7.2.1 Power to influence financial
flows, which entailed excessive drain 
of resources 
In addition to tax liability, some state enterprises
(SPP and ST) are obliged to transfer so-called
special transfers to the state budget, which get into
the budget as non-tax revenues and the Government
use them to cover Government expenditure. The
negative relation between the growing transfers to
the state budget and the profit before tax is
alarming. The substantial deficit of the state budget
in 1996 called for a greater pressure on special
transfers. The decline of SPP profit before tax was
accompanied with higher transfers to the budget.
While in 1994-1996 the proportion of transfers to
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Variant Privatisation  option
1 The first variant contemplated replacing blockage percentages with a provision that the state would 
retain property interest on the basis of defining the strategic interest of the state in any particular branch.
2 The second variant attempted to antecede the process of restructuring in these companies and strove 
to define substantively the natural monopoly, i.e., it separated in companies those aspects that had 
a monopoly position for natural or administrative reasons from what may be termed the scope for 
liberalisation and competition. State monopolies as such do not represent natural monopolies, only 
a part of their activities which have not been so far organisationally or assets -wise singled out. The 
variant proposed to determine a range of activities that cannot be privatised regardless of the volume 
of assets that serves to render these activities. For example, the central power transmission system 
and control in power industry or transport route in the Slovak Rail and similar companies serving to 
administer and protect ground water. 
3 The third avenue determined that the Government make decisions about privatisation with a proviso 
that the concept of transformation of individual branches be submitted to the parliament with 
a clearly defined strategic interest of the state. Thus the Government would have to publicly declare 
certain position and the failure to comply with these provisions might be a reason for recalling 
the Government.
4 The last and the final variant carries a centralist handwriting of SD» which have got through 
a 51- percent stake of the state in 6 energy enterprises and an unspecified permanent interest in the 
ST (the Government decided it at 34%) and non-privatisation of the Slovak Post and the ºSR 
(Slovak Railways). 
Table 17 — Variants of deetatisation of natural monopolies
Source: Variants 1, 2 and 3 are according to the statements by the Minister for Privatisation Mria Machov, the commission
member. Variant 4 is the approved variant. PROFIT 39/99 of September, 21 1999
the state budget in profit before tax comprised 9%,
in 1997 it went up to 21% and in 1998 to even 23%
(Table 20). The state thus drained resources through
special transfers to the state budget.
An unbearable situation in the state budget was
confirmed also by the development in 1998 when the
state required additional transfer also from the Slovak
Telecommunications which until recently was not
obliged to make an special financial transfers (Table
21). M. Machov, Minister for Privatisation, in
relation to transfers said that although it was not most
lucky for an enterprise to have to replenish the
revenues of state budget more than others, it was
clear that these enterprises had been one of the worst
managers over the last three-four years, and faced
enormous problems which were taking on not only
local but wider social significance.26
The loss of this additional transfer may be a
significant risk in privatisation. If the state is going
to exercise ownership rights on behalf of its 51%, it
can decide about using them to cover the state
budget deficit, but a private investor could disagree.
In the sale of a minority stake the Government will
have to strengthen decision making powers of
investors, which may weaken the Government
position and the Government will no longer be able
to enforce additional financial transfers. 
7.2.2  Power to politically reward,
which reduced the level of corporate
governance
To be a manager of a state monopoly, both, in
the past and at present, has been considered 
a lucrative position. A manager had to be a person
who was politically acceptable. In return for the
work done in advocating the policy of a particular
party, a person could become general director of 
a state monopoly, which was publicly
acknowledged by Jn Duckø27 in 1997 when
appointed to the position of general director of SPP.
He said then that he took his appointment to the
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Motives of the state for Impact on natural Impact on business, economic 
non-privatisation of natural monopolies and competitive environment
Retaining decision making power Excessive drawing of resources that Potential encouragement of the 
over financial resources of natural caused the enterprises did not have demand side of the GDP through 
monopolies. Control over collecting sufficient own resources for increasing revenues of the State 
taxes and transfers to the state investment activities, which they Budget instead of reducing state
budget. compensated for by taking on expenditures. 
outside resources. 
Power to reward political and Low level of corporate governance, Discrimination against specialists. 
bureaucratic top officials for when candidates were appointed to Negative perceptions of the position
good work. positions of director general along by the public. 
party lines, rather than according to 
professionalism and specialist skills.
Financing political parties of the Draining resources Distortion of the competitive
Government through different environment.
contracts with advertising agencies.
Pseudo-strategic interests of the Labour overmanning and shortage Statistical posting of low rate of 
state, which are in fact political of development funds owing to low rate of inflation through huge 
interests with a populist undertone. price regulation. regulation. Fostering socialist 
Fulfilling social functions. understanding of the concept 
of a natural monopoly. 
Support for private firms. Increasing debt on the grounds of Discrimination, sub-optimal resource 
shortage of own resources.   allocation.
Table 18 — Motives for retaining natural monopolies in the hands of the state
new function as a reward28. When asked whether
his allegiance to HZDS decided the appointment he
said, he saw no obstacles in his membership in
HZDS and his ambition was to continue with his
duties as an MP. He went on to say "I will work in
SPP and I will come to parliament to vote".29 The
most serious qualification yardsticks were political
obsequiousness and readiness to subordinate to the
dictate of a political party. The daily Prca
commented the change at the top of SPP with
scepticism: "Only a great optimist can hope that
replacing A. Demko with a politician who --in his
words --is only going to acquaint himself with the
problems of the SPP, will bring about further
increase of profits." Since the time J. Duckø joined
SPP, the profit before tax went down by SKK 5.2
bilion (for details, see Appendix 1 of this chapter). 
The greatest risk in filling top positions in state
monopolies is the fact that the management does
not manage their own financial resources but the
state funds. This was a major temptation and it
often lead and is still leading to abuse of the office
for private and political purposes.
It is a paradox that the position of the director 
of a natural monopoly was not, and still is not 
a managerial position, but rather, a political one.
Filling top positions in natural monopolies in this
way resulted in controversial decisions and
activities which, though producing an effect on the
surface, were damaging not only to the interests of
natural monopolies themselves, but, above all, to
the citizens of this state. Natural monopolies were
becoming less efficient, which showed in their
economic results. The task for the director
appointed in this way was to secure sufficient
funds for the political party, which in practice was
effected through so-called image campaigns and
use of a selected advertising agency. 
State monopolies are strategic mainly from the
viewpoint of political parties, which is best seen in
changes of Governments after the elections.
Changes at positions of directors of state
monopolies have become a natural consequence of
the changing of the Government. In addition to the
four-year political cycle, there are also changes at
the director positions mainly for purpose of
building a stronger position within the ruling
coalition. It is thus not an exception when 
a minister becomes director of a state monopoly
and vice versa. It is a rare case, when poor
economic performance of a company results in
changing the director. Yet, such arguments are used
most frequently to justify a change which is
actually of a "political and strategic" nature. 
The low level of corporate governance resulting
from political appointments to managerial positions
could  notably change as of January, 1 2000. Top
officials of natural monopolies should switch to 
a system of so-called managerial contracts. Their
fulfilment will be assessed at half-year intervals.
The managerial contract will set each director
different terms. What will be common to all, is 
a relatively low basic salary, which will have a very
strong motivational component. This component
will depend on how the manager succeeds in
stabilising, rationalising or improving the position
of the monopoly. Apart from prerequisites of 
a Specialist, the directors will have to possess also
personal qualities, such as assertiveness, stability or
resistance to stress.
A key prerequisite for introducing the system 
of managerial contracts is to abandon cronyism
and corruption in the process of recruiting renown
managers. At the same time, domestic managers
should not be given preference over foreign
managers.
7.2.3 The power to finance 
political parties
In Slovakia, all natural monopolies are
controlled by political parties. Moreover, the
founders of natural monopolies are individual
ministries. Accordingly, there is a relation of
subordination, on one hand, between individual
ministers and the management of natural
monopolies, on the other hand, a relation of
political incompatibility, because the minister of
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1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Profit before tax Mill. SKK 29,091 26,094 23,857 13,374 6,913
Sales Mill. SKK 114,423 122,442 132,122 137,445 143,213
Profit before tax/Sales % 25% 21% 18% 10% 5%
Table 19 — Profit before tax and sales of natural monopolies*
* SPP, SE, ZSE, SSE, VSE, Transpetrol, ºSR, SP, ST, Source: Top Trend 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999
the founder ministry may be of a different political
orientation than the general director of a natural
monopoly. This situation then may lead to contra-
productive decisions which, on one hand, are
consistent with the decision of a political party,
but, on the other, do not necessarily correspond to
the interest of the Government and vice versa. In
the background of filling individual managerial
positions, there is a tough political struggle and
"coalition agreements" on getting control over a
particular state monopoly or leaving it in the
control of somebody else. 
So, in the leadership of the strategic enterprises
referred above there are concrete people of certain
political persuasion. Moreover, the quality of
management by state bureaucrats in many of these
companies is falling dramatically. These
companies have always been used by political
subjects to achieve political objectives.30
Following example may serve to illustrate the
liaison of political and economic power:
In January 1997, Slovensk Elektrrne (SE),
without a tender, signed a contract on exclusive
advertising representation and collaboration in
implementing marketing and communication
strategy with an advertising agency Donar, at an
amount of more than SKK 130 million.31 In
addition, the control of the Ministry of Economy
revealed that Donar made out SE invoices without
specification of works delivered.32 The daily Prca
even published an order of the general director of
SE, Tibor Mikuä, asking all directors of units and
district plants to always collaborate in their
advertising activities with the Agency Donar. The
daily further mentions that "the advertising agency
Donar is running campaign for HZDS and T.
Mikuä is a top-position candidate of the ruling
movement in this yearÕs parliamentary elections.
This is then a way how money of the state budget
can be transferred from a state enterprise for the
election purposes of the HZDS."33 It is most
relevant that the management of SPP, headed by
Jn Duckø, also concluded unfavourable contracts
with Donar.34
7.2.4  The power to put forward
natural monopolies as a tool of
economic policy to achieve pseudo-
strategic state interests 
Maintaining low inflation 
Until 1993, for political reasons delayed energy
price deregulation had been conterproductive. The
dogma taken over from the communist ideology, on
some public goods "free of charge" or for low prices
had become a key tenet of the whole process of
transformation and the subject of deregulation had
been detabuised only at the turn of the years 1998 and
1999, within the first so-called stringency measures
package. A more significant deregulation occurred
immediately in May when the populist SD», too, had
to give in to the pressures of right-oriented
economists. Deregulation within second, so-called
"rescue" package, was necessary mainly due to the
pressure of the decomposing public finance and the
failure to maintain the exchange rates.
The intentional delay of price deregulation in
the last five years had a political overtone. Apart
from the competent policy of the NBS, it was
freezing consumer prices for energy, fuels, water,
etc. that significantly contributed to maintaining
very low growth of the price level. At the same
time, the input prices of natural monopolies were
steadily increasing in response to inflation and the
changes in the interest rates. The distorted prices
could not cover the growing cost of state
monopolies, which reflected primarily in the
economic results of natural monopolies. The
widening gap between the regulated output prices
and unregulated input prices could at least
temporarily be closed by the double deregulation
in January and in May 1999. 
The energy prices and those of other regulated
products and services had been regulated only
minimally by January 1999. The final consumer
prices were many times lower than the production
and input prices. A particularly critical situation
occurred in energy prices for individuals when
they were regulated more significantly than those
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1994 1995 1996 1997 1998*
Transfers of in million SKK 1,197 1,200 1,200 2,000 2,000
SPP profit before tax in million SKK 13,253 13,322 13,792 9,645 8,574
Transfers /Profit before tax in % 9 % 9 % 9 % 21 % 23 %
Table 20 — Transfers of Slovenskø PlynrenskøPriemysel (SPP)
Source: Top Trend 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999
for businesses and the proportion of individual
consumers began to significantly grow against
businesses.35 The low rates for electricity for
households had an adverse effect upon investment
activities of the companies. 
This has been constantly pointed to by directors of
distribution companies. Andrej Deveka, the director
for trade and development of ZSE, stated that instead
of profits being channelled into improvements of
energy facilities they were lost in the low price of
energy for the population. "The price for small
consumers is at the level of 50% of the cost for which
ZSE gets the electricity. Each citizen is then
subsidised equally, regardless of consumption."36
The situation was assessed similarly by the
senior director for economy and finance of the SSE
Miroslav Ryäavø when he saw behind the negative
economic development and performance the
regulated purchase price of electricity, the regulated
purchase and selling price of thermal energy and the
inflation and its impact on the input growth. The
company managed to cover the most urgent non-
investment costs. The price structure of electric and
thermal energy has no relation to the cost of
production and supply, and these are higher than the
selling price. As a result of the regulation mentioned
above, there is insufficient accumulation of own
resources for reproduction and the rate of interest
burden is growing. 37
It follows from the above that the strategy of
increasing prices for electricity and heating is
insufficient from the aspects of the costs connected
to the energy supply. 
According to the analysis of SE, their input cost
have gone up 600 % over the last years, while the
consumer prices do not even cover the production
and distribution costs of electricity. Moreover,
since 1993, the impact of the devalued crown, the
change of VAT, inflation development, and new
types of cost had not been reflected in the
electricity rates.38 Thus the electricity rates so far
have not been an instrument which would take
account of real cost of production, but rather, they
were a social instrument.39
A similar situation developed in the price of
gas. According to J. Duckø, then general director,
the gross profit of SPP for the years 1995-1997
was running at SKK 33 billion, even with the price
of natural gas for the population at the level of
SKK 1.90 per m3, although SPP purchased it at
SKK 3.40. "By doing this, we fulfil also one of the
social tasks of the state. We do not need to add that
a private firm would not do it, which would
definitely entail increased prices of gas for the
households."40
A policy of high employment
The process of restructuring and rationalising
has not touched state monopolies at all. The reason
for the employee reduction in state monopolies
was the departure of 5,800 employees of the ºSR
over the course of the years 1993-1998. The excess
number of employees under falling profits exerts
an adverse effect on the economy of a state
monopoly because the wage cost growth arising
from the increase of nominal wages under equal
(or higher) number of employees is not offset by
increased profit. This entails a steadily declining
proportion of profit before tax per employee,
which since 1994, has gone down from SKK 250,
000 to the level of SKK 60,000 in 1998. (Table 23)
As one might expect, in the view of keeping
social peace, the state was more interested in high
employment than in improving economic
performance. Owing to the peculiarly set way of
taxing (a system of credited and deductible items)
the companies always transferred the financial
resources in the form of taxes. 
Achieving high growth of the GDP at the
expense of growing debt
Another stumbling block was the insufficient
co-ordination in the economic policy with the
economic management of the individual
enterprises. The priority of the economic policy in
the past years was the growth of the GDP. This
growth, however, was not based on a sound
development through increased competitiveness of
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1994 1995 1996 1997 1998*
ST transfers in million SKK 0 0 0 0 500
ST profit before tax in million SKK 2,117 2,802 4,199 4,310 2,061
Transfers / Profit before tax in % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 24 %
Table 21 — Transfers of Slovensk Telekomunikcie (ST)
Source: Top Trend 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999
the economy, but was driven mainly by increased
consumption of the population and the
Government. Within a very short time, state
monopolies had invested huge amounts. The
positive effect of investments was significantly
restricted by the volume of financial resources for
this investment. Owing to low prices of their
output products and services, and the declining
profit, the undercapitalised state monopolies then
did not have sufficient funds for these cost-
intensive investments, consequently the
Government had to give state guarantees for the
credit financing of these investments. Though the
high tempo of investments of state monopolies led
to a speedy growth of their balance sheet amounts,
it did so only at the expense of substantial increase
of foreign resources in the assets of these
companies. (Table 24). 
Granting state guarantees and the subsequent credit
burden of the enterprises hides an enormous timed
risk. The credit repayment schedule is unrelenting. By
taking over the guarantee, the state will have to pay if
the enterprise is unable to repay the credit. The
instalment burden for enormous investment activities
will be transferred from the enterprise to the state
budget and from the state budget to the taxpayers.
This inability of natural monopolies to repay interest
and credits is augmented by pouring profits of these
companies into private firms and political parties.
Minister Machov confirmed that "the indebtedness
of state monopolies is paid by us all because the
majority of their credits is guaranteed by the state and
they themselves had pledged their assets for credits
taken by other companies. Making their activities
more efficient thorough privatisation thus is of equal
significance as the revenues from their sale for the
budget."42 Moreover, domestic credit sources are
several times more expensive when compared to
foreign sources, which means that the resources for
investment ambitions and restructuring are raised in
foreign currency, which in turn relevantly affects the
volume of financial cost through the change in the
exchange rate. 
7.2.5 The power to support private
businesses which resulted in assets
stripping of state monopolies
The assets stripping of state monopolies over
the course of transformation has been pointed to
by not only journalists but politicians and
independent economists as well. The position of a
state monopoly and the power of its management
in Slovak economy makes (legal) assets stripping
of the enterprise possible, i.e., to transfer its assets
in the form of financial resources or capital to a
private firm, from where the funds are directed to
different purposes , such as private benefit,
financing political parties, etc. The largegest
weakness of the transformation process in
Slovakia is the absence of institutional framework.
The current state of institutional arrangements has
offered management of state monopolies ideal
conditions for pouring assets out: 
¥ management is appointed by the sector minister
without a competitive interview, only based on
references and mainly political allegiance 
¥ tough control process is missing, as well as
control by the public. The Government accepts
many errors and faults in decision making, with
personal accountability absent. The controlling
function is to a large extent eroded by the
loyalty of the Government to the management
of state monopolies
¥ state monopoly (and its management) lacks
motivation to achieve profit 
¥ management administer immense financial
resources and they make decisions alone.
Though the sector minister is superior, this
superiority is often only formal, which is seen
in the absolute wilfulness of the management of
a state monopoly 
¥ the nexus of political and economic power is
thus taking on a severe dimension when
efficient control mechanisms through the
opposition or the public are not in place 
¥ state monopolies are artificially maintained
through subsidies to carry out social functions 
¥ non-transparent selection of suppliers,
preference given to close private firms.
Insufficient information on the economic
performance of enterprises
¥ exclusion of foreign consultancy firms from
decision making processes. 
The asset stripping of state monopolies 
has got several forms. The most common 
are the following: 
¥ purchases through a mediator without calling a
tender, or through a manipulated public tender
(office equipment, information technology
systems, etc.) 
¥ signing fictitious delivery contracts that had
been duly invoiced by third parties, duly paid
by the state monopoly but never supplied 
81 PETER PAºITNł
¥ concluding unfavourable third-parties beneficial
contacts (unfavourable lease contracts,
unfavourable leases, etc.) 
¥ financing advertising image promoting
campaigns 
¥ purchases of unattractive stocks of loss making
enterprises at higher than market prices 
¥ reimbursement through drawing own bills of
exchange
¥ exacting receivables through third parties for
unreasonably high commission charges 
¥ sale of property for unusually low prices. 
7.3 RISK FACTORS 
OF PRIVATISATION 
Privatisation of state monopolies carries with it
a number of risks. The major risk involved is the
readiness for privatisation, in which time plays an
important role. The scope of privatisation and
setting adequate price for assets privatised is
another significant factor, while it is vital to opt for
the right form of privatisation and decide how the
proceeds of privatisation are going to be
employed. Last, but not least, we need to bear in 
mind that the privatisation process must be
economic and specialist, rather than political
problem, as has been the case to date. 
There are two important factors which 
are relevant prerequisites for minimising risks
involved in privatisation of state monopolies: 
¥ depoliticising the process of privatisation 
¥ co-ordination of the process of privatisation and
regulation.
7.3.1 The readiness of natural
monopolies for privatisation 
Excluded from privatisation for the moment
are: ºeleznice SR, Slovensk Poäta, Slovenskø
VodoHospodrsky Podnik and Lesy SR,
administered by 6 state enterprises. Other excluded
entities include transit gas network (component
part of SPP) and transit petroleum pipeline, (a
component part of Transpetrol). In the province of
SE, the central transmission systems, the energy
control, and the water power plant in Gabkovo
have also been excluded from privatisation.
Privatisation of the nuclear power plants in
Jaslovsk Bohunice and Mochovce will also be
problematic in the forthcoming period. That would
leave electricity generation (part of the SE) and
distribution (SSE, VSE and ZSE) and the thermal
energy producing facilities, subject to privatisation
in the energy sector. 
The Slovensk telecomunikcie (ST) are best
prepared for privatisation, whose privatisation should
have taken place in 1999 but several scandals have
caused that it would likely happen in the year 2000.
Under the recent decision adopted by the Government,
the strategic investorÕs share should be 51%, that of the
state 34%, and the FNM 15%, respectively.43
Privatisation may slightly be problematic in those
enterprises, where, subject to relevant legislation, the
state is to retain 51% and which encompass also
components that cannot be privatised. These include:
SPP, SE, ZSE, SSE, VSE and Transpetrol.
A potential delay reduces the price of these
monopolies. Eugen Jurzyca, the President of the
Centre for Economic Development, in respect of
the delay, notes that the most vehement opponents
of privatisation who see themselves as defending
the interests of Slovakia, should contemplate
whether they have not deprived this country of
tens, if not hundreds, of billion crowns.44
7.3.2 Privatisation - a victory 
of politics 
In 1998, privatisation was opposed equally by
parties of the opposition and the coalition. The
attitude then was conditioned by the pre-election
populism. Currently, the greatest opponents of
privatisation are the opposition parties, which, in
summer 1999, initiated a petition drive to ban
privatisation of state monopolies. The opinions on
privatisation of state monopolies vary within the
current coalition. Only the parties of SDK, SMK
and SOP, have unequivocally stood up to support
privatisation, and also agree in suggesting that the
amendment of the large privatisation law should
not stipulate permanent percentage holdings of the
state in so-called strategic enterprises, such as SE,
SPP, ST or Transpetrol.45 The position of SD» was
expressed in two draft amendments. The 
first called for retaining 51% permanent stake in
energy utilities, and the second proposed to
increase powers of the parliament in privatisation,
when each privatisation project of state
monopolies should first be debated in the
Government and then in the Parliament. (Table 25) 
The greatest proponents of privatisation in the
Government before the law was passed was the
Deputy Prime Minister for Economy, Ivan Mikloä,
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and the Minister for Privatisation Mria Machov.
Ivan Mikloä said that considerations about potential
restraints to privatisation of natural monopolies with
permanent majority interest of the state had very
negative direct and indirect consequences, both
from the aspect of the conditions of the OECD, and
the potential revenues of the state. If the investor,
Mikloä contends, takes over the management and
control over a strategic company, then it is
necessary to also consider the sale of a larger stake
of stocks. Such sale will bring the state budget much
higher proceeds.46
The Minister for Privatisation saw major risks
of the stipulation of permanent property interest of
the state in natural monopolies and some financial
institutions under the state control, in significant
narrowing of the scope and ways for stabilisation
of Slovak economy and the elimination of risks of
the state budget for 2000. It would also make the
position of the FNM SR more difficult in
redeeming bonds of the Fund, bond /share swaps
and also fulfilling some other priorities of the
Government policies.47
Eventually, the political struggle for
(non)privatisation of state monopolies was won by
the SD», which, despite the resistance of the other
three coalition parties, advocating a more vehement
privatisation, managed to get through the blockage
clause and also the control by the parliament. 
7.3.3 Through privatisation 
of natural monopolies as much 
as around SKK 266 billion could 
be received 
The economic public perceives privatisation of
natural monopolies and their subsequent
legislative and executive regulation very
positively. Their market value, however, will
remain a problem, that is, how much 
a foreign investor will be willing to pay for any of
these natural monopolies. The Minister of Finance
has already introduced some alternatives of the
market value. If her projections were to come true,
the state might get as much as SKK 266 billion in
privatising state monopolies. (Table 26) 
7.3.4 The form of denationalisation
and how to deal with the revenues
Denationalisation of natural monopolies may
run in several ways. In selecting the privatisation
method, at least two important factors should be
accounted for, namely the proceeds of the potential
privatisation and the obligation of the Fund
towards the citizen in the form bonds. Privatisation
can basically take four avenues: 
¥ swapping natural monopolies shares for FNM
bonds
¥ selling stocks of strategic enterprises to the
citizens association Your Wave of Privatisation 
¥ sale to strategic investors through public tender
¥ combining the above. 
Trading bonds for shares 
At January, 1 2001, the National Property Fund
( FNM SR) must pay out bonds to citizens worth
around SKK 32 billion. Swapping bonds for shares
of natural monopolies is one of the solutions that is
offered. Minister of Finance, B. Schmgnerov
even thinks it appropriate to swap bonds directly
for shares of lucrative, meaning now only strategic
enterprises.48 Minister Machov deems the idea of
exchanging bonds for stocks of the predetermined
enterprises, in kind of packages even, to be
premature.49
The greatest advantage of this variant is 
a quick solution of the FundÕs obligation regarding
citizens, without inflation pressure being exerted
on the economy.50 The risks involved in applying
this model clearly include the negative image of
the voucher (voucher) privatisation and the
citizens distrust for this form of privatisation.
Another significant risk is that the economy would
not get real money. The last relevant risk in case of
swapping bonds for shares is the fragmented
ownership and a possibility that subjects might
buy out state enterprises that would jeopardise
their functioning.
Sale of natural monopolies to 
a Slovak entity 
A successful Slovak entrepreneur came up with
the project of Your Wave of Privatisation. He
founded a citizens association with the goal of
privatising natural monopolies. Currently a massive
advertising campaign has been launched to raise
financial resources from the citizens. The idea is to
then bid for privatisation of state monopolies with
the money. The activities were criticised by both the
Deputy Prime Minister Ivan Mikloä and the
Minister of Finance Schmgnerov. 
The major risks of this form of privatisation
include the unverifiable promises of the
associationÕs founders about high yields reaching
100% of the deposit, whose guarantee is doubtful,
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and also lack of confidence of citizens in
investment funds as a result of the abolishment of
the second wave of privatisation. The fact that the
economy will not experience the inflow of foreign
investment, know-how, technologies and
management is a significant risk as well. 
Foreign bidder (international tender)
The sale of a part of state monopoly to a foreign
bidder requires long-term preparation. The key
prerequisite for a successful privatisation is to call
international tenders and ensure transparency in
their preparation, course, and assessment. The
major benefits of privatisation through a public
tender include: 
¥ inflow of real financial resources in the
economy
¥ experienced management coming
¥ inflow of additional foreign investments
¥ curbing political influence on natural
monopolies.
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Year Annual average Price for Date of Price for Date of
rate of inflation households introduction businesses introduction 
1990 4.5 % 53 % 1 Dec. 1990
1991 61.2 % 70 % October, 1 1991 80 % April, 1 1991
1992 10.0 %
1993 23.2 %
1994 13.4 %
1995 9.9 %
1996 5.8 % 10 % August, 1 1996 5 % August, 1 1996
1997 6.1 % 5 %-13 % August, 1 1997
1998 6.4 %
1999 10 -11 % 50 -100 % July, 1 1999
35 % July, 1 1999 5 % July, 1 1999
Table 22 — Price increases for electricity in the years 1990-1999
Source: Monitoring of daily press
Natural monopolies 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Sales mill. SKK 114,423 122,442 132,122 137, 445 143, 213 
Profit before tax mill. SKK 29,091 26,094 23,857 13, 374 6, 913 
Number of employees average state 115,890 113, 060 112,993 110, 738 110, 061 
Sales per employee mill. SKK 0.99 1.08 1.17 1.24 1.30 
Profit per employee mill. SKK 0.25 0.23 0.21 0.12 0.06
Table 23 — Employment in natural monopolies*
* SPP, SE, ZSE, SSE, VSE, Transpetrol, ºSR, SP, ST
Source: Top Trend 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Foreign funds mill. SKK — — 79,711 125, 920 172,747 
Assets mill. SKK — — 268,918 326, 118 371,337 
Foreign funds/Assets % — — 30 % 39 % 47 %
Table 24 — Growth of foreign funds in state monopolies assets*
* SPP, SE, ZSE, SSE, VSE, Transpetrol, ºSR, SP, ST, Source: Top Trend 1997, 1998, 1999
The major risks of privatisation through public
tendering include:
¥ minority stake designated for privatisation will
not be attractive to foreign investors
¥ failure to manage public tenders (invitation,
control, assessment) may create bad image
among investors 
¥ yielding to political and populist pressures,
whereby a risk is pending of consuming
revenues from privatisation to cover current
expenses,
¥ the absence of an appropriately set regulatory
framework may elicit unfavourable ramifications
on the economy in the form of price increase, etc. 
The privatisation process of state monopolies
will not be fast and without complications. The
real financial resources of the privatisation of state
monopolies will be coming gradually, in medium-
term horizon, their potential use including: 
¥ paying out bonds (recommendation of the
International Monetary Fund), for which the
FNM will need around SKK 32 billion.
¥ cutting foreign debt of the Slovak Republic which
currently amounts to around SKK 480 billion,
which comprises 60 % of the GDP
¥ supporting development programs for business
sector, primarily small and medium-size
businesses 
¥ restructuring banking sector, which, according
to the estimates of the World Bank would
require around SKK 96 billion 
¥ restructuring the system of pension security,
i.e., switching from pay-as-you-go financing to
a four-pillar system, the introduction of which
over the course of 15 years will require SKK
300 - 400 billion. 
¥ payment of state guarantees granted , the volume
of which currently amounts to around SKK 130
billion, with significant peaks occurring in the
years 2001, 2006 and 2007.
APPENDIX 1: CHARACTERISTICS OF
INDIVIDUAL ENTERPRISES HAVING THE
NATURE OF NATURAL MONOPOLIES 
Slovensk Elektrrne
Slovensk elektrrne (SE), a.s., with the assets
of SKK 136.1 billion is the largest Slovak
enterprise generating 88% of the electricity
produced in our country. In 1999, SE faced a
collapse when the economic year ended with a loss
of SKK 11 to 12 billion, and the costs of SKK 23
billion. The planned loss was only SKK 4.6
billion. The collapse was ascribed to the
unfavourable development of the Slovak crown.
The sales of the SE and its distribution energy
plants should go up by SKK 3.7 billion following
electricity price increase, of which SKK 3.2 billion
will fall to the SE. No major improvement of
results awaits the SE.  
Zpadoslovensk Energetick Zvody
The state enterprise Zpadoslovensk
Energetick Zvody (ZSE) Bratislava (West-
Slovakian Energy Utility) was founded by the
Ministry of Economy of the SR in 1990. Its
business includes the purchase, distribution and
supply of electricity and the services of delivery,
consumption or use of electricity and heat. It
further includes production of heat and electricity,
engineering and design in investment construction,
revision of operating boilers, gas facilities,
electrical facilities and lifting devices.
Stredoslovensk Energetick Zvody (SSE)
The state enterprise Stredoslovensk
Energetick Zvody ºilina is a distribution
company operating in production, and distribution
of electricity and thermal energy in the territory 
of ºilina, Bansk Bystrica and partly also Trenn
regions. SSE deal also in design and construction
and mounting activities of the extra high tension
and high voltage technology, electricity and
heating distribution services, metrology, and
counselling. They are beginning to offer
telecommunication services. The SSE is member
of the international consortium Globtel for
building GSM mobile phone network. The SSE
employs 3,650 people, with an average age 
of 39.8 years.  
Vøchodoslovensk Energetick Zvody 
The state enterprise Vøchodoslovensk
Energetick Zvody (VSE) Koäice with a 70-year
tradition carries out economic activity in the area
of purchase and sale of electricity. The company
focuses on construction of power and heating
works, equipment necessary for their operation,
including control devices and technical means to
control electricity consumption. The activities
further include designing electrical devices,
research and development, electrical facilities
inspection, repairs of transformers and electric
motors, official measuring (official checks of
measuring transformers of current and voltage,
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official checks of electrometers ). The VSE supply
electricity through their distribution companies for
the territory of Koäice and Preäov regions. 
Slovenskø Plynrenskø Priemysel
Over the first 6 months of 1999, SPP (the
Slovak Gas Industry) posted a record-breaking
profit of SKK 9.4 billion. The success was mainly
due to sales for transit of gas which went up SKK
1.5 billion. A slowdown in profit is expected for
the second half of the year, with the anticipated
profit of SKK 16 billion by the end of the year.
The SKK managed to cut its credit by SKK 1.6
billion (at mid-year, the credits reached SKK 8.2
billion). The payment discipline of SPP consumers
was declining. The total receivables at mid-year
were SKK 9.7 billion, with receivables past due
increasing to SKK 2.7 billion. 
Transpetrol
Transpetrol was founded on July, 1 1991,
following the split of the SFR, it was divided into
two independent companies. In the CR, the firm
Petrotrans was established that later transformed
into Mero R. Transpetrol is a monopoly operator
of the transit pipelines Druìba and Adria in the
territory of Slovakia. Apart form the parent firm,
there are four joint stock subsidiaries operating in
the SR - Transpetrol - Tranzit, Transpetrol -
Trading, Transpetrol - Finance Leasing and
Transpetrol - Servis. The company employed 474
people last year, with the equity assets of SKK 1.9
billion. The Ministry of the Economy of the SR is
the 100% shareholder of Transpetrol. The first half
of the year 1999 ended for the joint stock company
Transpetrol Bratislava, with the operating profit
before tax of SKK 339.7 million, which is a 51-
percent fulfilment of the agreed annual plan. They
anticipate to run a profit of SKK 664 million, and
a turnover of SKK 2.2 billion.
Slovensk Poäta
Slovensk Poäta (the Slovak Post) has been
excluded from the process of privatisation
although some analysts point out that there is
nothing that would preclude it from being
deetatised and other entities may provide postal
services as well. On a long-term basis, the Slovak
Post has been only very slightly profitable. 
Slovensk Telekomunikcie
Slovensk Telekomunikcie, a.s., (ST) posted a
net profit of SKK 902 mill. last year, the operating
profit of almost SKK 17 billion and costs of SKK 9.5
billion. Last year, the ST invested SKK 9.6 
billion in development and continued with the
Telecommunication Project 2 (years 1996-2000).
They lag behind in its fulfilment with SKK 6 to 8
billion. The SKK had 1.6 billion main phone lines in
operation and is the third largest employer in the SR. 
ºSR
ºeleznice SR (ºSR) ended the first half of the year
with a loss in excess of SKK 2 billion.. The costs of
SR amounted to SKK 11.4 billion, the sales to SKK
9.4 billion, respectively. Of this, as much as 68.5 %
accounted for transport sales. For individual transport,
ºSR collected SKK 778 million, for freight transport
SKK 5.6 billion, respectively. Their total debt climbed
to SKK 32.7 billion, with the credits of recent four
years accounting for half of it. The European
Investment Bank granted the ºSR a credit of EUR 200
million (in excess of SKK 9 billion) for a period of 15
years, with the first instalment due in 5 years.
APPENDIX 2: REGULATION OF
MONOPOLIES51
The problems of regulating natural monopolies
are not comprehensively provided for in the
legislation of the SR. Although discussions about
it began in 1992, to date, measures have not been
adopted (except for telecommunications) that
would correspond to world trends, as well as
requirements of globalisation and maximisation of
benefit for the whole society. The first attempt was
made in 1992 when a draft bill was discussed in
the Economic Council, which did not recommend
it for Government debate. The Economic Council
gave another advice on the draft concept for
regulation of natural monopolies as late as in
summer 1999 when  they decided to refer it to the
Government for debate. 
The year 1992
The need for a special provision of regulatory
framework for natural monopolies arose in early
nineties and entailed the first draft bill on
regulation of natural monopolies which was
prepared by the Slovak Antitrust Office in 1992.
The bill assumed unification of basic principles of
regulation of particular entities enjoying the
position of natural monopolies, namely the
separation of the owner from the regulator, the
obligation of regulated subjects to involve also in
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Political Position Proposed percentage
party for state holding in 
state monopolies
SDK
SD»
SOP
Minority property
interest of the state 
Minimum permanent
interest of the state or
the FNM at 51 % in
case of energy
enterprises (6), in case
of the ST, 
at 34 %.
The stake of the state
or the FNM should
range between 
34 - 49 %. 
The proposal by SD» have encountered indignation when the Deputy Prime
Minister for Economy, Ivan Mikloä, called the efforts of SD» to set forth their
ideas in the amendment as preference of politics over professionalism. It was
assumed that the whole parliamentary caucus would endorse the draft
amendment but the possibility was not excluded of SDK deputies to support
some of the proposals by SD» with the purpose of gaining their support.
SDSS (Social Democratic Party of Slovakia) proposed to stipulate lower
threshold for the state property interest at 34%. According to its chairman,
Mr. Volf, this control stake would enable to effectively retain the influence of
the state in strategic enterprises. 
The ministers for this party in the Government clearly endorsed the
Government draft amendment. After the meeting of the Republic Board of the
SD», whose motions were acquired by Minister Schmgnerov, the approving
position of the SD» to the Government proposal changed. SD» requested a
minimum percentage threshold for the state interest to be stipulated in the law
itself, and the scope for control by the Parliament over the course of
privatisation of natural monopolies. The Chairman of the Parliament and the
SD», Jozef Migaä even said, that without these motions the SD» deputies
would not endorse the Government proposal. Privatisation was supported only
by the MP Fico, who said that the constant postponement of the process could
damage the economy in many strategic enterprises considered for privatisation.
As he stated, only the inflow of larger investments could help get these
companies out of the red figures and start up development projects.
Supported the Government draft amendment, but support for several proposals
by SD» was anticipated. According to Minister Machov, SOP would support
all privatisation steps conducive to enhancing economic efficiency of the
enterprises. The minister had no doubts about the existence of political will to
set about practical implementation of privatisation and declared a minority
interest of the state in individual enterprises and went on suggesting that the
state holdings in strategic enterprises should range between 34 and 49%, and
the Government proposal did not address this. The stateÕs property interest
would depend on particular proposals and the objective need for privatisation
in any given state enterprise or a joint stock company.
Table 25 — Position of parliamentary parties on privatisation prior to passing the amendment
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unprofitable activities (public goods), the right of a
regulated subject to economically justified
prices/tariffs, creation of conditions for the rise
and enhancement of competitive environment
where that is efficient. Other principles included
increasing transparency, stability, and
predictability of the regulatory framework. These
regulatory provisions should be conducive to
maximisation of benefit for the consumer, more
efficient development of regulated subjects, and
the creation of an environment encouraging access
of private capital to the area of natural monopolies. 
Regulation should be applicable to the
production, transmission and distribution of
electricity, heat, gas, water and telecommunication
services. The subjects of regulation should include
prices, tariffs, costs, trading companies, and access 
to the market through licensing.
The draft bill was worked out in two alternatives
as for the way of setting up and the position 
of regulatory authorities. The first alternative
contemplated setting up four autonomous regulatory
offices that were to be financed from the sales of
regulated subjects, with an assumed possibility of
SMK
HZDS
SNS
Source: Monitoring of daily press (SME, Nrodn obroda, Pravda, Hospodrske noviny) July - September 1999
Minority stake for the
state
Essentially against
privatisation 
Retaining majority for 
the state 
Fully supported the Government proposal. The position of SMK was very
similar to that of the SDK, when SMK representatives were not ready to
endorse the SD» proposals and deemed them rather destructive. Equally as
SDK deputies, they are likely to support at least some of the SD»Õs proposals
to gain their support. 
Thinks the whole amendment anti-Slovak and in no way will it endorse it.
HZDS advocate non-privatisation of natural monopolies. In the words of Jn
Cuper, HZDS is not going to vote for anything that would allow this
Government to privatise. 
In contrast to the HZDS, SNS acknowledges the need to privatise also some
strategic enterprises. It requests majority to be retained by the state in the
privatised subjects and transparency of the process. The support of the
amendment by SNS deputies though is very unlikely
Natural monopoly Revenue in billion SKK
SPP 60-120 billion (estimate Schmgnerov)
SE not available According to spokesman for MSPNM
ZSE B. Schmgnerov gives the estimated SR M. Luptk, only gross estimate of 
SSE proceeds of privatising distribution proceeds from privatising strategic VSE
VSE companies at SKK 6 billion. enterprises is available. In energy sector 
it may be as much as SKK 36 billion. 
Transpetrol For the part of Transpetrol, SKK 7-10 billion
ºSR Cannot be privatised.
Poäta Cannot be privatised. 
Telekomunikcie According to daily SME SKK 30 to 100 billion. (SME, October, 30 1999)
Total According to available information, the scope of anticipated revenues is not equivocal. The 
total revenue from privatisation of state monopolies according to these statements should 
be around SKK 133 to 266 billion.
Table 26 — Anticipated revenues from privatising natural monopolies
Source: Monitoring of daily press
regulation by municipalities. The other alternative
assumed a central body of state administration
designated by the Government to have the
responsibility of a regulatory office.
The bill referred to above, was submitted for
deliberations of the Economic Council of the
Government that discussed it on 30 November
1992 but did not recommend it for Government
debate. Between 1992 and 1994, inter-ministerial
talks were held at different levels. Their main
purpose was to eliminate the fundamental
differences pertaining to the position of the
regulatory office. The draft assumed devolution of
all regulatory responsibilities to a single body.
That would mean that either the Ministry of
Finance or some other relevant founding ministry
would have to give up part of their responsibilities.
Moreover, at that time, with the exception of
Antitrust Office and the Ministry of Transport,
Post, and Telecommunications of the SR, the
officials of central bodies of state administration
did not agree to the idea of creating a relatively
independent regulatory office. 
The year 1999
Regulatory responsibilities are currently split
between several authorities. Price regulation is the
domain of the Ministry of Finance, while other
regulatory responsibilities, such as licensing are
undertaken by the relevant sector ministries. The
Antitrust Office exercises its responsibilities in the
area of protecting competition. The draft concept
of regulation of natural monopolies assumes
substantive regulation in the following areas: 
¥ energy sector,
¥ transport, post and telecommunications,
¥ water management.
The Ministry of Finance in relation to the Act
no. 18/1996 on prices and the implementing
regulation no. 87/1996 has drawn up the
"Methodological procedure in regulating prices of
natural monopolies", in which under regulation of
prices of natural monopolies is understood the
following:
¥ setting prices, tariffs and tariff terms,
¥ setting binding conditions for the production,
supply and purchase,
¥ setting economically acceptable costs and
reasonable profit, including investment that can
be calculated in the prices and tariffs.
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Parameter 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Profit before tax mill. SKK 9,294.20 7,487.20 4,935.60 2,435.40 1,535.10 
Sales mill. SKK 24,228.90 26,175.80 29,087.70 28,982.80 29,591.50 
Profit before 
tax/Sales % 38 % 29 % 17 % 8 % 5 %
Foreign resources mill. SKK 37,479.30 56,393.30 75,080.20 
Assets mill. SKK 94, 453.40 115,733.30 136,085.90 
Foreign 
resources/Assets % 40 % 49 % 55 %
Profit after tax mill. SKK 6,335.70 4,369.80 2,711.10 975.90 -1,715.50
Transfers to the 
State Budget (SB) mill. SKK — — — — —
Employees Average state 10,294 10,382 10,748 11,282 11,313
Table 27 — Economic performance of Slovensk Elektrrne
Source: Top Trend 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999
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Parameter 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Profit before tax mill. SKK 769.90 334.70 251.20 214.70 146.90 
Sales mill. SKK 10,928.40 11,301.10 11,949.70 12,642.10 13,061.90 
Profit before 
tax/Sales % 7 % 3 % 2 % 2 % 1 %
Foreign resources mill. SKK 2,697.70 2,927.10 3,663.20 
Assets mill. SKK 3,017.30 9,387.90 10,261.20 
Foreign 
resources/Assets % 89 % 31 % 36 %
Profit after tax mill. SKK 418.50 177.90 111.70 95.90 46.10 
Transfers to the SB mill. SKK — — — — —
Employees Average state 3,730 3,771 3,732 3,728 3,762
Table 28 — Economic performance of the state enterprise Zpadoslovensk energetick zvody
Source: Top Trend 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999
Parameter 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Profit before tax mill. SKK 618.50 232.40 4.40 68.30 -237.20
Sales mill. SKK 10,411.30 10,635.80 10,927.30 11,332.80 11,628.70 
Profit before 
tax/Sales % 6 % 2 % 0 % 1 % -2 %
Foreign resources mill. SKK 3,703.90 4,324.10 5,763.70 
Assets mill. SKK 9,670.10 10,345.70 11,533.10 
Foreign 
resources/Assets % 38 % 42 % 50 %
Profit after tax mill. SKK 302.10 116.00 4.40 39.10 -246.70
Transfers to the SB mill. SKK — — — — —
Employees Average state 3,700 3,610 3, 615 3, 648 3,700
Table 29 — Economic performance of state enterprise Stredoslovensk Energetick Zvody
Source: Top Trend 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999
91 PETER PAºITNł
Parameter 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Profit before tax mill. SKK 282.10 169.10 122.40 128.50 51.20 
Sales mill. SKK 6,561.20 6,87.30 7,153.30 7,662.90 7,974.70 
Profit before 
tax/Sales % 4 % 2 % 2 % 2 % 1 %
Foreign resources mill. SKK 1,361.80 1,515.40 2,232.90 
Assets mill. SKK 4,028.70 4,284.20 5,000.10 
Foreign 
resources/Assets % 34 % 35 % 45 %
Profit after tax mill. SKK 177.80 90.70 94.50 67.90 24.10 
Transfers to the SB mill. SKK — — — — —
Employees Average state 2,120 2,084 2,056 2,068 2, 087
Table 30 — Economic performance of the state enterprise Vøchodoslovensk Energetick Zvody
Source: Top Trend 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999
Parameter 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Profit before tax mill. SKK 13,252.90 13,321.50 13,791.80 9,644.50 8,574.10
Sales mill. SKK 34,546.60 36,825.00 39,439.40 41,547.90 43,514.10
Profit before 
tax/Sales % 38 % 36 % 35 % 23 % 20 %
Foreign resources mill. SKK 9,155.90 18,032.20 23,095.30 
Assets mill. SKK 56,972.80 69,155.90 76,298.10 
Foreign 
resources/Assets % 16 % 26 % 30 %
Profit after tax mill. SKK 6,321.00 6,467.90 7,404.34 3,459.10 1,674.40 
Transfers to the SB mill. SKK 1,197.00 1,200.00 1,200.00 2,000.00 2,000.00 
Employees Average state 5,473 5,586 5,935 6,265 6,440
Table 31 — Economic performance of the state enterprise Slovenskø Plynrenskø Priemysel
Source: Top Trend 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999
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Parameter 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Profit before tax mill. SKK 1 461.5 1 441.1 980.5 770.5 619.9
Sales mill. SKK 2 345.0 2 144.9 1 791.0 1 600.9 2 016.1
Profit before 
tax/Sales % 62 % 67 % 55 % 48 % 31 %
Foreign resources mill. SKK 422.6 535.5 648.6 
Assets mill. SKK 5 757.8 6 285.8 6 656.8 
Foreign
resources/Assets % 7 % 9 % 10 %
Profit after tax mill. SKK 870.3 853.2 573.7 446.0 283.1 
Transfers to the SB mill. SKK — — — — —
Employees Average state 476 490 470 462 474
Table 32 — Economic performance of Transpetrol
Source: Top Trend 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999
Parameter 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Profit before tax mill. SKK 99.00 12.30 68.4 0.50 11.30 
Sales mill. SKK 2,976.60 3,094.90 3,342.90 3,626.70 3,940.50 
Profit before 
tax/Sales % 3 % 0 % 2 % 0 % 0 %
Foreign resources mill. SKK 2,377.10 2,337.50 3,184.90 
Assets mill. SKK 4,814.60 4,812.40 5,866.80 
Foreign 
resources/Assets % 49 % 49 % 54 %
Profit after tax mill. SKK -21.20
Transfers to the SB mill. SKK — — — — —
Employees Average state 18,730 18,866 18,718 18,581 18, 001
Table 33 — Economic performance of  Slovensk Poäta
Source: Top Trend 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999
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Parameter 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Profit before tax mill. SKK 2,116.70 2,802.20 4,199.30 4,310.2 2,061.40
Sales mill. SKK 8,648.80 9,882.70 12,863.90 15,235.70 16,973.50
Profit before 
tax/Sales % 24 % 28 % 33 % 28 % 12 %
Foreign resources mill. SKK 10,946.20 17,731.60 26,942.10 
Assets mill. SKK 31,082.10 39,799.90 48,838.30 
Foreign 
resources/Assets % 35 % 45 % 55 %
Profit after tax mill. SKK 1,291.50 1,882.90 2,347.70 2,321.20 423.10
Transfers to the SB mill. SKK — — — — 500.00
Employees Average income 15,367.00 15,306.00 15,374.00 15,278.00 14,848.00
Table 34 — Economic performance of Slovensk Telekomunikcie
Source: Top Trend 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999
Parameter 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Parameter 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Profit before tax mill. SKK 1,196.20 293.10 -497.10 -4,198.90 -5,849.70
Sales mill. SKK 13,775.80 15,594.20 15,567.10 14,813.30 14,512.40 
Profit before 
tax/Sales % 9 % 2 % -3 % -28 % -40 %
Foreign resources mill. SKK 11,566.60 22,123.70 32,135.70
Assets mill. SKK 59,120.90 66,312.50 70,796.30
Foreign
resources/Assets % 20 % 33 % 45 %
Profit after tax mill. SKK -497.10 -4,198.90 -5,849.70
Transfers to the SB mill. SKK — — — — —
Employees Average 56,000 52,965 52,345 49,426 49,436
Table 35 — Economic performance of ºeleznice SR
Source: Top Trend 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999
NOTES 
1 Jurzyca, E.: Natural monopolies - The family silver or the silver of some families? . In: Jakoby, Niì¸anskø(ed.): Promises and
the reality (Slovak economy 1994 -1998). M.E.S.A. 10. Bratislava 1998
2 Since 1991, the Act no. 63/1991 of the Collection of Laws on protection of economic competition was in force, that used the
term "monopoly position" 
3 For example, Nafta Gbely, VSº Koäice, ZSNP ºiar nad Hronom, Slovnaft Bratislava, Benzinol Bratislava, Duslo Æa…a, Chemlon
Humenn, Istrochem Bratislava, SCP Ruìomberok, JCP Ætrovo
4 For details, see Appendix 1 (privatisation-gates)
5 Though the law did not ban their privatisation , subject to ⁄ 3, they were included under the category of strategically important
state enterprises and joint stock companies with property interests of the state or the FNM.
6 Of 117 deputies present, the motion was supported only by 87, while a constitutional law requires agreement of 90 MPs.
7 PRçCA, July, 7 1998
8 SITA, July, 9 1998 
9 The results of the referendum are valid provided minimum 50% of authorised voters participate. 
10 Of the total number of voters, that have participated, 84.3% voted for passing a law on non-privatisation, whereas 15. 7% voted
against such law.
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11 Pravda, October, 15 1998
12  SME, July, 24 1998
13 SITA, August, 28 1998
14 Meäeìnikov G.: Internal political development and the system of political parties. In: Mezeìnikov G., Ivantyäyn M.(ed):
Slovakia 1998- 1999, A summary report on the state of the society: The Institute for Public Affairs, Bratislava 1999
15 The fund will have to pay around SKK 32 billion for its bonds. 
16 SITA, July, 31 1998
17 The term strategic enterprise in this context is not quite correct since most strategic enterprises were privatised over the period
of 1995- 1998 and only minority stakes of some enterprises and natural monopolies remained in the ownership of the state and
in the portfolio of the FNM. 
18 Of 115 deputies present, 70 voted for, 37 against and 8 abstained from voting (SITA, 16 September 1999)
19 The NR SR Act no. 258/1993 of the Collection of Laws , on the Railways of the SR, as later amended in the Act no. 152/1997
of the Collection of Laws
20 The Act no. 61/1997 of the Collection of Laws on forests, as later amended
21 Article 4 of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic
22 The Act no. 222/1946 of the Collection of Laws on post
23 The Act no. 70/1998 of the Collection of Laws on energy sector and on change of the Act no. 455/1991 on trade license business,
as later amended
24 The Government decided about the future composition of shareholders : 51% -the investor, 34% - the FNM, 15% - the state.
25 PROFIT, September, 21 1999
26 Prca, June, 10 1999
27 The economy minister of the day.
28 Novø as, April, 5 1997
29 Novø as, April, 5 1997Novø as, April, 5 1997
30 Novø as, April, 5 1997Profit, September, 21 1999
31 Pravda, March, 10 1999
32 SME - Kapitl , March, 6 1999
33 Prca, August. 11 1998
34 SITA, January, 11 1999
35 The individual small consumers/ businesses ratio was 44% :.48 %, with a growing tendency in small consumers
36 SITA, July, 1 1997
37 SITA,  May, 12 1998
38 PROFIT, August, 19 1997
39 Jn Oravec, HOSPODçRSKY DENNŒK, September, 7 1999
40 Jn Duckø, SITA, July, 14 1998
41 SITA, April, 22 1998, Peter Gavala, special director for economy and trade of the ZSE: ª The useable profit achieved is by far
not sufficient to cover financing of its investment needs." 
42 Prca, June, 10 1999
43 SME, October, 30 1999
44 Profit, October, 26 1999
45 SME, August, 27 1999
46 SITA, July, 12 1999
47 SITA, July, 12 1999
48 Profit, June, 15 1999
49 Slovensk republika, September, 16 1999
50 A single-time paying out of SKK 32 billion to citizens could seriously affect the development of the volume of money in
circulation which might exert pressure upon the price level. 
51 Processed according to the Explanatory Report for the draft bill on regulation submitted to the Economic Council of the
Government in September 1999.
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8.1 THE BANKING SYSTEM OF
THE SR SINCE 1989
The banking system, similarly to the whole
economy of the SR, was characterised by a
transition from a command-type of banking
system to a market economy banking system It
was marked with split of the SFR and the whole
political and economic environment. The
transformation of our banking system occurred in
three phases: 
¥ phase 1, starting on January, 1 1990 until
February, 1 1992,
¥ phase 2, starting on February, 1 1992 until 31
December 1992,
¥ phase 3, starting on January, 1 1992. 
The first phase, prepared already under the
previous regime, concerned mainly a formal
division, whereby a single-tier banking system
was made into a two-tier system. Starting on
January, 1 1990, the macroeconomic control
centre of banking was separated and a central bank
was created, which kept the name of the original
monobank, Ættna Banka eskoslovensk,
(ÆBS) [the State Bank Czecho-Slovak]. At the
same time, the Act 158/1989 Of the Collection of
Laws, on banks and savings banks, made
provision for creating first seven ªcommercial"
banks focused on microeconomic activity of
banking. These included: 
¥ Komern Banka (KB),
¥ Väeobecn òverov Banka (VòB), 
¥ esk Sttn SpoÞitelna (SS), 
¥ Slovensk Ættna Sporite…¸a (SÆS),
¥ eskoslovensk Obchodn Banka (SOB), 
¥ ºivnostensk Banka (ºB), 
¥ Investin Banka (IB).
These commercial banks had mostly transformed
from previously existing banks, and not much had
changed in their practical activity. KB and VòB
were created from ÆBS network of subsidiaries,
other banks from specialised banks of the socialist
economy. An essential change did occur in their
focus though when they switched from narrowly
specialised to universal banking. All banks
remained state-owned, and the banking sector, on
the whole, retained its monopolist structure. 
The second phase of the reform was more
radical in nature. Two important pieces of
legislation came into force, the Act no. 21/1991
Of the Collection of Laws, on banks and the Act
no..22/1991 of the Collection of Laws, on ÆBS,
which fell effective on February, 1 1992. The
ÆBS Act defines the position of the central
bank, its responsibilities, the relation to the
Government, and the other banks. Before it was
adopted , there were efforts to create two central
banks with a co-ordinating centre and a unitary
monetary policy (federal arrangement) but the
proposal was defeated. 
The third phase was elicited by split of the
SFR, and has virtually continued until today.
ÆBS was discontinued, its place being taken up
by esk nrodn Banka and Nrodn Banka
Slovenska (NBS). The position of the NBS is
stipulated in the Act no. 566/1992 of the
Collection of Laws, on the NBS while the
position of the other banks is still defined by the
law dating back to the time of the existing federal
arrangement, which, of course, had been several
time amended. The principal element of the third
phase should be progressive restructuring and
privatisation of banks with state property
interests. None of these areas have seen much
change. Investin Banka split into the Investin
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Banka Praha and the Investin a Rozvojov
Banka Bratislava in connection with the split and
within sharing assets and liabilities of ÆBS the
share of the SR in SOB went to the NBS, while
the shares of the FNM R in VòB and the FNM
SR in the KB are still subjects of disputes. 
8.2  PRIVATISATION OF BANKS 
Bank privatisation in our country did not only
concern former state banks but also those newly
created, whose majority owners were state
enterprises or institutions. We have decided to
structure this part chronologically, including the
"affairs" accompanying the privatisation process
in state banks. 
Privatisation started as early as in 1992, when
first stakes of shares were offered (IRB 52 %,VòB
52 %) within voucher privatisation (1992). Apart
from this, the state did not take a resolve in any
further step towards full deetatisation of state
holdings in the banks. 
The year 1996 brought an interesting turn. In
January, ambitious targets were announced as to
completing privatisation and implementing a
split-second privatisation of these financial
institutions. The former Prime Minister Meiar,
on the occasion of a prestigious economic
conference, the Economist Conferences, held in
Bratislava on January, 25 1996, announced that
the privatisation in Slovakia would be completed
by the end of mid-1996. He then shocked both
domestic and foreign participants when he said
that "Éby the end of this month, or by mid-
February, at the latest, the privatisation of
banking structures will have been completed.
With the exception of the National Bank of
Slovakia, everything else will be private" (Trend
January, 31 1996).  
What was startling about the statement was the
fact that until then, there had not been any public
or expert discussion about the issue, and there
even was not any concept of either the
Government or the NBS about taking such a
serious step. The NBS Governor Masr said that
"the NBS has not received yet any project
connected with privatisation of banking
structures. They will assess any such project of
privatisation of a commercial bank, once it is
submitted to them". (Trend January, 31 1996)
Soon it was clear in what way the Government
intended to effect split-second privatisation of
banks. Several Government and FNM officials
jointly claimed that the privatisation of banks had
been administratively prepared for quite some
time and that the investor which would take part
in it should be a domestic subject and that major
Slovak industrial enterprises would also have
their share in it. The absurdity, Slovak way, began
to take on clear forms. The banks were to be
privatised by large Slovak companies of which
they were, at the same time, largegest creditors!  
In March the waters again were stirred by
Prime Minister V. Meiar, stating, at a press
conference held in Vienna on the occasion of his
official visit to Austria, that by the end of
February the essential decision had been made as
to the way banks would be privatised, but that the
delay in administrative action was due to the
failure to reach conclusion on the property
interest of the FNM R in VòB. 
In April, the banking privatisation stir pacified.
The likely reason for not implementing split-
second privatisation were differences in coalition
parties over the participation of business
structures close to them, in this undertaking. 
8.2.1 The Slovensk PoisØov¸a 
(1) case
Privatisation differences between HZDS on
one hand, ZRS and SNS on the other, were fully
unveiled in May and June of 1996, in the cause
over changing the management of  Slovensk
PoisØov¸a (SP) (Slovak Insurance Company).
Although not a bank, SP is not mentioned in this
section by accident. SP itself is the decisive
shareholder in several Slovak banks (IRB 66.7%,
IstroBanka 71%, Po…noBanka 32%). 
In May 1996, SP management was called off,
in which people from SNS and ZRS had major
influence (Vice-president Sokol - SNS, President
Trstenskø - ZRS) and replaced with people from
HZDS. The change was enforced by the FNM, as
the largegest shareholder, the whole transaction
was orchestrated from behind by the Deputy
Prime Minisiter Kozlk. The exchange took place
despite disagreement from SNS and ZRS.
Subsequently, a sharp and widely media-covered
dispute broke, in which top officials offended and
97 MIROSLAV K¯AºKO
accused each other of privatisation interests and
on both sides. Voices were overheard that this
was the end of the coalition. When it turned out
that until then the opposition SD» through
entering into coalition with the HZDS might
replace the ZRS and the SNS, the two parties
returned to the coalition camp. 
On June, 21 1996, still only new "under way"
coalition of the HZDS and the SD» passed an
amendment of the Strategic Enterprises Act,
according to which the list of companies that
cannot be privatised was extended by four largest
financial institutions (VòB, SLSP, IRB, SP). The
privatisation embargo was approved for the period
until March 1997, and concerned the very
financial institutions, which according to the
Prime Minsiter Meiar, should have been
privatised until the end of January 1996. After the
ballot was taken, it turned out that a confusing text
got passed, which prevented privatisation of the
property of these banks but does not preclude
privatisation of their shares. And as all four were
joint stock companies, the law did not effectively
address anything. 
8.2.2 The IRB case
After this dramatic developments in SP, the
situation in the privatisation of the four major
banks on the surface calmed down and the status
quo was maintained until the end of the year.
That, however, applied only to the property
interests of the FNM in these largest Slovak
banks. The candidates for bank privatisation
recruiting from the circles of industrial lobby had
already been taking steps in other areas. The most
active group of VSº, headed by the minister and
simultaneously most influential of VSº owners,
Alexander Rezeä, began buying out shares of SP
and IRB (high proportion of shares in the voucher
privatisation). 
Early in August, a group of companies acting
in agreement with the VSº, had controlled in
excess of 43% of the bankÕs shares and changed
four members of the Supervisory Board. Under
the Slovak Banks Act, increasing property
interest in a bank over the level of 15%, by a
single company, or a group of companies acting
in agreement, requires the consent of the NBS.
The National Bank of Slovakia, by its decision of
October, 2 1996, declined to give the consent and
asked the VSº and the ARDS, o.c.p. to decrease
their share under the level of 15%. This did
happen, but only formally. The VSº reduced its
share to 14.63%, but the shares appeared in the
accounts of companies that collaborated with the
VSº in similar transactions (Slovrea, Eurotrade,
Tectum, Tatrapetrol). On January, 22 1997, the
Supervisory Board of IRB removed five of its six
members of the IRB Board of Directors,
including the President, Jozef Tk.
Representatives of subjects, directly or
indirectly, linked to the VSº voted for the
removal. The vacancies were filled with people
close to VSº owners. Vojtech Vranay, a relation
of Alexander Rezeä, became the new President of
IRB. The FNM, with a 35.14-percent stake,
supported the VSº group throughout the whole
period, and even agreed to removing their own
people from the management of the bank. The
economic performance of the bank over the
recent years had been steadily deteriorating. 
Rumour began louder about a strategic partner
coming to the IRB. This did not happen though
and the shareholders attempted to address the
situation in May 1997 by raising the equity by
SKK 500 million. Eventually, the move was not
supported by the VSº (which was beginning to
face its own liquidity problems), or the FNM
either. In December, MPs, within their
deliberations about the draft state budget for
1998, agreed to cancellation of reimbursement of
the property loss suffered by the IRB at SKK 782
million. That was a compensation for the losses
on interest in low interest-bearing loans provided
by the bank for the completion of housing
construction. This triggered also insurmountable
problems of liquidity, accompanied by massive
withdrawals of deposits, which resulted in
imposing receivership on the bank on the part of
the NBS on 19 December 1997. 
The NBS propped up the bank with a total sum
of SKK 24 billion. Over the course of 1997, the
NBS urged IRB majority shareholders on several
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1995 1996 1997 1998
0.167 -1.357 -3.250 -4.516
Table 36 — Economic performance of the IRB 
(in billion SKK)
Source: Top Trend 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 and Top trend in
finance sector 1999
occasions (i.e., VSº and FNM) to raise the equity
in the bank. The request had not been satisfied, by
contrast, the shareholders around VSº opted for a
different approach - in our opinion they simply
tunnelled the finances of the bank. The statement of
the Prime Minister Meiar was all the more
surprising to the public when he, meeting with the
management of the VSº, said: "You have done a
great deal (VSº, note by the author) for the
rehabilitation of bankingÉ and therefore we,
together with the VSº, are seeking ways how to
redress the situation in a way that would not deprive
you of your property that you have put into it".
8.2.3 The Poätov Banka case
Over the course of 1996, the VSº had gained
control over two other smaller banks - Dopravn
Banka and Poätov Banka. It is worth noting that
the VSº increased their share in these banks at
the expense of state enterprises, which belonged
under the ministry of A. Rezeä, the most
influential owner of the VSº. 
Following was the original shareholder
structure in the Poätov Banka: Slovensk
Telekomunikcie - 51.55 %, Slovensk Poäta
34.3 %, the Ministry of Transport and
Telecommunications of the SR - 1.7 %,
remaining shares were owned by two foreign
investors. In 1996, the equity was raised from
SKK 600 to 909 million, when the increase was
due to only new shareholders. The companies
Tectum and Trade Trans Rail (close to the VSº)
acquired 15 % each, and Kinex 4 %, respectively.
Hence, the shares of state shareholders dropped
from 87.55% to 57.8%. At the AGM in July 1997,
it was decided to further increase the equity, this
time by SKK 300 million. State enterprises in the
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Transport , and the
ministry itself, again did not participate in this
subscription. Their share came down to 43.5%,
which in effect meant that the Poätov Banka was
privatised by private companies, with
considerable assistance from the enterprises
controlled by the Ministry of Transport. 
8.3 FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN
THE PRIVATISATION OF BANKS 
Another theatre act of privatisation of the four
largest banks unveiled in February and March
1997, when first the opposition parties together
with the Workers Party were successful in
imposing moratorium on privatisation of these
banks by the year 2003, but in a repeated vote
taken the VòB and the IRB had been withdrawn
from the moratorium. The state holdings in these
financial institutions then accounted for 91.3% in
Slovensk Sporite…¸a, 50.8% in VòB, 35.9% in
IRB and 50.26% in SP. 
At the end of February 1997, the National
Bank of Slovakia, published a statement
according to which "at present full privatisation
of four largest financial institutions would not be
appropriate, given their present position in the
financial sector" (Trend March, 5 1997). The
NBS proposed to finish privatisation of the IRB
and did not exclude further potential partial
privatisation of other three financial subjects. 
The central bank wanted to address the situation
in the IRB by selling the bank to a solvent bidder,
most likely a foreign one, that would be capable of
adequately raising the equity. Then, apparently
under political pressure,  they changed their view
and agreed to Slovensk PoisØov¸a increasing the
equity in the IRB. This was proposed for an
institution which faced enough problems of its
own. The point was that in this way VSº did not
have to invest any money in the sanitising the IRB
without losing control over it. Though their direct
share would be reduced as a result of the equity
increase, yet their indirect influence through SP, in
which they - together with the FNM - were
majority owners, would increase (the FNM then
acted in concert with the VSº). 
8.3.1 The Slovensk PoisØov¸a 
(2)  case
Slovensk PoisØov¸a was established on
November, 1 1991 through transformation of a
state enterprise, Slovensk Ættna PoisØov¸a, into
a joint stock company. In 1991, 48% of its shares
were offered in the first wave of privatisation. In
July 1998, the largest shareholder of SP was the
FNM SR, controlling a 50.55- percent stake. VSº
Holding had roughly 20 percent, and the
companies Vinlan and Telemar, close to VSº,
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owned 8,6 %, and 6 %, respectively, of the equity.
In early July 1998, SP shareholders efforts
intensified (primarily those of VSº) to gain a
more significant position in the company at the
expense of the state. VSº was not only interested
in getting hold of the insurance company, whose
book value was SKK 31 billion and SKK 25
billion in technical reserves, but also in the
property holdings worth around SKK 100 billion.
By increasing equity, the law would have been
evaded banning the privatisation of strategic
enterprises, including SP, until the end of 2003. 
Originally, the equity was to be raised by SKK
1 billion, to SKK 2.5 billion. Shareholders
changed it to SKK 375 million thus increasing the
equity by 25 percent. This increase sufficed for the
FNM to lose its majority position in the event it
would not apply its pre-emptive right and SP
would fall in private hands of privatising actors
close to the ruling coalition. The share of the FNM
SR would have fallen to 40.4%. The argument
advanced by the Government officials that the
increase by SKK 375 million would be beneficial
to SP was but an excuse, given the SKK 2 billion
which SP effected to raise the equity of the ruined
IRB, i.e., more than five time the amount. 
The process of loss of the majority of the state in
SP strikingly resembled the procedure in increasing
the equity of Poätov Banka in 1996 and 1997,
even the bidder was the same, the VSº group. 
In increasing the equity in July and August, all
375 thousand new SP shares in the nominal value
of SKK 1,000 were subscribed without the
participation of the FNM SR. The envisioned
hidden privatisation scenario for SP was coming
true. At the extra-ordinary general meeting on
September, 4, SP shareholders, however,
surprisingly did not approve the change to the
statutes of the company - to enter the increased
equity from the original SKK 1.5 billion to 1.875
billion in the companies register (despite having
voted for it on July, 24). Due to the failure to
agree on the equity increase by shareholders, it
was not possible to lodge an application to have
the change in the amount of equity effected in the
companies register and the whole process then
could not be completed. 
After the parliamentary elections, and after
small shareholders of SP not only brought a suit
but lodged also an instigation to discontinue
proceedings related to the entry with the Register
Court, on October, 15 1998, further changes
occurred in SP. At the proposal of ARDS
company, representing the interest of VSº
Holding, the extra-ordinary general meeting
cancelled the resolution on increasing the equity,
of July, 24 1998, and annulled the whole process.
However, shareholders have achieved another
amendment of the statutes, which made any
change to the amount of equity and personal
changes in the Supervisory Board of SP, subject to
the consent by the shareholders owning at least
two-thirds of shares - i.e., one million pieces. Until
then these actions had required consent by a
simple majority of the participants. Karol
Melock, SP President, justified the proposal by
the need to protect minority shareholders. Despite
the fact that the change significantly restrained the
influence of the FNM SR in SP, the Fund
endorsed it. The amendment of the law on
securing state interest in privatisation of
strategically important state enterprises and joint
stock companies of 20 November 1998 de facto
neutralised the decision of the EGM. 
8.3.2 Väeobecn verov banka (VòB)
and Slovensk Sporite…¸a (SLSP)
Over ten years, nothing has happened in
privatisation of these two largest banks. One needs
to see behind it mainly the inability or the reluctance
(of the Government, the NBS) to address the very
complex situation that these two banks face.
Without restructuring their credit portfolio, the
idea of them getting privatised cannot be
conceived of. They both have not been meeting
capital adequacy imposed by the NBS (8-percent
minimum level of capital to be held against risk
adjusted assets). Moreover, the VòB is dependent
on constant liquidity supplies from inter-bank
market, which is not a sustainable situation in the
long term view. The SLSP is slowly but for sure
losing its dominant position in the segment of
deposits of the population. Banks have not been
increasing their equity for a long time because their
owner, (the state - VòB 50.8%, SLSP, 91.3%)
cannot afford it and will likely not be able to raise
funds for it for quite some time. In the case of
VòB, the question continues to be unresolved of
swapping the VòB stake held by the FNM R and
the Komern Banka stake, held by the FNM SR.
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8.4  THE CURRENT STATE AND 
A POTENTIAL COURSE OF
ACTION 
Currently the state indirectly controls a few
other small banks. That is the case of Dopravn
Banka, formerly owned by the Slovak Railways
(ºSR), with a 45-percent stake (the stake was
later taken over by the Slovak Savings Bank, and
by Bansk Bystrica based Banskobystrick
Dopravn SpolonosØ, ä.p., which had a 37.5-
percent stake, again a state institution; the Banka
Slovakia (FNM: 60.1%, SP: 26.4%, SLSP: 6.6%);
the Priemyseln Banka (SPP:11.99%, SP:10.17,
Slovensk Elektrrne: 7.99% and SLSP:7.19%). 
The economic performance in most banks -
directly or indirectly - controlled by the state has
been progressively deteriorating. This is due to
incompetent management and the political
pressure to provide risky credits, and in the case
of SLSP, VòB, and IRB, also bad debts dating
back to the period before and after 1989. 
In 1998 the Government tried to tackle the
situation in IRB through SP (it increased the
equity of the bank by SKK 2 billion) but
eventually they did not help the bank, while SP
was placed in serious trouble. In 1999, the
Government again increased the equity of the
IRB from the extraordinary profit of the NBS,
only to reduce it soon after, at the expense of loss
of the previous years. It is not clear even after this
intervention, whether the bank is able to be
privatised.
Additionally, the Government, working with
the NBS, adopted a program of restructuring the
banking system of the SR, a first conceptual step
after a long recovery period of the whole banking
system. This was followed by the amendment of
the Act no. 92/1991 of the Collection of Laws on
conditions of transfer of state property to other
persons, whereby full privatisation of the VòB,
and partial privatisation of Slovensk Sporite…¸a
and Slovensk PoisØov¸a were made possible (the
amendment says only that the state will keep
interests, without stipulating precise shares). 
From the global perspective, even the largest
Slovak banks rank among small banks. The total
VòB assets place the bank in 649th place and
those of the SLSP at 883rd place among banks
world-wide (Banker, 1998). Which means that
the significance of none of them extends beyond
the territory of Slovakia. In the spirit of general
globalisation in the economy, it is vital that these
banks find a strategic investor as soon as possible.
Their share in the banking market is steadily
decreasing (in favour of fierce young banks
mostly relying on strong foreign investors),
whereby their appeal for potential foreign
investors is fading. It should be in the interest of
the state to seek foreign investment as best as it
can. 
Still unresolved is the issue of the NBS stake
(24%) in SOB of the Belgian KBC Bank, which
bought a majority stake in the bank from the
Czech Republic. The whole agreement is held up
by the SOB receivables against Slovensk
Inkasn, which the Slovak side is challenging.
The political agreement about the solution of the
problem is bound to be reached soon. Equally, the
agreement was pending about swapping VòB
shares and those of Komern Banka, owned by
the FNM R and SR. On November, 24 1999 an
agreement was signed by Czech and Slovak
Prime Ministers that the VòB-KB shares
exchange will not take place. 
For the sake of completion we need to note that
the state, on 30 November 1999, controlled still
three financial institutions: Slovensk Zrun a
Rozvojov Banka, ä. p. ., Konsolidan Banka ä.
p. ., and EximBanka. For these financial
institutions, privatisation is not assumed as yet,
although these kinds of banks function abroad on
a commercial basis as well. 
In conclusion we will give the estimate made
by the World Bank, which sets the amount
necessary for the recovery of VòB, SLSP, IRB
and Konsolidan Banka at SKK 96 billion (SKK
87 billion according the estimate by the NBS).
The saddest thing about it is probably that the
"bill" will have to be paid by us all, without
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1995 1996 1997 1998
VòB 0.647 0.074 0.170 -3.790
SLSP 0.670 0.401 0.079 0.088
Table 37 — Economic performance of the VòB and
SLSP (in billion SKK)
Source: Top Trend 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 and Top Trend in
Finance 1999
distinction. It goes without saying, that no clever
investor would ever buy a bank with the credit
portfolio these banks currently possess. It is
necessary that the Government attempt, at least to
some extent, to restructure the banks. In the view
of the enormous cost of restructuring itself, it is
desirable that the state makes every attempt to sell
its holdings in the banks as soon as possible. We
maintain that by so doing a unique chance would
emerge to shift at least part of the restructuring
burden onto new strategic investors.
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5. Weekly TREND 1995-1999
Though this part of privatisation has been
going on from the beginning of the
transformation, however it is little known. We
believe it may be partly due to the narrow
understanding of this part of the privatisation
process as merely sales of municipal assets, which
were not guided by privatisation laws but by the
Municipal Establishment Act. Privatisation of the
property of cities and communities under the
privatisation law, effected through gratuitous
transfer of state assets to the municipality, was
and still is part of the privatisation process.
9.1. THE LEGISLATIVE
FRAMEWORK FOR THE ACTION
OF CITIES AND COMMUNITIES 
At the outset we deem it necessary to define the legal
framework in which cities and communities operate. In
chapter 4 of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic the
position of territorial self-Government, i.e., cities and
communities too, is embedded. The municipality has
the status of a legal entity, managing its property and
finance. Municipalities can be given tasks and their
activity can be intervened upon only by law. 
The basic law stipulating the activities of
municipal self-Government is the Slovak National
Council Act no. 369/1990 of the Collection of Laws
on municipal establishment, to which subsequently
a number of other laws relate. This law lists the most
important functional responsibilities and obligations
for a municipality. For the purposes of this section,
the following are important:
¥ acts related to regular management of tangible
and intangible assets of the municipality, 
¥ drawing up and approving municipal budgets
(revenues — outlays),
¥ founding, establishing, and controlling of its
own budgetary, contributory organisations, and
other legal entities. 
All tasks connected to the management of
municipality and municipal property are carried
out by citizens through self-Government bodies (
City or Community Mayor - City or Community
Council). 
9. 2. FINANCING MUNICIPALITIES 
The financial management of the municipality
is governed by the approved budget. This is drawn
up subject to the Act on Budgetary Rules. This
law defines also the principles and guidelines for
drawing up and approving the budget and
financial management of municipality. 
The budget is passed annually, often with
delay, hence municipalities operate under the 
so-called provisional budget and cannot apply 
a financial plan for a longer period (a year). The
unforeseen demands on municipal expenses are
often covered through sales of municipal
property.
The revenue side can be divided into own and
other revenues. The main sources of own revenues
include:
¥ local taxes and fees,
¥ tax shares in central taxes, 
¥ proceeds of municipal property (lease and sales
of property),
¥ proceeds of municipal companies and other
legal entities,
¥ other revenues (credits, bonds, subsidies,
grants),
¥ and other and irregular revenues (fines,
penalties).
Main items of outlays include:
¥ expenses for self-Government,
¥ expenses for the maintenance and operations of
municipal organisations, 
¥ investment expenses.
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9. PRIVATISATION OF THE PROPERTY 
OF CITIES AND COMMUNITIES
Miroslav K¸aìko
9.2.1. Why do municipalities 
sell property
The scism between revenues and expenses of
municipal budgets is being steadily widened.
Although according to statistics, municipalities
have still been generating surpluses, these data are
not quite credible. 
The surplus in municipal budgets tends to
occur mostly due to enforced savings. They are
caused by the necessity, particularly in small
municipalities, (of insufficient credit capacity) to
accumulate funds for investment undertakings
over several years. Moreover, municipal budgets
even cannot end up in deficit, because even if it
was generated, it would have to be covered with a
bond issue or a credit (tables 39 and 40).
This long-term trend of gradual generation of
debt results in an insoluble financial situation many
cities are facing. There are several reasons for it.
The yields of local taxes and fees, although being
still a stable source of revenues, are not growing
much. Perhaps the most problematic item of the
municipal budgets are the shares in centrally
collected Government taxes. There are no fixed
rules for the distribution of these tax yields. Self-
Governments do not know until the very last
moment what will "remain" to them when the
annual budget is prepared, which renders longer-
range planning and also investment impossible. 
On the other hand, expenses, and current
expenses, in particular, have been steadily
growing, driven by ever increasing public
consumption and inflation. Capital expenses get
entirely pushed out by the current expenses. 
A number of municipalities tried to address this
problem by selling municipal property or through
borrowing, either raising a credit or issuing bonds.
They used municipal property as collateral. Many
of them overestimated the credit capacity of the
city, with bankruptcy becoming imminent
although, in this form, it has not been recognised
by our law. When banks or other creditors apply
their liens, municipal officials will be left with
almost no salable property. Currently,
municipalities are obliged to sell their property not
only because of the shortage of funds for
operating , maintaining, or for reconstruction of
municipal property but also they use the resources
raised in this fashion to cover current expenses,
which is a very disconcerting phenomenon. These
resources are non-recurrent in their nature, and
unique (they cannot be reproduced) and should
not be used for recurrent current expenses. The
public administration reform, which is under
preparation, will need to tackle this situation,
mainly through clarifying the relations in
functional responsibilities and finance between
cities, communities, and the state.
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1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
MB revenues 16,175 20,627 20,966 20,073 22,236 25,424 28,785 25,930
MB expenses 14,300 19,670 19,298 19,098 18,853 23,154 26,625 25,809
MB balance 1,875 957 1,668 975 3,383 2,270 2,160 121
Revenues/GDP 5.06% 6.21% 5.68% 4.56% 4.30% 4.42% 4.40% 3.59%
Table 38 — Revenues and expenses of municipal budgets (mill. SKK)
Source: SO SR, MF SR
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
— — — 40.4 2057.7 93.8 118.5
Table 39 — Municipal bond issues (mill. SKK)
Source: Financing municipal self-Governments in the SR (ZMOS)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
404.0 — 1003.7 886.4 1173.4 2565.7 2733.1
Table 40 — The degree of discretion and the anticipated scale of corruption
Source: Financing municipal self-Governments in the SR (ZMOS)
9.2.2. Why do municipalities get
involved in the privatisation of
property as a privatiser
Municipalities are willing to privatise different
property which is located in their territory for
similar reasons as they sell their own property.
They are attracted by the vision of new budgetary
resources, which is the root of their frequently
overstated demands. They demand to be conveyed
or sold valuable land or even companies from the
state. There are well-known cases of spas,
bakeries, even cement works and many other
enterprises being privatised this way. The most
common argument on the part of municipalities
refers to a kind of "natural" ties existing between
the municipality and the firm. Perhaps one the
most notorious cases is the interest of the City of
PieäØany to privatise the spas, an interest which is
still there. The statement by Ivan Mrzik, the
former city Mayor of PieäØany that if they get hold
of spas, they will be able to boost profits six-fold,
perhaps calls for no additional comment. It seems
that some city mayors and self-Government
councillors have forgotten about the main role of
cities and communities. The vision of fatty profits
flowing into the municipal treasury may be
alluring but none of them realises that most Slovak
firms are financially weak and need capital to
remain competitive, a situation in which
municipalities fall short.
Yet, there is also property for which
municipalitiesÕ bidding is justified. Since supplying
citizens with drinking water is one of the tasks which
municipalities are required to provide by law,
municipalities logically demand gratuitous transfer
of water and sewer utilities assets from the state. 
Another very similar issue is the demand that
cities and communities receive shares of those
energy and gas utilities, whose facilities - such as,
gas and electric distribution lines, regulating
transformers for gas and electricity - were
constructed from municipal resources or through
the "Action Z" schemes (with voluntary citizensÕ
efforts under previous regime). In this case the
claim of municipalities to the property created in
the past by their own citizens are justified. Though
it concerns redressing injustice caused by past
regimes, this will be far from smooth. Proving
which construction and distribution lines had been
implemented within Action Z schemes will be
difficult, equally it will not be easy to calculate the
costs related to it. Another disputed moment may
be the setting of the value for municipal property
and its equitable weighting in terms of shares. It is
hard to believe that the law is still in force, under
which municipalities are bound to gratuitously
transfer the infrastructure (water, gas, electricity)
built at the expense of municipalities, before it is
launched into operation, to relevant state-owned
companies. And to make the paradox perfect, the
citizens are bound to pay the state enterprise one
more time for using the infrastructure built with
"their taxes".
9.3. THE PROPERTY OF CITIES
AND COMMUNITIES
Under the Municipal Establishment Act, the
property of cities and communities includes articles
in municipal ownership, ownership rights of the
municipality and the property rights of legal entities
established by the municipality.
Municipalities acquired the property according
to the Act of the SNR no. 518/1990 of the
Collection of Laws on transfer of the founding or
establishing function from the national committees
to municipalities, central bodies of state
administration and the bodies of local state
administration, and also subject to the Act no.
138/1991 of the Collection of Laws on municipal
property, which also stipulated municipal
management of this property. According to these
laws, the founding function in respect of state
enterprises founded by the national committee was
transferred to that municipality in whose territory
the state enterprise had its seat. The enterprises
founded by former regional committees were an
exception. The founding function in respect of
these state enterprises, as a rule, was transferred to
a central body of state administration. A more
complicated situation existed in budgetary and
contributory organisations. The law stipulated
precisely which organisations were transferred to
the administration of a municipality, local state
administration and which came under a central state
authority. In the health sector, only child nurseries
first came under municipal administration, in
education initially nothing, and later kindergarten,
came under the municipality, while in social area, it
was pensioners clubs, canteens and pensioners
meals distribution, laundries of the nursing service,
and the centres for social care provision. Former
state apartments were also transferred to
municipalities, as were all cultural facilities, set up
by city and community national committees.
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In 1992, municipalities took over ownership of
280, 000 former state flats. Within large
privatisation , they also took over from former state
enterprises an additional 20,000 thousand flats. This
housing fund had to be gradually sold to citizens.
Municipalities also took over from the state,
housing objects under construction or those which
were unfinished, technical and civil infrastructure,
and amenities valued at around SKK 12 billion.
Municipalities also received from the state
agricultural land, non-agricultural land, (around
179,000 hectare), agricultural buildings, and
construction serving agricultural and forestry
production, they had owned before 1949. They also
own local roads, public spaces, and other public
facilities serving for municipal operations
(incinerators, municipal refuse landfills, mourning
housesÉ). The real property used by sports
organisations, historical city halls, cultural
establishments, such as culture centres, libraries and
cinemas, also came into the hands of municipalities.
Within the privatisation process, those operating
units in relation of which municipalities fulfilled the
founding function could, subject to the decision by
the Ministry for Administration and Privatisation of
National Property, be withdrawn and transferred in
the municipal property. Between 1991 and 1993,
489 operating units were withdrawn in this way
from small privatisation and became municipal
property. 
In the first wave of privatisation, between
March, 31 1992 and 31 December 1993, assets
worth SKK 886 million were transferred to
become municipal property. This concerned free
transfers for the benefit of municipalities, which
were part of approved privatisation projects.
Mostly they were so-called companies
apartments, dormitories, buildings of nurseries,
kindergartens, recreational resorts, and the land on
which blocks of flats are built. 
Some cities at that time became shareholders in
different companies whose shares could be
subject of further sale - privatisation. Bratislava,
Poprad, and Koäice became shareholders of the
SA (air carrier) (1.4% each), the city of
Topo…any of the local brewery Topvar (15%),
Humenn, of the company Chemes (8%),
following the agreement with the FNM, spa towns
became or will become owners of a 10-pecent
stake in local spas, with the exception of
Slovensk lieebn kpele PieäØany, in which case
the city will get only 5%. These are but few well-
known examples. 
The volume of property that came in municipal
hands was not small, which is well illustrated by
the following facts. In October 1993, Peter
Kresnek, the mayor of Bratislava City, ordered
stocktaking of real property, ownership rights and
obligations to real property and lease rights of this
town. The results of the stocktaking carried out by
city wards, budgetary, contributory, and
autonomously managing organisations show that
of the total area of the territory of Bratislava, the
capital of the SR, municipal property comprises
13.3%. The city on the Danube River owns almost
4,900 hectare of the territory, worth more than
SKK 73 billion, at SKK 1500/sqm, more than
4,400 buildings and constructions, worth SKK
16.5 billion, The stocktaking then set the value of
property owned by Bratislava at SKK 90 billion.
For the sake of illustration, we give a curiosity
related to the completion of small privatisation and
the need to clarify property legal relations in 1994
in cases where state administration had the right to
manage the property, while the founding function
was transferred to the municipality. The files of the
state property administered by municipality was
not to be found even at MSPNM SR, although this
ministry was, by law, the central body of state
administration for administration and privatisation
of National Property in business sphere The
ministry attempted to map the property by
approaching all Slovak cities and communities in a
letter, but the response was minimal. Even a request
for co-operation addressed by the Register Court
and the Ministry of Justice of the SR would not
help. With the exception of District Offices Koäice
- the city and Koäice-countryside, the ministry was
reported they did not register such property. 
9.4. PRIVATISATION 
OF PROPERTY 
In the event the municipality - for different
reasons- is unable to directly use its property for
fulfilling self-governing functions, it may:
¥ offer the property for sale,
¥ lease,
¥ place it in a commercial company, in which it
enters as a partner with other subjects, or which
it establishes as sole proprietor, 
¥ use it as collateral. 
In all these areas, the responsibility rests with
municipal councils. The law provides which acts
are subject to consent by municipal council. They
include: 
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¥ contractual transfer of title to real property, 
¥ contractual transfer of the title to a real
property above the value set by municipal
council, 
¥ handling property rights of a given value,
¥ auction sales of things, subject to special
regulations. 
Over the course of past ten years, communities
and cities have got hold of relatively large
property in different ways. Concurrently,
privatisation of this acquired property was
progressively taking place. The form of
privatisation of municipal assets vary from case to
case. This process in individual municipalities
depended upon several circumstances. 
9.4.1. Composition of community 
and city councils
From the aspect of the council make-up, 
it was important whether there were majority of
people inclined to build a municipality with a high
measure of regulation and municipal property, or
councillors advocating the philosophy that the
major role of cities and communities lies in
creating conditions conducive to business, which
should, in principle, be carried out by private
businesses and companies. The composition
factor was, no doubt, also the cause of many
privatisation and corruption scandals. Despite the
way they were elected (direct vote), the councils
were politically divided, the groups fighting not
only each other, but often the city or community
mayors. Such a situation was a breeding ground
for different lobbyist groups, which took
advantage of it. I will refer to a few most famous
cases. 
One such great scandal was the case of bribery
of the mayor of PieäØany, Viliam Hjovskø. He
was caught soliciting part of the bribe at SKK 1
million for mediating direct sale of part of a
municipal wood producing company
(Drevovøroba) in liquidation. 
The ºilina City Hall saw a few curious cases,
too. The sale of a one-storey house in the centre of
ºilina to the director of municipal investorÕs
office for SKK 125 thousand while the market
price of the real property was SKK 5 million,
came under investigation. Only in annual rental,
the city could raise SKK 700 thousand. Another
odd case was the sale of ºilina Park of Culture and
Relaxation, for one crown, (the value of around
SKK 10 million) to Matica Slovensk. Mayor Jn
Slota gave the following comment: "I am
determined to promote and assist Matica
Slovensk while I live!"
The last case to be mentioned here is the sale of
the supermarket complex Jadran in Bratislava.
The Councillors Committee selected the firm
Homar in a public tender to be the new owner. The
new owner paid SKK 40 million for the building
but after it was entered in the property register, he
sold it to another firm for SKK 80 million. The net
profit of the private firm was SKK 40 million,
with a duty to pay tax on real property transfer.
(We were unable to find out how the councillors
handled this case. Most probably just as in most
other cases, that is, in no way. - the author). 
We should not harbour any illusions about the
situation being diametrically different in other
cities. These cases probably just received less
publicity than those referred to above. The
accountability should be sought somewhere else.
The genuine cause is the absence of efficient
control over, both, councillors and city and
community mayors, on the part of citizens - the
electors. They do not even suspect the scope of
decisions this group of people takes. To most city
and community dwellers it has not yet ocurred that
this concerns primarily their money and their
property. It is enough if in the end of the election
term a new pavement is built or a new park gets
planted and the result of the election is not to be
feared. It holds twice for a Slovak elector - What
the eyes cannot see, the heart does not feel.
9.4.2. The existence or 
non-existence of the way
municipalities function from the
aspect of involvement in business
activities or creating positive
conditions for businesses
With a few exceptions, we may note that in
majority of communities and cities, a more
realistic and longer-term concept of economic
development was missing. Such a concept should
embrace not only a list of necessary investment
and non-investment activities, but, above all, a
draft arrangement of the economic structure of the
municipality, including the ownership and
organisational and legal form of subjects that were
expected to ensure the performance of self-
governing functions of cities and communities. It
was due to this absence that municipalities have
often been acting inconsiderately, almost
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unrestrained. The problems which gradually
began to pop up, (municipal waste, dilapidated
real estates, municipal public transport,
housingÉ) have often caught municipalities not
prepared. The subsequent solutions selected under
time pressure were rarely optimal. In what other
way then, the inadequate investment undertakings
of the cities of Koäice and Bansk Bystrica can be
explained., which have brought them on the brink
of bankruptcy.
The reason for the absence of any concepts and
real estimates of municipal potentials lies not only
in inadequate level and preparedness of self-
Government officials, but also in the non-
existence of rational rules of the game, which
would clearly divide the rights and obligations
between the state and local Government. 
9.4.3. The volume, the value and the
form of property fit for privatisation 
The volume and the value of property was
directly related to the size of individual
municipality. The yield of privatisation grew in
proportion with it, just as the problems associated
with such property, which could often be sold
with great difficulties. 
Privatisation of apartments caused municipalities
major problems. As was mentioned above, they have
taken more than 200 thousand of them in their
administration - former state and enterprise
apartments. The original rationale was the
expectation that, through sales, municipalities would
raise finance necessary for new housing
construction. As it turned out later when calculations
were made, the funds thus raised would not be
enough to cover maintenance of the existing housing
fund. Moreover, self-Governments were concerned
about the unfinished complex housing construction
(CHC).
Apartment sales, in principle, were to start
immediately on their transfer to municipalities in
1992. Ever since its beginning, the whole process
encountered scores of legislative barriers and
shortcomings. Only on July, 8 1993, did the
deputies of the NR SR approve the draft bill on
ownership of apartments and non-living space, on
the basis of which the apartments could be sold.
As early as in 1995, the self-Government through
ZMOS called for the amendment of the law
because communities and cities had great
difficulties in selling municipal apartments and
were striking against scores of insoluble
problems. Under this amendment, Slovak
nationals could apply for transfer of the ownership
of a municipal or co-operative apartment starting
from August, 1 1995. 
After this amendment, there should be no
obstacles in the way of privatisation of apartments.
Each applicant should be satisfied within 2 years
from the date of his filing the application..As it
turned out, municipalities, and registry offices of
the relevant district offices, were unable to absorb
such a flow of purchase-anxious citizens. Hence,
the privatisation of the housing fund has been going
on until today, albeit at a considerably higher pace
than was the case in 1995. For the sake of
completeness it must be added that the Government
in 1995, in relation to their switch from voucher
privatisation to bond compensation wanted to make
municipalities accept FNM bonds in selling
apartments to citizens. After protests from cities
and communities, it was left at their discretion to
decide whether they would accept them or not.
The ZMOS idea of the volume of privatisation of
housing fund was presented in 1995 by ZMOS
President, M. Søkora: "Cities and communities
intend to earmark more than 52 thousand
apartments (18.72%) for social purposes and they
will keep more than 50 thousand of them in the
category of regulated rent. Of the total figure of 278
thousand apartments more than 10 thousand will be
withdrawn from privatisation on a long-term basis." 
Following the transformation of former
municipal housing enterprises, apartments were
found belonging to different companies (as a rule,
limited liability companies), which were set up by
cities to administer and manage the housing fund.
Their economic management was often very non-
transparent and different machinations with the
property entrusted occurred. Media highlighted
mainly the scandals around allocation and sale of
progressively completed apartments from the
"inherited" CBC. 
The fate of the CBC in progress was slightly
different. Until 1991, the state contributed solid
sums to municipalities to complete it. Despite this,
municipalities had to finish these constructions
later mainly at their own expense, or else solve the
situation by selling them to an investor with the
necessary capital. 
Privatisation of agricultural and non-
agricultural land is almost illegible as the data of
the SO SR does not contain any land survey by
type of owners. Privatisation of non-agricultural
land was individual. For municipalities, lucrative
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building sites, in particular, have become a
substantial source of finance. They were sold for
market prices, primarily through real estate
agencies and public tenders. Here, too,
municipalities did not avoid scandals and
suspicions of corruption and clientellism. In the
recent period, however, municipalities have come
to understand deeper the problems of housing
development and the economic development of
regions and has begun offering land with built up
infrastructure for marginal prices. They strive to
help address the burning issue of housing and
employment of their citizens. 
Municipalities were returned forests and forest
land within restitution. The table below shows the
volume of reprivatised forest fund. The data for
2000 and 2001, and are predictions which have
been used in the draft Program of Development of
Agriculture and the Food Industry, Forestry, and
Fisheries of the SR by 2010, submitted to the
Government of the SR in September 1999. 
Most often, municipalities have established
municipal limited liability companies to administer
and manage forests. Hence, the profit generated
becomes a revenue of municipal budgets. 
Indeed, the sale of real property (except for
flats) has become a major source of capital
revenues and scandal as well. We have mentioned
several cases already and there is no need to refer
to tens of others. What is necessary though is to
alert to the problem of municipalities divesting 
of their property under pressure, which they, later
on, could have put to good use efficiently
themselves. Table 42 shows the tendency towards
increasing municipal revenues through capital
assets sales (the main component of municipal
capital revenues).
The growth is visible, both in absolute terms
and relative to the overall revenues of municipal
budgets. This phenomenon is characteristic
mainly of larger municipalities. As in the case of
land, in other real property, municipalities have
embarked on sales for symbolic prices. The more
famous cases included the sale of Eurohotel in
Bansk Bystrica to the state for one crown, and
under equal terms, and to the same transferee 
of the building of present seat of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of the SR in Bratislava. To 
a lesser extent, we have seen transfers in favour of
different non-Governmental organisations. 
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1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1997
— — 166 ,503 180, 092 181, 425 198, 995
Table 41 — Reprivatisation of forest land in favour of cities and communities (ha)
Source: SO SR
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
4.9 10.3 1,901.6 1,904.9 2,150.2 2,265.9 2,970.9
0.03 % 0.05 % 9.07 % 9.49 % 9.67 % 8.91 % 10.32 %
Table 42 — Capital revenues of municipalities (mill. SKK) and their percentage share in overall municipal revenues
Source: Financing municipal self-Governments in the SR, MF SR
municipalities with the population
YEAR up to 500 501—1000 1001—2000 2001—3000 3001—4000 4001—5000 5000 plus SR
1995 63 139 178 243 134 55 368 271
1996 106 174 203 335 308 130 695 479
1997 71 183 198 272 229 186 767 510
Table 43 — Credit burden per capita in SKK
Source: Financing municipal self-Governments in the SR, MF SR
9.4.4. The economic situation of
particular municipalities
This situation varies, but is essentially bad.
Perhaps it is most critical in large cities. They are
unable to cover current expenses from their
current revenues and are forced to either sell their
property or raise credits. It will follow from Table
43, showing the per capita credit burden in the SR,
that it is highest in largest settlements. 
Their problem is all the more significant, as
they are most often metropolitan seats, which
bring about additional tasks that are not accounted
for in state budgets allocations. They are
permanent debtors for energies, waste collection
and disposal, and other services. Some cities find
themselves in a situation where they are bound to
sell their property under great pressure and for
unfavourable prices in order to be able to repay
instalments of credits and other debts. In contrast,
small municipalities cannot finance even the
smallest investment activities from the meagre
funds that flow into the budget and are unable to
borrow money. 
9.4.5. The overall economic conditions
for functioning of self-Governments
The situation of municipalities has been sad
from the outset and is steadily aggravating. One
cause may be the unbalanced economic relations
that exist between the state and municipalities. The
relations are very unstable, changing each year, and
thus not giving self-Governments a chance to
pursue medium-term and long-term planning.
Though the Municipal Establishment Act gives
municipalities a relatively great independence and
autonomy, this de iure independence does not
constitute a de facto independence, primarily in the
economic area. This is mainly due to the fact that
the economic conditions of self-Government
functioning, which are determined by the state,
restrain the autonomy substantially. 
A major restriction in municipal budgets
revenues and expenses occurred in the SR
between the years 1990 and 1995. This restriction
was much more significant in municipal budgets
than in the state budget. As can be seen from
Table 44, the phenomenon is well illustrated in the
proportional changes between investment and
non-investment expenses (from 1995 on, the SO
SR does not provide the data). 
The growing restriction makes communities
and cities spend almost all their resources for
current consumption, connected with provision 
of those functions that they are bound to 
undertake by law. The state made it even harder
for municipalities by handing over some
competencies without their subsequent
compensation with adequate funds (for example,
municipal public transport). 
The Government acted punitively toward
municipalities in 1993. In comparing the state
budget for 1993 with the final statement of the
account for 1993, the experts of M.E.S.A. 10
found unlawful cuts to self-Government share in
personal income tax. The State Budget Act
stipulated that 70% of this tax would be
transferred to municipal budgets. The planned
revenues of this tax amounted to SKK 6.766
billion, but actually reached the sum of SKK
9.326 billion. The budgets of cities and
communities, however received instead of SKK
6.528 billion, only SKK 5.647 billion. In this way,
municipal budgets were, at variance with the State
Budget Act, short SKK 881.36 million. 
Even today, the state fails to meet its
obligations in a way it should, and is a permanent
debtor (municipal shares in state-shared taxes) of
impoverished self-Governments (on August, 31
1999, that amounted to SKK 180 million). 
Apart from blaming the state, municipalities
should also search their conscience when looking
at their severe financial situation. Not always,
were they managing their funds wisely. They not
only attempted to privatise property, which was
referred to above, but often placed municipal
funds in companies that never brought them the
desired benefit. First, these were banks and then
regional television has become the most recent hit. 
The most absurd may be one case that,
fortunately, have never materialised. It concerned
the offer for cities and communities to involve 
in the second wave of voucher privatisation 
(1994). Self-Governments maintained that some
opportunities emerged that were easy to get hold
of with their financial resources. They were to
establish an investment company through Prv
Komunlna Banka ºilina, which was to fulfil the
function of an administrator of three to six
investment privatisation funds on a regional
principle. The role of municipalities was to
arrange advertising and to promote it in their
contact with the investors - (investment voucher
holders). It was even contemplated to provide
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loans to citizens to purchase voucher books and
the stamps from municipal resources. 
9.4.6 Concealed forms of privatisation
of municipal assets
Among these forms of privatisation should be
included mainly contributions of municipal
capital in companies whose operations closely
relate to the municipal obligations imposed by law
but also in companies which are totally unrelated
to the running of a municipality. 
The first group includes firms operating in
cities which provide heating, road and public
spaces and landscape maintenance, municipal
refuse collection and disposal, funeral service,
public lighting, and others services. Municipalities
mostly put in them property of former communal
enterprises, which is often in poor condition and
does not satisfy current economic or ecological
standards. This is the reason why they, as a rule, do
not have majority in these companies and virtually
lose control over their own assets. 
The second group are contributions in the firms
that are not necessary to running of a city. There
are many examples around Slovakia. By putting a
non-financial contribution of the building of
former Gastrocentrum in Bansk Bystrica, the city
became a shareholder in Banka Slovakia (6.9%).
Similarly, when the PKB was established, there
were 61 cities and 80 communities, some of them
putting their contribution into it in the form of
buildings, which became the base for the future
network of subsidiaries of this bank. Bratislava,
too, became a shareholder in IstroBanka, holding
an 18-percent stake. 
A similar case would include collateral
provided by a city or a community for credits
taken by third parties, whether these concerned
firms with municipal participation or not. In
failures to repay credits, the banks then apply their
mortgage rights to the property owned by
municipality and become owners of this property.
The municipality thus pays for the errors
committed by others and for its own carelessness
in providing such security. 
9.5. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
REFORM — NEW COMPETENCIES,
NEW PROPERTY
On August, 18 1999, the Government approved
the Strategy for the Decentralisation of Public
Administration, which in 2001 should result in
massive devolution of the functions from the state
to self-Governments. The delegating of
competencies, however, will not resolve the
problems of managing municipal property (the
property sale, so-called privatisation). The
responsibility for this activity of self-Governments
will rest with their decision making. Therefore we
should not expect the public administration reform
to tackle transparency, particularly in the process of
municipal assets sales. In addition to the
competencies and financial resources for their
performance, cities and communities, or bodies of
upper tiers, will get not insignificant property under
their administration.
This property will preliminarily include the
following:
¥ forest economy (forest land and the property
related to it),
¥ agricultural land,
¥ transport infrastructure or part thereof,
¥ road network except motorways,
¥ water management except water sources,
¥ energy industry; participation together with the
state in those sections which have the nature of
natural monopolies,
¥ housing fund,
¥ health facilities except those of national
significance,
¥ school facilities except universities,
¥ cultural facilities.
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1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Noninvestment 8,376.5 12,123 12,715.9 12,863 12,971.2
Expenses 59% 62% 66% 67% 69%
Investment 5,922.8 7,547 6,583 6,237 5,881.8
Expenses 41% 38% 34% 33% 31%
Total Expenses 14,299.7 19,670 19,298.7 19,097 18,853
Table 44 — Municipal budgets expenditures (mill. SKK)
Source: Financing municipal self-Governments in the SR
It should be taken as a tentative list , which may
be slightly changed by the time the reform is
launched. There is no doubt that not all this
property is fit for privatisation but there is some
scope for privatisation, if not all, then of at least
part of this property. In some areas, the
development took the right direction. In case of
the assets of water and sewer utilities, the Ministry
of Soil Management and self-Government
officials have agreed that these assets would be
handed over to communities and cities, starting
from July, 1 2000. They failed to come to similar
agreement on the transferring of agricultural land.
The Ministry of Health also worked out the
privatisation of health facilities, in which, no
doubt, municipalities and upper-tier territorial
units will play important roles. We have to trust
that cities and communities will handle this
property in a way beneficial to both municipalities
and their citizens. 
Within almost ten years, property of different
kind and quality has come in the hands 
of municipalities. We would hardly find 
a municipality in which the management of the
newly acquired property was flawless. There are
several reasons for it. Starting from the
incompetent municipal management, preference
was given to narrow interest groups, insufficient
control, and the lack of interest on the part of
citizens, to the inadequate economic conditions in
which self-Governments operate. The result of all
these influences and other factors is the bleak
condition that municipalities find themselves in
today, (excessive credit burden, insolvency, etc)
and the property managed by them (the property
in the hands of creditors, or sales under their
pressure, emergency state of property). Moreover,
the new property, which self-Governments should
get through public administration reform will also
likely be in poor condition and unfit for sale. The
dilapidated buildings of schools, outpatient
clinics, and social care facilities will take their
toll, just as the long-lasting neglect of water
pipelines and treatment plants. By further careless
sales, municipalities might deprive themselves of
not only control and guidance over vital services
to their citizens but of the running of a city or if
fact the community. The city and community
mayorsÕ chairs should be filled with managers that
are capable of handling diverse property primarily
for the benefit of the citizen - the elector.
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In 1989 The Slovak economy started its
transition from a command model of economic
management to a market economy, which is
generally based on private ownership and
enterprise. Slovakia thus after a long period has
become a country which set itself the objective to
consolidate and develop business activities, to
create motivational business environment, to
create the market.
Privatisation has become one of the
instruments of creating the market and the private
sector in the economy. Privatisation in Slovak
economy has not only affected the economic area,
its course has had an impact upon the entire
society. It affects essentially and, in at least three
aspects, what type of institutional framework is
being created in the economy and the society,
mainly due to the fact that: 
¥ ownership relations constitute the fundamental
part of the institutional architecture of an
economic system and privatisation,
a substantial part of the institutional
transformation, 
¥ there is a strong effect the mode of
privatisation has upon the formation of the
business and executive culture and ethics,
¥ there is a strong effect the mode of
privatisation has upon the whole social
climate, formation of informal rules in the
society, and subsequently on creation of
conditions conducive to long-term sustainable
development in Slovakia. 
The following schemes depict a simplified
relation between formal and informal institutions
and their impact upon the economic growth: 
Formal rules
based on the principe
of transparency
accountabilitz equal
chances ...
Formal rules
not based on the 
principle of
transparency equal
chances ...
or these principles are
violated
Informal rules
growing morals ...
Informal rules
declining morals ...
minimal corruption
minimal hidden 
economy
suitable condition for
healthy
economic growth
growth of corruption
growth of hidden
economy conditions
not conducive 
to healthy
long-term economic
growth
10. NON-TRANSPARENCY 
AND CORRUPTION IN 
THE PRIVATISATION PROCESS
Emlia Skov
The word corruption is of Latin origin, derived
from the word rumpere, and means: break, break
up, or tear. The Latin expression corruptus
conveys the effect of breaking — anybody who
undertook breaking is spoilt degenerate, perverse.
To most people, the notion of corruption connotes
with the break in faith with ideals, moral
principles and represents betrayal of honour and
obligations against the community. 
There are several definitions of corruption
though. Perhaps one of the simplest defines
corruption as a deviant conduct - departing from
the norms regulating the activities of public
officials. 
Corruption also implies a conduct of public
sector officials, whether politicians or state
bureaucrats, through which they unlawfully gain
by abusing powers, which they have been
entrusted. We can conclude from what has been
said above the following characteristics.
Corruption represents abuse of power over other
personÕs property, rights with the objective of
gaining oneÕs own private benefit.
Corruption encompasses bribery, nepotism -
that is favouritism shown to relatives, and
clientellism - favouritism shown to friends. This
understanding of corruption in the broader sense
of the word encompasses every conduct that is at
variance with the law, ethical standards and moral
criteria and also inconsistent with the criterion of
equal chances and competition on equal terms. 
The size of corruption in individual parts of
privatisation process - pre-privatisation phase,
decision making phase about allocating property
and post-privatisation phase, is affected by the
formal framework which is determined for the
implementation of the given process, but also
informal rules existing in our society. We will
discuss corruption in the above phases of
privatisation in more detail in the following
section, but before that, we should focus on the
informal rules which have influenced all parts of
privatisation process. 
Informal rules concern mainly conventions
and personal standards of integrity. The
importance laid on informal rules is directly
related to the adoption and implementation cost
of formal measures. For example, the more
difficult it is to implement the act on the conflict
of interest, the more important the way people
think, is. If the adoption of a given measure and
its efficient implementation could be achieved at
lower costs, it would indicate that the ideology in
a given society was congruent with the law
implemented. Conversely, it is necessary to
influence also the ideology, which increases the
overall cost associated with the implementation
of a given law or a mechanism. Trust, morals,
upholding ethical values are thus significant
economic categories. 
While formal rules can be changed
"overnight", the change in informal rules is much
more difficult to effect. It is because informal
rules act gradually and often subconsciously, on
the basis of individuals creating alternative
patterns of behaviour, in agreement with new cost
and benefit assessment.
Many factors had an effect on the formation of
informal rules, but we will mention the following
in particular:  
* shortage- driven nature of the socialist
economy 
Informal rules, morals and ethical values had
been distorted in Slovakia during the existence of
shortage driven economy in the period of socialist
economy. Disregard for the rules of the game on
the part of a substantial portion of citizens was
given by several specificities of the life in the
society, in which the proclaimed values and rules
of the game often differed from genuine values
and rules of the game. In a deficient economy the
actual differentiation in the living conditions
depended more on the readiness and the ability to
break written and unwritten laws of ethical and
moral conduct than on the actual work
performance. 
In the socialist Czechoslovakia, there was no
interest in deeper analysis of the inequilibrium of
the supply and demand, the weaknesses of the
system of management. A shift occurred only in
the 1980s when more attention was devoted to
clarifying causes for the existence of shadow
economy. The shadow economy in socialist
countries thrived mainly as a result of significant
demand overhang over supply, which was due to
the monopoly position of many organisations and
the protective attitude of the state. Shadow
activities were sought mainly by those customers
who were impatient to get the product or could
not wait to have some other needs satisfied
through official channels. In 1988, an estimate
was published in the SFR claiming that an
average national spent 1- 10% of his work income
in the black economy.
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Corruption had become a part of life in
socialist economies of the era. The rate of
corruption of the day is illustrated in the survey of
households of April 1988, and can bring us to the
following conclusion: so-called payments for
procurement had pervaded all walks of life and
were perceived as quite common, generally
occurring phenomena and there was no reason to
hide oneÕs personal share in the relevant
activities. Only 6% of respondents said they did
not use a bribe in order to achieve what they
needed in some areas. 75% of respondents
admitted to have used this form at least once in
shopping in retail shops, 49.5% in health care,
44.5% in repair and some other trade services,
37.5 % in buying a car, spare parts for cars, and
for repairs. Such was then the state immediately
before transformation.
With a sufficiently long time of the system
acting, considerable damage was done to the
peopleÕs consciousness, which will take several
generations to undo. The widespread
predisposition for disregarding rules of the game,
the efforts to help oneself at all cost - even at the
cost of breaking not only written laws and
regulations, i.e., formal rules, but also regardless
of unwritten laws of elementary ethics and morals
- have not stood in the way of the growing
corruption in the process of privatisation in
Slovakia. It is this inherited state which is one of
the major causes of several undesirable
phenomena, associated with the corruption in
privatisation process, but also of the non-
existence of real public opinion pressure against
genuine and dangerous corruption in privatisation
and its bearers. 
* social frustration after the fall of communism 
After the fall of communism and the launching
of the economic transformation, economic
decline ensued, coupled with social decline,
decreased purchasing power and the living
standards of majority of the population
accompanied with growing unemployment and an
overall social confusion of a considerable portion
of the population. Very soon, property and
economic differentiation followed the suit, which
quite often did not stem from the differences in
performance, creativity, and inventiveness but
was also due to different measure of willingness
and capability to employ illegal or at least non-
ethical and immoral practices. As the result of
failure to prosecute evident and notorious
privatisation excesses, general social frustration
has been enforced. One can assume that social
frustration has facilitated boom in the overall
corruption in the society, hence also in the
process of privatisation. 
We can conclude from the above that informal
rules did not preclude the growth ofcorruption in
individual phases of the privatisation process.
A more detailed description of the corruption are
given in the individual parts of the privatisation
process which follow. Just to emphasise the
different manifestations of corruption in
individual phases of the privatisation process, we
have selected the following classification: 
¥ corruption before the property is sold, so-
called pre-privatisation corruption,
¥ corruption in the decision making process
about allocating the property - i.e., during the
privatisation process itself, sale of property,
¥ corruption after the property is sold, so-called
post-privatisation corruption.
10.1. CORRUPTION PRIOR 
TO THE ASSET SALE - SO-
CALLED PRE-PRIVATISATION
CORRUPTION 
This kind of corruption connected with the
economic transformation and privatisation is also
called spontaneous privatisation. This denotes the
process of stealing property in the period from the
time the economic transformation or economic
liberalisation was launched until the privatisation
of a particular company is completed. It is
a spontaneous privatisation on the part of
management and their close people. 
The scale of spontaneous privatisation depends
on the speed of privatisation and is directly
related to the duration of the period from
launching economic transformation until
privatisation of the particular company is
completed. The slower the course of privatisation
, the greater the scale of spontaneous
privatisation. 
Privatisation is definitely a challenging and
unprecedented process, the implementation of
which required and still requires achieving
political consensus on the ways and concept of
privatisation, carrying out many administrative
acts with the purpose of introducing a system into
recording the property relations and preventing
subsequent challenging of the created private
ownership. This kind of time schedule creates
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conditions for potential corruption. Although ⁄ 45
of the Act no. 92/1991 of the Collection of Laws
on large privatisation was drafted for the purpose
of limiting spontaneous privatisation - as it should
prevent the management of state enterprises to
involve in transactions beyond the framework of
regular management of the assets, which might
decrease or depreciate the equity of the company
and bring the management property benefit -
Slovakia did not avoid spontaneous privatisation . 
Spontaneous privatisation has many forms but
they have a common feature in the existence of
two subjects - a state enterprise or a state joint
stock company on one hand, and a private
physical or legal entity, on the other, with which
the management of the state enterprise is in some
way connected. The form of the connection may
differ, from open participation in that company,
through dormant partnership, participation of
family relatives or friends to acting in return for
payment. The most common form is setting up
limited companies with dormant participation of
the companyÕs management. 
The frequently applied forms of spontaneous
privatisation include intentional aggravation of the
economic situation in the company, reduction of its
value and subsequent purchase at a low price. In
Spontaneous privatisation, contracts were signed,
for example, of lease for non-living space, foreign
trade activities, advertising and promotion, supply
and distribution, service, transport service, etc. An
important factor encouraging the growth of
spontaneous privatisation was the absence of
competitive forms in procurement, as the Act no.
263/1993 of the Collection of Laws on public
procurement was adopted with the effect at
January, 1 1994. 
10.2. CORRUPTION IN THE
PROCESS OF DECISION MAKING
ABOUT THE ALLOCATION OF
THE ASSETS 
In connection with the decision making
process itself about allocating the property, we
need to concentrate on the following elements
defining the formal process ofprivatisation, which
suggest the likely scope of corruption in the
process: 
¥ method of privatisation and control
mechanisms,
¥ (non)existence of supplementing legal norms.
10.2.1. The method of privatisation
and control mechanisms 
The room for corruption in this stage of
privatisation depends primarily on the methods
used in privatisation - on the existence of clear,
transparent, controllable, and controlled rules
ofthe game. In this respect we should point to
individual methods and how they depend on the
degree of potential subjectivism in decision
making. 
Table 40 shows voucher privatisation and
standard methods ofprivatisation as methods with
the least likely for there to be corruption - there
are clearly determined criteria on the basis
ofwhich individual privatisation projects and
control mechanisms are agreed and approved.
In Slovakia, so-called standard methods and
also a non-standard method have been used in the
process of privatisation. These methods have
been discussed in particular sections ofthis
publication. After briefly outlining their basic
characteristics, the author will therefore touch on
only those parts of formal rules, which define the
framework for the way of privatisation and might
have an effect on the scope of corruption in the
privatisation process. 
10.2.1.1 Non-standard method 
of privatisation — voucher
privatisation
This method of privatisation reduces room for
corruption and the risk of corruption prevalence.
Among all privatisation methods, it is one that
appreciates most equality of conditions and
chances and gives the least room for subjectivism.
Each national had thousand points in the voucher
privatisation and each could apply them in
relation to any joint stock company privatised in
this way. The demand for shares of individual
joint stock companies was not known in advance,
at the same time, nobody knew what their market
value was going to be. The rules of the game were
known from the outset, and were applicable to all
equally. The room for favouritism and
manipulation had thus been minimised. Despite
the fact that the voucher privatisation was - as to
the process itself of distributing assets (shares) -
evaluated as a transparent and quick way of
distributing shares among the population, there,
too, were several cases in this method of
information abuse and hence also corruption.
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There are several indications that information was
abused from the very beginning ofits
implementation. Other problems related to this
method of privatisation were, in most cases, not
due to the voucher method itself, but rather, to the
legislative provisions in the area of supervision
and control of the capital market and insufficient
protection of the minority shareholders. 
10.2.1.2. Standard methods 
of privatisation 
Standard methods of privatisation include:
¥ public auction
¥ public tender
¥ direct sales
Public auction 
The so-called small privatisation was
organised through district privatisation
commissions having jurisdiction in their own
districts, which were subordinate to the Ministry
for Privatisation. The only criterion was the price
offered. The selection of the bidder was made by
public auction, whereby room was created for
a transparent way of its implementation. Despite
this, even in this way of privatisation
a phenomena occurred which foretold ofthe
presence ofcorruption. This corruption had direct,
criminal, and unlawful nature and was (or should
be) prosecuted by the police and law enforcement
bodies. 
It included, for example, hidden or open
blackmailing of bidders or potential bidders with
the intention to deter them from participating in
the auction or from raising the price, soliciting
reward for readiness not to enter the auction, or
increase price on the part of speculators as
opposed to serious bidders interested to get the
operating unit, organising so-called Dutch
auctions where serious bidders were discouraged
from participation by threats, acquisition of
operating unit through auction with the intention
not to pay within the deadline and at which time
the result of the auction is rendered void, and the
manipulation ofdocuments regarding the previous
lease of the operating unit auctioned with the
intention of priority purchase. 
Several measures were adopted by the
Government, the parliament, and the ministry for
privatisation, which were intended to minimise
the scope of these negative phenomena.
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Degree of discretion Anticipated scale of corruption
total discretion in deciding the method and the considerably widespread  
price (this power is at lower levels 
of management)
total discretion in deciding the method and the Widespread and probably institutionalised, 
price, with final decision made centrally, depending on control mechanisms 
at a higher level of management
method that was decided before: abuse is limited by a competition or criteria 
a competitive method, public, buyers chosen of selecting the buyer
by state employees 
method that was decided before: very limited, mostly in cases when the criteria
buyers selected according to clearly set are vague 
defined criteria
voucher privatisation: a model when clerks do very limited 
not have powers in setting prices or providing 
information to participants
Table 45 — The degree of discretion and the anticipated scale of corruption
Source: Political Corruption, Privatisation and Control in the Czech Republic: A Case Study of Problems in Multiple Transition,
University of Oxford
Public tender
Even in the process of public tendering there
are risks of corruption. They can be eliminated
though - provided all standard procedures
ofpublic tendering are upheld, such as publicising
the offer for sale, setting clear selection criteria,
sealed bids free ofthe risk ofinformation leakage
on competing bids, and independent and unbiased
selection committees. The experience of public
tendering shows that these conditions are not
always upheld, which may lead not only to
opportunities for corruption and influencing these
processes, but also to challenging the results of
such tendering and their potential review and
even annulment. 
Direct sales 
In the process of large privatisation, a major
part of property has been sold through direct
sales. The direct sale is a form ofselling property
or shares of a former state enterprise, when the
sale is effected on the basis of approval ofa
privatisation project for direct sale to a pre-
designated entrant. Even in the event of
implementing privatisation through direct sales,
transparent, competitive, and controllable course
can be introduced. It is the case when rules of the
game and criteria are defined on which selection
takes place from among different bidders, and
when it is possible to check the compliance with
these rules and criteria during privatisation and
also in retrospect. This mode of privatisation then
can be effected in several ways, depending on the
way of decision making, degree of transparency,
control, and hence also room for corruption: 
¥ the Act no. 92/1992 of the Collection of Laws
on conditions of transfer of state assets to other
persons stipulated for this form of sale an
obligation of the Government approval for the
privatisation project. Early on when direct
sales began, it was provided that Government
was to decide about direct sales. There were
also clear efforts to introduce transparency in
the whole process. For example, during the
Government of Jozef Moravk in 1994,
institutions competent to issue the decision on
privatisation were obliged to publish the
information about submission of the
privatisation project in daily national press
before the decision was issued. It was also
stipulated that the decision could not be issued
before 30 days had elapsed since the
information was published. 
¥ an important systemic change occurred during
the night ofthe 3rd ofNovember 1994. At the
first session of the newly elected parliament,
the parliamentary majority, represented by the
Movement for Democratic Slovakia, (HZDS),
the Slovak National Party (SNS) and the
Slovak Workers Association, (ZRS) passed
several substantive and systemic changes,
among them, the amendment of the Large
Privatisation Act, which took away all decisive
powers from the Ministry for Privatisation and
the Government of the SR and transferred
them to the National Property Fund ( FNM
SR). The FNM SR transferred responsibilities
on the basis of which the Board of the FNM
could issue decisions on direct sales and
change the decisions that had already been
made regarding privatisation. This
unconstitutional amendment of the Large
Privatisation Act contributed to a situation
where the privatisation process became much
more uncontrolled and non-transparent. The
privatisation process was outside ofthe control
ofthe public and the media. Over the course of
1995, there were no press conferences, which
had been common before. Peter Bisk, the
Minister for Privatisation, repeatedly stated
that subject to the Privatisation Act, the
decision making on privatisation is not open to
public. Although ⁄10 of the Act no. 92/91 says
in paragraph 7 that "decision making on
privatisation is not public" , at the same time
paragraph 5 of the same ⁄10 says: "the
ministry shall publish the privatisation
decision issued within 30 days in the
Obchodnø vestnk (Commercial Bulletin) and
shall use also other forms ofpublicising it."
The close character of privatisation decisions
then only concerns the procedure of decision
making itself. 
The change of responsibilities, referred to
above, allowed the FNM SR to disregard
decisions issued by the Ministry for
Administration and Privatisation of National
Property of the SR, to change the method of
privatisation, and to place at advantage the
transferees of privatised assets in selecting and
setting contractual terms (e.g. purchase price,
terms of payment). The change also enabled the
FNM to restructure liabilities, in some cases,
a decisive part of liabilities were moved to
a single output, with its subsequent liquidation.
Subsequently, there were frequent non-
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transparent assignments of assets to persons close
to the ruling coalition at very low prices and with
possibilities to have a significant part of down
payments of the price, already low enough,
pardoned. There has not been made public any
criteria applied in selecting from the bidders for
the property, there were genuinely no rules of the
game, and hence no way to check them. The
political opposition and the public were deprived
of any possibility to at least formally control the
process. The motion to get the FNM under control
of the Supreme Control Office of the SR had beed
defeated several times. The only information the
FNM published were lists of companies it
intended to privatise, and then the lists of
companies that had been privatised, the purchase
price, first down payment, and the transferee of
the asset. No register of privatised assets was
established that would provide equal information
to all potential bidders. 
Despite this confidentiality, some media have
published information on privatisation affairs and
favouritism of people close to the ruling coalition
in the process of privatisation. Testimonies of
contravention of the law appeared. Several
newspapers have published names of persons
concerned and facts. 
In connection with the process of privatisation
and potential corruption, we need to mention also
a phenomenon of so-called wild privatisation.
This denotes privatisation of the period between
February and March 1994. Under the banner of
declared objective "to create domestic business
layer" the assets were assigned on the basis of
business plan. The business plan, which thus
became the main criterion of selection, made
room for excessive subjectivism, as this criterion
cannot be measured. Moreover, most proclaimed
intends in the business plan cannot even be
legally fixed and enforced. Since domestic
entrants in privatisation have limited investment
possibilities, the Government was contemplating
"in order to support the growth of domestic
business layerÉ to allow downpayment schemes
in sale which would credit investment in the
purchase price". Privatisation along these criteria
allows subjectivism and favouritism of the
management of state enterprises, or other pre-
selected interested parties. 
10.2.2. (Non) existence of
supplementary legal norms 
The process of privatisation was launched at the
beginning of the transformation process. This
implies, among other things, that it was not
launched in a legislative environment which would
correspond to the principles of standard market
economy, based of private ownership and
enterprise, but rather, in an environment tailored to
an economy, in which private business, ownership
of means of production, etc. were banned. 
Hence, the process of privatisation ran in
parallel with the process of drafting new
legislation. The regulations missed most in the
process of privatisation included the regulations
that would make provisions for conflict of interest,
laws and regulations governing procurement of
goods, services and public works, laws and
measures precluding money laundering, tax
regulations making provisions about the system of
tax returns, according to which property and
income of individuals can be tracked down, etc. 
10.3. POST-PRIVATISATION
CORRUPTION 
There may have been room for corruption in
connection with fulfilling the terms of contract,
signed by the buyer and the FNM SR. It may take
place, for example, in payment of the purchase
price of the privatised assets, particularly when
the sale implemented was by instalments. These
are the situations when the transferees are able to
pay instalments but do not do so, relying on the
imperfectness of the contracts of purchase and
sale, high caseload of commercial courts, political
lobbying in favour ofnot punishing breaches of
contracts or even in favour of change in terms of
reducing the purchase price or pardoning
instalments, etc. 
It must be emphasised that a failure to pay the
purchase price can occur not only for speculative
but also for objective reasons, when, say, the
market conditions are eroded compared to the
state assumed by the buyer. Accordingly, the
inability to keep to the instalment plan, agreed at
the time the contract of purchase and sale was
signed, can arise. 
In the context of post-privatisation corruption,
we should also refer to the Act no..286/1992 of
the Collection of Laws on income tax, which
made provisions for deductions of investments
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from the tax base in the transferees in direct sales. 
Thus a particular group of entrepreneurs has
gained advantage. 
The room for corruption was created also in
the handling of bonds. In March 1996
a Government decree was adopted which
specified the terms and forms of bond uses. The
bond privatisation allowed, among other things,
the sale of bonds to the FNM debtors, who could
thus cover their obligations to the FNM.
Subsequently, the sale of bonds to the FNM
debtors became one of the main forms of
handling bonds. The above Government decree
then enabled some (or selected) new owners of
privatised assets, who were FNM debtors, to
acquire FNM bonds before the date of maturity in
2001. Selected privatisation actors, FNM debtors,
could buy out bonds and pay their obligations
against the FNM. The nominal value of the bond
was SKK 10, 000, the Government fixed the
minimum price at SKK 7,500. Given the
significant imbalance which existed in the
demand and supply, the real price was lower and
was circumvented. The Constitutional Court of
the SR later ruled that several decisions were at
variance with the constitution, namely with
Article 55 par. 2, which refers to the protection of
economic competition. As there was difference
between the nominal value of the bond and its
market value, the privatisation actors could pay
the FNM effectively using its nominal value,
whereby this group of economic subjects were
treated more favourably.
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APPENDIX 1: Privatisation Cases
The appendix Privatisation Affairs contains
selected most famous cases which we put in
alphabetical order (bearing in mind that there is
also a different way of sequencing). The cases
have been processed on the basis of summarising
the events according to monitoring of the press
starting from the beginning of privatisation of
particular companies until present state. We do
not comment on the cases, neither do we close
them. We leave to the reader to form his or her
own judgement. 
THE CASE OF BA¯A ZçHORIE
The Board of the FNM SR decided on
October, 2 1996 about the sale of a 51-percent
stake of the a. s., Ba¸a Zhorie (Mine Zhorie) to
a company, Ba¸a Zhorie 1, the actors of which
were officials and members of HZDS in the time
of privatisation, for a symbolic price of one
crown. There were other bids at SKK 100-270
million. The winning company Ba¸a Zhorie 1
was founded only two days before the tender was
completed at the FNM. The fact that the case of
the winning company actually concerned HZDS
officials and members was highlighted by
reference letters of the officials of coalition
parties, and even with a supplement to the
resolution of the coalition board of District Senica
of 10 December 1995, according to which
"district coalition board insists that  the transferee
of Ba¸a Hol become the company Ba¸a
Zhorie1." 
On 9 December 1996, the Slovensk
Sporite…¸a, a. s., (SLSP) bought in direct sale at
the BCP for bonds the remaining 46-pecent stake
for SKK 4.4 million at SKK 30 per share (The
Board of the FNM decided this sale on 20
November 1996). On 12 December 1996, the
SLSP sold two companies - Auris and Emin, 23 %
of shares each, with a moderate profit (SKK140
thousand) (SKK 31 per share). In a few days,
Auris transferred 23% of shares in favour of
Miroslav Zachar (again at SKK 31 per share),
also a member of the bodies of the company Ba¸a
Zhorie 1, that privatised a 51 -percent stake of
Ba¸a Zhorie for a symbolic one crown. 
The company Emin (whose statutory authority
is Miroslav Zachar) sold its 23-percent stake to R.
ZboÞil (also at SKK 31 Sk/p.s.), the director of the
section of organisation of trade in bonds of the
FNM SR. When asked by daily SME on January,
21 1997 why he decided to buy a 23-percent stake
in Ba¸a Zhorie,a.s., he replied: " I have to check
this fact," and refused to give any other comments
(SME, January, 22 1997). 
In the late 1997, Ba¸a Zhorie increased its
equity when its shareholder with a 13.5% stake
became Hornonitrianske Bane, a.s. Pievidza
through capitalisation of its receivable against
Ba¸a Zhorie, a.s. Accordingly, shares of
previous shareholders were decreased. At that
time, ZboÞil and Zachar sold part of their shares (
12, 508 pieces each, i.e., around 3% of the
original equity, apparently for SKK 1,000/p.s.) to
the company HOSTA, Ltd. whereby (plus
consequences of equity increase) their ownership
shares dropped to 16.44% (each).
On March, 4 1998, M. Zachar and R. ZboÞil
sold all their remaining shares (16.44% each) to
the companies Koruna L, o. c. p., and T. D. F., s.
r. o., for SKK 760 /p.s., together SKK 89 698
240. Only from the sale of these shares, each
profitted SKK 43, 019, 748, which means a
corresponding loss for the FNM.
Summary: The FNM sold 97 % of the shares of
Ba¸a Zhorie, a.s., for SKK 4,291, 205.50.
Through subsequent sale of part of these shares in
the capital market, each of its "privatisation
actors" - Miroslav Zachar and Rastislav ZboÞil
gained SKK 55,527,748. Only on sales of Ba¸a
Zhorie shares, transacted so far, the FNM lost,
while Zachar, ZboÞil & co. made SKK 111, 055,
496 , with the total estimated loss of the FNM
from the sale of 97 % of shares of Ba¸a Zhorie
between SKK 224, 946,184 (at SKK 760/p.s.) and
SKK 297, 336, 944 (at SKK 1, 000 /p.s.).
Rastislav ZboÞil was at the time of the above
transactions the director of the section of the
organisation of the FNM bond market and
remained employed by the FNM until at least July,
29 1998 (Pravda, July, 29 1998), despite these
facts. ⁄38 par. 3 of the Act no. 92/1991 of the
Collection of Laws on conditions of transfer of
state assets to other persons, as later amended,
says: "Members of the Board, Executive
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Committee, Supervisory Board and the staff of the
Fund cannot carry out any activity that would be
against the interest of the FNM. Members of the
Board, the Executive Committee, and the
Supervisory Board cannot acquire property of the
fund, with the exception of bonds issued by the
Fund (⁄ 22) and shares for these bonds."
After debating the information on privatisation
of Ba¸a Zhorie, a. s., Hol, the Board of the
FNM in May 1999 lodged a criminal notice
against an "unknown perpetrator", when there
were suspicions of crimes being committed of
neglect of duties in administering other personÕs
property, breach of binding rules governing
economic relations, and the abuse of public
office. The information of the FNM says , that by
committing all these, an alleged loss of around
SKK 300 million was incurred to the FNM.
(Prca, May, 3 1999)
THE CASE OF BIOTIKA 
SLOVENSKç »UPA
On February, 29 1996, the Board of the FNM
decided on the sale of a 40.6-percent stake of a. s.
Biotika Slovensk »upa in favour of the company
G. V. Pharma, a. s., Preäov. In the bodies of this
company, among others, are also managers and
owners of the largest pharmaceutical company in
Slovakia - Slovakofarma, a. s., Hlohovec. Biotika
-zamestnanci, a.s., an employees and managers
company, with a 65-percent employee stake and a
35-percent manager stake also bid for the
privatisation of the above stake. They were not
successful despite the fact that their bid was three
times higher than the winning project. The bid by
employees assumed cash instalments higher by
SKK 140 million, investments higher by SKK
753.5 million, i.e., in total, a price which was SKK
893.5 million higher. In response to critical
articles by the employee joint stock company,
which appeared in the press, the FNM gave a
statement according to which the price offered by
the employee joint stock company was
unrealistically high. This statement is surprising,
especially if we consider that the price was set by
the managers of the joint stock company
themselves, who have best knowledge of what is a
feasible price and what is not. In addition, the
management representatives called the
investment, offered by the project of G.V.
Pharma, as not sufficient , a sum which is equal to
a 10-month investment need of Biotika. The
President of the Supervisory Board of G.V.
Pharma and at the same time the general director
of Slovakofarma, a.s., OndÞej Gattnar said that the
owners of G.V. Pharma did not wish to be named,
but in GattnarÕs words, Slovakofarma or a
majority owner of Slovakofarma was not among
them. Some Slovakofarma shareholders are in the
bodies of G.V. Pharma, but in GattnarÕs words,
they are there to have strategic influence on and
control over the running of Biotika. In this respect,
there were suspicions voiced in the media of a
strong group of HZDS people of Trnava District
standing behind the privatisation of Biotika
(Trend,  March, 31 1996).
The suspicion was confirmed by former
Biotika director Miroslav Otenä, who wrote an
article Too many false statements in response to
the interview with the current President of the
Supervisory Board of Biotika, Jozef Dolnk. In
the article he commented the ownership relations
in G.V. Pharma: "In a furher part of the interview,
J. Dolnk strives to make an impression of the
owner of G.V. Pharma from 1997 and play down
the presence of Mr. Gattnr, Varga and Por in G.
V. Pharma. It is scorning of all thinking people
because G.V. Pharma is a company with
unregistered stock." (Hospodrske noviny,
October, 26 1999).
THE CASE OF COLORIN
Slovnaft, a. s., Bratislava is the largest Slovak
oil refinery and one of the largest companies in
Slovakia. Annually it processes more than 5
million tons of oil, and annual sales currently
exceed SKK 40 billion. It exports more than half
ofits production. Currently its majority
shareholder is Slovintegra, which bought Slovnaft
shares from the FNM at lower than the market
price. 
The company Colorin was set up on March, 19
1996 in ºilina, with a business in retail in non-
specified outlets, mediating trade in mixed goods,
and other trading activities. 
The sale of a 10.23- percent stake of Slovnaft
from the FNM portfolio to the firm Colorin on
February, 25 1998 seems more than suspicious.
The transferee - the firm Colorin paid SKK
619,441, 888 for this stake. The transfer of shares
took place immediately before the GM of
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Slovnaft, which means that the FNM consciously
deprived itself of Slovnaft dividends. In the first
days after the purchase of shares, Colorin gained
almost SKK 43 million on dividends. The decision
about the sale was adopted by the Board of the
FNM despite the finding by the Constitutional
Court about the deal being in contravention with
legal norms. On the part of the FNM then it was a
case of gross neglect of the law. 
Even more scandalous than the unlawfulness
of the transfer and conscious transfer of the
dividends to an unknown entity, is the price of the
contract; the fund sold 1,684,772 shares at SKK
368/p.s. The market price of Slovnaft shares at
that time fluctuated around SKK 880/p.s. By
selling them at half the price, the fund lost SKK
862 million. This decision was taken by the Board
which was fully aware of the apparent crisis in the
liquidity of the Fund and scarcity of reserves to
redeem the bonds.The material on which the
Board made its decision stated that if the FNM
attempted to sell the shares, it would get a higher
price than in the sale to Colorin and presented
facts that the price of Slovnaft shares in the
anonymous market was SKK 930-945 and that
Slovintegra managed to sell a larger  package in
January at SKK 900. In May, BCPB stated that
Colorin placed 1,683, 266 shares in repotrade,
i.e., the whole its stake of the first issue of
Slovnaft. Currently the price of Slovnaft oscillates
around SKK 700, that means Colorin will make
several millions in profit in any sale of Slovnaft
shares above SKK 368.
It is worth noting that SPP bought Slovnaft
shares in December 1997, still at SKK 1196/p.s.
(suspicion of financial "asset stripping") and, two
months later, the FNM sold 1.6 million shares to
Colorin at SKK 368/p.s. A more comprehensive
analysis of the deals in which SPP bought
Slovnaft shares showed that unknown subjects
made tens of millions crowns in these
transactions at the expense of the state enterprise.
On 11 December 1997, SPP was transferred to its
account 10.1% shares from the second issue of
Slovnaft. SPP bough them at the stock exchange
for SKK 1,196 p.s. two day before. This package
was formed in the preceding days though, starting
from December 3, for prices around SKK 930. If
these shares had not passed through an unknown
broker but went directly to the account of SPP,
the state enterprise would have saved almost SKK
90 million. These transactions were made in a
way that made it impossible to identify who got
the money in cash. At the same time and in the
same manner, deals were made with shares of the
first issue of Slovnaft.
By handling state assets in an irresponsible
way, the FNM deprived the citizens of this state
of one billion crowns in just this case, when in
selling Slovnaft shares to Colorin it lost 862
million crowns, and additional 43 million crowns
were lost in Slovnaft dividends, while in transfer
of Slovnaft shares to the account of SPP through
brokers, the sum lost was 90 million crowns. 
THE CASE OF DMD HOLDING
The joint stock company DMD Holding arose
in 1995, with the purpose of integrating and co-
ordinating machinery production of state strategic
enterprises, as a company with a 100% state
interest. Its main machinery producing
subsidiaries became : ZŁS TEES Martin, ZŁS
Dubnica nad Vhom, Povaìsk strojrne, and
PPS Detva.
The obligation of the FNM against DMD
Holding arose in 1996 in relation to increasing the
equity of DMD (where the Fund was the largest
shareholder). The FNM was to pay SKK 2.21
billion in favour of DMD in half-year instalments
of SKK 200 million. The Fund paid its first
instalment at May, 31 1997 but given the existing
problems in liquidity, it did not pay the following
instalments. 
DMD Holding founded a daughter company
DMD Progres on September, 7 1998, to which it
transferred part of the FNM liability against DMD
Holding, at SKK 1.61 billion. The Fund resolved
its obligation against DMD Holding Progres by
settling it with a transfer of 230 thousand shares
at the nominal value of SKK 10,000 (i.e., in the
total value of SKK 2.3 billion) to DMD Holding
Progres. Through the decision of the FundÕs
Board thus DMD Progres gained a 40.48% stake
in DMD Holding (Nrodn obroda, January, 15
1999). The Fund, which took this step as one of
the last steps before the Government of M.
Dzurinda came in office, lost its majority interest
in DMD Holding and , hence, it lost control over
property interests in 22 machinery companies in
which DMD Holding is a shareholder. 
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The new bodies of DMD Holding were elected
at the extraordinary general meeting on January 5,
1999. Shareholders also decided about a change
to the statutes, through which so-called priority
shares of the company DMD Fin ( from
September 10, 1998) comprising 0.09% of the
equity, lost their possibility to block decisions of
the general meeting. In practice this means, that
the FNM, the Ministry of Economy and the state-
run subjects (SPP, Slovensk Elektrrne,
Slovensk Sporite…¸a) own together a dominant
package of stock. The general meeting was
attended by representatives of all shareholders
and voted unanimously. The case of DMD
Holding should then be finished. 
THE CASE OF PRIVATISING HOTELS IN
HIGH TATRA MOUNTAINS 
In early 1996, the FNM began to sell off 
hotels in the High Tatra Mountains. Formally, 
the hotels were sold by Interhotely Tatry, a.s., 
but in fact everything was decided and organised
by the FNM, which was a 100% shareholder 
in this joint stock company. The President of 
the Board of Directors of Interhotely Tatry at 
that time was Jaroslav Bilk, staff member of 
the FNM, currently Vice -president of VSº a.s.
for strategy. 
Table 46 gives the list of the hotels, their 
book values, market prices according to the
estimates by the Institute of Tourism for 1994, as
well as the purchase prices for which the hotels
were sold.
What is interesting, are the buyers of the
hotels. The Grand Hotel in Smokovec has become
part of Rezeä empire, the Park Hotel was bought
by Mr. HaØapkaÕs daughter and son-in-law, a
former MP for the SNS and the current
Ambassador to Mexico. The mountain hotel at
Popradsk Pleso fell to the son of HZDS deputy
Ms. Lazarov, Grandhotel Praha in Lomnica was
bough by the brother of another HZDS deputy,
Ms. Æoltøsov-Gantnerov, and the mountain
hotel Sliezky dom, by Slobodnkov, M.D., a
relative of the Ministry of Environment State
Secretary for the HZDS. Slobodnkov is the
same person, who lives in one of the apartments
in Mierov Street in Bratislava, which the FNM,
at variance with the law, sold to high-ranking
coalition offcials. It can be assumed that the
remaining hotels also fell to people close to
coalition top officials, only these did it less
ostensibly, not through their closest relatives. 
The last hotel to be sold from this group was
the mountain hotel Sliezsky dom, which the FNM
sold on the basis of its decision of April 8, 1998.
Later, on May 21, 1998, the Board of the FNM
decided the sale of a 97% stake of Interhotely
Tatry to Ekiva, s.r.o. for SKK 131,631,600 that
was to be paid by FNM bonds in a single payment
within 30 days of signing the contract. 
The arguments for this sale, given in the
explanatory report to the material which the FNM
Board approved, were that Interhotely Tatry, a.s.
no longer owned any real property and thus could
not carry out the original activity. If the shares
were not sold, it would have to go in liquidation. 
As follows from Table 46, the sum of prices
for which the hotels were sold amounts to SKK
215.5 million. The purchase prices in these cases
were not divided in instalments but were to be
paid in a single payment within 30 days of the
date the contract of sale fell effective. The
material also contained a provision according to
which the funds thus acquired by Interhotely
Tatry, a.s. through sale of the hotels would be
deposited at a term account and could not be used
for modernisation of the remaining hotels or
settling liabilities of the company. 
If the privatisation actors fulfilled the terms of
payment, which they were supposed to do under
the contracts of sale, Interhotely Tatry should
have in their accounts funds totalling minimum
SKK 215.5 million. The material on the sale of
97% of shares gives the balance sheet statement
at year-end 1997 as being SKK 241,827,000,
when these assets were covered at as much as
99.5 % with own equity and only at 0.5 % with
outside resources and other liabilities. 
The FNM thus sold 97 % of shares of a joint
stock company, which should have in its accounts
at least SKK 215.5 million, for SKK 131 million,
and even this was paid for through bonds. Hence,
it cost those that were buying for the above sum
of more than SKK 200 million, only roughly SKK
70 million, because those are average costs for
which bonds could be acquired that could cover
the liability amounting to SKK 131 million. (with
an average cost per bond amounting to SKK
6,500 and the coverage of liabilities against the
FNM by one bond amounting to SKK 11,760).
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It can thus be calculated relatively accurately,
what the actual costs were for which the
privatisation actors, recruiting from the ruling
coalition relatives and otherwise closely related
people, bought ten of the most lucrative hotels in
the High Tatra Mountains. The sum of book values
of these hotels is SKK 336 million, the sum of their
market values according to the estimates of the
Institute of Tourism from 1994, was SKK 889
million. The formal sum of purchase prices was
SKK 215.5 million, but the actual price for which
the hotels were privatised by privatisation actors
from the ranks of the ruling coalition comprises
only around SKK 70 million. 
It is then an amount which is equal to only
20.8% of the balance value of these hotels and
only 7.9% of the market value estimated by the
Institute of Tourism. 
THE CASE OF JUHOSLOVENSK
CELULîZKY A PAPIERNE ÆTòROVO
JCP Ætrovo (the South-Slovakian Paper Mill
in Ætrovo) ranks among major Slovak
enterprises. According to the charts of Trend TOP
96, JCP placed 25th, according to the turnover,
and 12th, according to the profit achieved in 1995.
Within the first wave of voucher privatisation,
70% of shares were sold, while 30% remained in
the FNM. In 1995 the company got in the control
of one of the largest investment companies in
Slovakia - Harvard Capital & Consulting
Slovakia (HC&CS), which, in the words of JCP
general director J. Kuera, controlled around 53
%. The representatives of HC&CS denied their
majority position in JCP, but the changes that
occurred in the bodies of the joint stock company
in 1995, proved them guilty of fraud. In 1995,
HC&CS representatives filled majority of the
positions on the Board of Directors and the
Supervisory Board of the company. The denial of
apparent majority was motivated by the failure to
abide by the Securities Act which stipulates, that
where a single owner or a group of allied owners
own more than 30% of the shares, a mandatory
buy-out is imposed on them of all other shares for
the capital market price. 
In February 1997, a public commitment from a
Swedish concern AssiDomn appeared in the
capital market for the purchase of 91% of JCP
shares for SKK 900 /p.s. JCP shares were traded
at SKK 600 - 900 at that time. This public
commitment was preceded by January sale of
more than 50% of JCP shares from the hands of
HC&CS in the holding of AssiDomn at assumed
price of around SKK 900 /p.s. This transaction is
in fact the first known large case of so-called third
wave of privatisation when Slovak majority
owners sold their shares to a foreign strategic
investor. There is nothing negative about the
transaction itself, just the opposite, the foreign
strategic investor could bring the needed
investment, know-how, and access to foreign
markets. The reason why we mention the JCP
cause among privatisation causes lies in the way
the FNM privatised the 30% shares, which were
not distributed in the first wave of voucher
privatisation. 
On October 28, 1996 the FNM sold its 30 %
stake in JCP Ætrovo to the firm KK Profin, s.r.o.,
Bojnice for SKK 100/p.s. , when the price on the
capital market at that time was SKK 600 - 900. It
was clear then, that the FNM lost in this
transaction around SKK 217.1 - 347.4 million. 
In March 1997, the media brought an article
according to which the firm AssiDomn owned
already 91 % of JCP shares (Nrodn obroda,
March, 12 1997). That means that the firm KK
Profin, s. r. o., had sold the 30% stake to the firm
AssiDomn for SKK 900/p.s., which confirms
that, only through this one transaction, the FNM
suffered a loss amounting to SKK 347.4 mill.,
while those people who were behind the firm KK
Profin, made  easy and quick profit of the same
volume. Who are these people? 
At the time of the sale of 30% of shares of the
FNM, in the extract from the trade register were
given names of two sons of the general director of
JCP, Juraj Kuera, and the seat of the company
was in the private house of one of them in
Bojnice. Father and the genral director Jozef
Kuera called the participation of his sons in the
privatisation of 30% shares of the company in
which he was the manager a case of "puerile
thoughtlessness" . The Kuera family also claims
that the firm KK Profin changed the seat, the sons
are no longer the firmÕs agents and do not own
any shares. Kuera Sr. unequivocally insists that
"the shares are outside our family", but they all
refuse to name the actual owners, i.e., those who
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were in the background, and for whose benefit the
whole transaction has been organised. (SME,
February, 8 1997, Trend, February, 19 1997). 
The contract signed between KK Profin and the
FNM contained, inter alia, also a condition that this
30% stake could not be handled without the consent
of the FNM for ten years. If during these ten years
the buyer would want to transfer shares to a third
party, he was obliged to offer them preferentially to
the FNM at SKK 100 (acquisition price). Perhaps
the greatest paradox is the fact that the KK Profin
actually observed the contract with the FNM while,
at the same time, they circumvented it. KK Profin
did not sell the Swedish firm AssiDomn the 30 %
stake in JCP Ætrovo, as the contract prohibited it,
but the whole firm of KK Profin. The actual transfer
of the shares was effected only after the elections
when the former management of the FNM still
managed to endorse the transfer of KK Profin shares
to a third party, provided AssiDomn take over its
obligations against the FNM and pays all
instalments. The approval was signed by the FNM
representatives on October, 13 1998 (Ing. Jn
Porvaznk, Vice-chairman of the Excutivee
Committee of the FNM and Ing. Miroslav Veleckø).
The new management of the FNM, elected on
November, 6 1998, did not deal with this case and
on April, 14 1999 even noted that conditions were
satisfied by KK Profin to be able to transfer these
cheaply acquired shares to a third party. Thus the
owners of KK Profin were allowed to "buy cheap
and sell dear" also by the current workers of the
FNM, although the recent President of the FNM SR
»udovt Kank announced that " FNM deems the
privatisation of JCP, a. s., Ætrovo by the firm KK
Profin, s. r. o., to be unprofitable for the FNM, with
the former management of the FNM being fully
responsible and currently hold talks with
AssiDomn on settling mutual contractual relations
with the FNM. " (Prca, October, 19 1999)
In the daily Prca, on October 25, 1999,
President of the FNM  »udovt Kank responded
to the situation in this case by stating that: "the
current management of the FNM did not endorse
the transfer of the shares of the firm KK Profin,
spol. s r. o., to the Swedish AssiDomn
Packaging Ætrovo, a. s.. The shares will remain
in the account of KK Profin, s.r.o., because the
contract contains effective restriction on the
transfer of shares to a third party for 10 years. The
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Hotel Balance price Market Purchase PP/BP PP/MV 
(mill. SKK) valuation price (%) (%)
(mill. SKK) (mill. SKK)
Patria 114 259 75 65.8 29.0
Panorma 33 82 20 60.6 24.4
Park 33 80 21 63.6 26.3
Grandhotel Smokovec 42 152 30 71.4 19.7
Bellevue 34 59 26 76.5 44.0
Grandhotel Praha 
Tatransk Lomnica 31 103 21 67.7 20.4
Tatra 10 18 7 70 38,9
Lomnica 8 14 6..5 81..3 46.2
Pop. pleso 20 8 6 30 75
Sliezs. dom 11 14 3 27..3 21.4
TOTAL 336 889 215.5 64.1 24.2
Table 46 — Privatised hotels, estimate by the Institute of Tourism, 1994
Balance price = the book value of the hotels as the book value of the construction, land and hotel equipment (in mill. SKK)
Market valuation = the market price calculated by the Institute of Tourism in 1994 (in mill. SKK)
Purchase price = the price for which the FNM (through a. s. Interhotely Tatry) sold the hotels in the period of 1996 - 1998 (in mill. SKK).
Source: Institute of Tourism, Bratislava, FNM SR, M.E.S.A.10
only thing that the Fund can do is not to agree the
change of the contract, which restricts transfer to
a third party for ten years. The letter signed by
two members of the Executive Committee of the
FNM SR only notes that AssiDomn observed the
terms of the contract against the FNM, but does
not change the contractual terms. I would like to
alert to the fact that conditional approval with the
transfer of shares to a third party , which was
signed by Ing. J. Porvaznk and Ing. M.
Medveckø, is not a consent in legal terms because
it was not even debated by the former fundÕ s
Executive Committee. Thus it equally does not
give any guarantee that the shares could be
transferred." (Prca, October, 25 1999)
THE CASE OF SLIA 
AND KOVçOVç SPA‘S
The Board of the FNM SR approved at its 36th
meeting privatisation of 51% shares of the a. s.
Slovensk Lieebn Kpele Slia a Kovov in
favour of the company Corvas, s.r.o., PieäØany,
whose one shareholder is also former Minister of
Health of the SR for HZDS and former chief
manager of the election campaign of HZDS, V.
Sobo¸a. The purchase price was set at SKK 151
million, with the first down payment at SKK 30
million. Sobo¸a in his interview for the daily
Prca said that the project of their company for
the privatisation of spa was the only one (Prca,
October, 12 1995). As was confirmed by S.
Brachna, the Mayor of Kovov, for the daily
SME the next day, the community Kovov was
also interested and submitted their privatisation
project on time. In answer to the question, how
the Ministry of Health could enter privatisation of
spas, State Secretary of the Ministry of Health, Æ.
Zelnk said for SME that their sector only gave
advice on whether the health aspect had been
maintained: "That is all, the other things are in the
responsibility of the Ministry for Privatisation
and the FNM." Sobo¸a, who in the capacity of the
Minister of Health in 1992, enthusiastically
advocated the state keeping majority of shares of
spas, because only then, in his words, the medical
character would be preserved, had gained
majority in both spas through a FNM decision for
a sum which is, according to experts, laughable.
The daily SME said, "the mere statues and
fountains on spa premises are of a comparable
value" (October, 13 1995). 
On July 13 1999, the Securities Centre (SCPB)
finally transferred 51 % shares of spa Slia and
Kovov from the account of the company
Corvas PieäØany to the FNM. Hence the share of
the FNM in spas increased to 67 % (other
shareholders include: VäZP (General Health
Insurance) — 20 %, city Slia — 8 %, RIF — 3 %,
others — 2 %). The reason was the failure to fulfil
the terms of the contract, particularly inadequate
provision of sale of employee shares of spas.
Corvas did not create 240 new jobs, as was
pledged in the contract. The director of spas and
former Minister of Health Viliam Sobo¸a deems
this reprivatisation act on the part of the FNM to
be a political revenge and simultaneously sued
the Fund for unlawful repudiation of the
privatisation contract. (SME, July, 15 1999).
In July 1999 thus the FNM unilaterally backed
out of the contract of purchase with the company
Corvas and SCPB transferred 51% shares in the
FundÕs account. Corvas, in turn, sought indictment
with the Regional Court in Bratislava to annul
repudiation of the contract and asked to have a
preliminary injunction issued and consequently the
Regional Court blocked the FNM to handle the
shares and prohibited the Board of Directors and
the Supervisory Board to call the general meeting.
It also ordered SCPB to register the injunction of
the FNM to handle Corvas shares until the matter
was settled. Despite this, the Regional Court in
Bansk Bystrica at the instance of the FNM called
the extraordinary General Meeting for October, 28
1999. The management of spas, however,
obstructed its proceedings and turned to the
Supreme Court. The situation in handling the
shares and in filling positions in the company,
which arose following the steps by the FNM,
SCPB and subsequent rulings of the Regional
Courts of Bratislava and Bansk Bystrica was
dubbed as legally confusing by dr. Ikrnyi
(solicitor of the firm Corvas) (SME, November, 16
1999). 
THE CASE OF NAFTA GBELY
Nafta Gbely, a. s. is one of the most prosperous
enterprises in the SR. The profit before tax in
1995 amounted to SKK 1,075 mill. (USD 35.8
mill.) and the company ranked fourth among the
most profitable companies of the SR according to
its profit/sales ratio. The shares of Nafta Gbely
were ranked highest in the Slovak capital market,
when in late July 1996 their price fluctuated in the
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range of SKK 2,236-2,360/per share (with SKK
1,000 nominal value per share). It is also a
company which was, subject to the Strategic
Enterprises Act of September 1995, included
among strategic enterprises. Part of the shares
(54.1%) were privatised in the first way of
voucher privatisation.
On August, 1 1996, the FNM decided about
the direct sale of the whole unprivatized stake of
Nafta Gbely (45.9%) to an unknown company
Druh Obchodn a.s. for SKK 500 mill., with the
first down payment of SKK 150 mill. within 30
days and the remainder according to the payment
scheme within 10 years. Part of these down
payments can be invested in the company, in
which case down payments are reduced by the
investments. The annual profit of Nafta Gbely is
more than SKK 1 billion, and hence it is clear that
the new transferee will comfortably pay its
commitments from the dividends which he will
acquire as a new owner. It is another case of so
called self-propelled privatisation (see for
example the privatisation model of Slovnaft a.s.).
A number of domestic and foreign investors
were interested in privatising Nafta Gbely shares,
including Ruhrgas, MV, and Gas de France.The
President of the FNM Board and Vice-Chairman
of the Association of Workers Party Ætefan
Gavornk said that the price, domestic bidder and
his trustworthiness were decisive. (Nrodn
obroda, August, 8 1996)
The purchase price was SKK 500 mill. With
the actual price of SKK 2,200 per share on the
capital market, the price of the 45.9% stake would
have been SKK 3.2 billion. The actual market
price would have been even higher because it is a
controlling stake of a lucrative joint-stock
company (the remaining 54.1% of shares were
sold in the voucher privatisation and are relatively
dispersed). Almost all domestic and foreign
bidders offered a much higher price than the
winner. We may conclude that direct loss arising
from this sale amounted to around SKK 3 billion.
As to the trustworthiness of the transferee and the
domestic nature we may state that according to
the investigation by the media, the seat of Druh
Obchodn a.s. was a derelict family house. At
general meetings, new owners are represented by
solicitors, while the statutory representatives of
the joint stock company are entrepreneurs of local
significance and character.
The amendment of the Securities Act, which
was pushed through in the parliament at the end
of 1996 by coalition deputies, and which removed
the mandatory dematerialised form of securities,
introduced in 1995, is closely connected with the
privatisation of shares of Nafta Gbely and with
similar privatisation scandals. The amendment
reintroduced the form of instruments without the
obligation to keep data on the owners. Thus,
again, the uncontrollable institute of unregistered
stock was resumed and the shares of Druh
Obchodn are just of this nature. In other words,
it is impossible to find out who the actual owner
is of the controlling stake in Nafta Gbely, which
was privatised for a symbolic price. 
In relation to this sale, repeatedly information
surfaced in press claiming that the actual owners
should be the top HZDS functionaries, namely the
(former) Chairman of the Parliament Ivan
Gaäparovi, Vice-chairman of the Parliament,
Augustn Marin Hska, Deputy Prime Minister
Sergej Kozlk and former closest colleague to
Prime Minister Meiar, Anna Nagyov. They all
deny participation in the privatisation, but
statutory representatives of Druh Obchodn, a.
s., admit they themselves are not actual owners of
the company, and refuse to answer the question
about actual owners, appealing to the trade secret.
The secret is provided for by the unregistered
stock, the use of which was allowed by the vote
taken not so long ago by the coalition deputies.
There is also much further indirect evidence and
indication about the involvement of the top-
ranking representatives of HZDS in this
transaction. 
The long-time spokesman of the Chairman of
the Parliament I. Gaäparovi, L.Jurk, who
resigned quite recently, told a journalist from the
weekly Plus 7 dn, in the presence of a witness
that at the time the Parliament was deciding about
stripping Frantiäek Gaulieder of his
Parliamentary deputy mandate, I. Gaäparovi was
for a long time considering his resignation from
the position . Then he had a phone call, in JurkÕs
words, that decided that he did not abdicate. In
reference to the reason behind, former spokesman
said in front of witnesses : "And does that surprise
you, when it involves 3.2 billion? (Plus 7 Dn,
8/97, p. 16)
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The media also published an article according to
which the shares of Nafta Gbely have already
changed hands and were sold to a Russian gas giant
Gazprom, which was known to have interest in this
company mainly because of the large ground
storage tanks, which the company owns and which
have strategic significance for large gas exporters.
Gazprom has become significantly active recently
on the Central-European markets, particularly as
they strive to keep their position in gas exports in
the competition with the expanding West-European
companies. The dumping bid of Gazprom for gas
supplies to the CR is well-known, and was made in
an attempt to prevent diversification in gas imports
to the CR from Norway or other European
exporters. Representatives of Druh Obchodn
have denied that the shares of Nafta Gbely had been
sold to Gazprom. 
What is significant, since the time 
the stake of Nafta Gbely was privatised, a
commercial of Nafta Gbely has been appearing
regularly on television VTV, whose owners are
high functionaries of HZDS. The television VTV
is also known for its high debts , a major part of
which is in VòB, which is controlled by the FNM
and whose management is close to HZDS and 
the VTV owners. 
In 1997 it was disclosed that one of the owners
of Druh Obchodn, i.e., also Nafta Gbely, is
Vladimr Por, the Chairman of the Regional
Board of HZDS in Trnava. The Prime Minister
and the Chairman of the HZDS, Vladimr Meiar
said however that he did not know who the owner
of Druh Obchodn was. The Social Democratic
Party of Slovakia Chairman Jaroslav Volf filed
legal notice against the members of the Executive
Committee of the FNM and the President of the
FNM Ætefan Gavornk. In consequence, SPP
bought 6% of shares at SKK 2,000, although a
short time before that, SPP director Jn Duckø
advocated privatisation of Nafta Gbely, arguing
that the price of Nafta Gbely shares was
unreasonable high at the time of privatisation. 
The price of shares of Nafta Gbely, which in
1996 was more than SKK 2,200 dropped in
summer 1998 to SKK 500. The parliamentary
investigation into the sale of Nafta Gbely was not
successful. Early in 1999 the price of shares of
Nafta Gbely fluctuated around SKK 320.
Vladimr Por announced his intention to sell his
stake in Druh Obchodn. The Prime Minister
Mikulä Dzurinda stated that work was initiated
to return part of the Nafta Gbely property to the
FNM. (SME, February, 4 1999). This statement
by the Prime Minister relied on a legal analysis,
according to which there was legal claim to
repudiate the contract of Nafta Gbely shares
transfer in private hands. According to this
analysis, in the case of Nafta Gbely, there was a
clear contravention of the Privatisation Act, as the
sale did not respect the approved privatisation
project of 1991. 
According to this project, the shares of Nafta
Gbely were to be divided in the following way: a
3-percent stake should be deposited in the
account of the Restitution Investment Fund, 47 %
should be sold in the voucher privatisation
scheme, 40 % should be the state interest in the
company and the remaining 9.3 % should
temporarily fall to the FNM. The privatisation
law was also infringed in that all shares have been
sold into private hands. Moreover, the
Commercial Code was also contravened and the
Act on Prices because this legislation refers to
reasonable price in sale, which in the case of
Nafta Gbely was not upheld. 
In early March 1999, representatives of the
FNM and Druh Obchodn concluded an
agreement about returning 40.9 % of shares of
Nafta Gbely. This could only be done after the
FNM sued Druh Obchodn. Druh Obchodn,
which in August 1996 acquired a 45.9 % stake for
SKK 500 million, when the market price for the
stake at that time exceeded SKK 3.2 billion, will
retain the remaining 5 percent. Nafta Õs subsidiary
- Nafta Trade, controlled by V. Por, however
was left the unfinished gas storages. (SME,
March, 17 1999).
Returning the 45.9 % stake of the Nafta Gbely
in the account of the FNM on October, 15 1999
put a definite ending to the scandalous
privatisation and even more scandalous re-
privatisation, whose victims after long media and
legal protraction, were the president of the FNM
». Kank and Vice-president J. Sklenr. The
report of the BCPB says it was returned for
roughly SKK 500 million, i.e., for the sum which
Druh Obchodn, then still unknown, had
acquired it in 1996 from the FNM.
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THE CASE OF NçKLADNç
AUTOMOBILOVç DOPRAVA 
TRENŒN (NAD)
On  October, 19 1995 the Board of the FNM
approved the direct sale of Nkladn
Automobilov Doprava Trenn (truck transport
company) in favour of v. o. s. Merkur for SKK
60,140,000, of which SKK 30,140,000 was in
cash and SKK 30 million was in investments; the
cash payment: first down payment of SKK 15
million (a credit granted by the Priemyseln
Banka), further SKK 15.140 million in eight
annual instalments at around SKK 1.9 million,
carrying an interest rate of 9.75 %.
The firm Merkur had two partners and agents
(Karol Chorvt and Milan Mack). One of them,
Ing. Mack, on January, 20 1997 filed a request to
have the instalment put off by two years due to
bad financial situation of the company. On
January, 21 1997, i.e., one day after the request
was filed (!!!) the executive board of the FNM
denied the request and informed the applicant
accordingly in a letter of February, 12 1997.
On April, 16 - 18 1997 a audit group of the
FNM checked the fulfilment of provisions of the
contract of sale for the company and also the state
of handling the privatised property in the
company Merkur for the period between January,
1 1996 and March,31 1997. The control report
says among other things, that at the time Merkur
requested the deferment of payment due to bad
financial situation (at the time of second down
payment at SKK 1.9 million that he did not pay),
he had in his holding (at the account and in cash)
financial resources amounting to SKK 5.3
million. He did not pay on purpose. 
On June, 18 1997 the protocol of the control
was discussed and it was concluded that the agent
of the company Merkur, Ing. Milan Mack, has to
eliminate deficiency and take measures for the
improvement of the situation in upholding
provisions of the contract by 30 June, 20 1997.
On the same day the control report was debated,
on which the date was set for rectification at 30
June, 20 1997, Ing. Milan Mack received a
notification from the FNM of the FNM pulling
out of the contract of purchase.
On June, 19 1997 (the day after pulling out of
contract with Merkur), the Board of the FNM SR
adopted a decision about the sale of the company
NAD Trenn to S-BiBa s.r.o, but this time for a
puchase price of SKK 7 million. The first
downpayment was SKK 0.5 million, the others
added together totalled SKK 6.5 million, while
mandatory investments were SKK 20 million.
The cash price thus is less than one-quarter of that
in 1996 and is lower by more than half compared
to the first down payment that the previous
transferee paid immediately on signing the
contract, (SKK 15 mill.).
On July, 22 1997, i.e., a month after the sale,
the abstract of the trade register gives Ing. Samuel
Bibza from Bratislava as a 100% owner of S-
BiBa, and the address of the firm as being in
Trenn, Jilemnickho Street no. 2.
On September, 2 1997 the abstract of the trade
register says that Ing. Milan Mack (!!!) is a 100-
percent owner and the only agent for S-BiBa, but
the address changed from Jilemnickho to
Zlatovsk St. 29, which is the address of the
former company NAD Trenn.
On November, 4 1997, according to the
abstract of the trade register, the address of the
former NAD Trenn (Zlatovsk 29) is the seat of
Trenianska Dopravn SpolonosØ, abbreviated
TDS, a. s. It was set up on September, 5 1997,
issued unregistered stock (what a surprise), and it
was established through transformation of the
trading company S-BiBa, s.r.o., with the firm
TDS, a.s. taking over all rights and obligations of
the terminated company S-BiBa, s.r.o.
On the Board of Directors of TDS, amoung
others, is Ing. Milan Mack and on the
Supervisory Board, among others, sits a Jn
Paulny, residing in Kostoln-Zrieie 81, the
brother-in-law of the Vice-president and the
Chairman of the Executive Committee of the
FNM and the Chairman of the Regional Board of
HZDS in Trenn, Milan Rehk.
What is remarkable about this case is the fact
that the first - for the FNM relatively more
favourable sale of the company took place in
1995 (i.e.,already under the present FNM),
subsequently there was an evident purposeful
failure to uphold the contract of purchase on the
part of the transferee, the pulling out of contract
by the FNM SR, and a repeated privatisation at a
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much lower price. From the outset, the
transaction was apparently planned so that it
would end up with one of the original transferees
from the year 1995, but at much lower price and
with the accession of a relative of the second
highest official (and the highest executive) of the
FNM, who happens to be also a high-ranking
official of HZDS.
TDS Trenn became the legal successor to the
firm S-Biba, the members of the Board of
Directors are Milan Mack, the agent for Merkur,
and Milan Struäka, the director of Merkur. K.
Chorvt said for the daily SME that, "the legal
analysis made by Dr. Volfov, indicates that the
sale to the firm S-Biba was only a simulated legal
act that should entail the change of owners and the
reduction of the purchase price of the companyÕs
assets". After being withdrawn privatised assets,
the firm Merkur filed a request to have the first
down payment of SKK 15 million returned,
together with 5 million that were invested. Instead,
the FNM SR levied a liability of SKK 27 million,
which indicates that Merkur has become a debtor
of the FNM. (SME, July, 13 1999) 
THE CASE OF PRIVATISATION 
OF A 51 % STAKE IN NOVçCKE
CHEMICK ZçVODY, A.S., IN FAVOUR
OF THE FIRM INEKON (CR)
On November, 3 1994, the National Property
Fund concluded a contract with the firm INEKON
Praha. The Fund proceeded on the basis of the
Government decision of September, 6 1994,
according to which INEKON was to buy a 51 %
stake in a chemicals manufacturer, Novcke
Chemick Zvody, (NCHZ) for SKK 1.217 billion
( by SKK 403.5 mill., i.e., in excess of 49 percent
of the nominal value). Of this, SKK 400 mill.
should be paid cash, while the remaining SKK
817 mill. should be paid in investments in NCHZ,
particularly related to ecology. INEKON signed
the contract with a proviso that on  November, 25
1994, shares of NCHZ would be transferred to
their company and for each day of delay, the other
contracting party was to pay a penalty of SKK 50
thousand. Although INEKON paid SKK 80 mill.
(first of the five agreed down payments for 813,
485 shares) and provided NCHZ also a credit of
SKK 200 million to bridge their business
operations, the Fund did not transfer a single
share to the joint stock company.
Immediately after the FNM managed to
conclude the contract with INEKON, the newly
elected Slovak parliament at its night session
from November, 3-4 1994 recalled the officials of
the FNM and adopted a law revoking the
decisions of Moravk Government. Soon after,
the Ministry of Privatisation, after a legal analysis
realised that the newly passed law was not
applicable to 29 of 54 revoked decisions,
including the privatisation of NCHZ.
In May 1995, the Constitutional Court of the
SR ruled that the night act of the NR SR on
revoking privatisation was in contravention with
the constitution, arguing that the NR SR
encroached their power and had no right 
to revoke the Government decrees. Although
MeiarÕs Government insured themselves 
and revoked the decrees of the former
Government after the NR SR (although 
many people believe, unlawfully), even the
possibility of the Government to revoke their own
resolutions could not make it applicable to NCHZ
privatisation. The Constitutional Court revoked
the "night" law also for its unacceptable
retroactivity, specifically because it
unconstitutionally suspended and alienated the
ownership rights that were acquired through
effective legal acts, regardless of the FNM not
transferring INEKON the shares of NCHZ. This,
despite the fact that the Supreme Court of the SR,
in May, also confirmed that in this case the act on
annulment of privatisation decisions was not
applicable. 
J. Duckø, the Minister of the Economy, 
said in January 1995 that he had nothing against
the new owner, only he did object they should
have a majority. In December 1995 this was
confirmed by the deputy chairman of the
Executive Committee of the FNM, J.Porvaznk.
In his view, the FNM want INEKON to remain a
shareholder, take them as partners, appreciate
they have a positive contribution, only strive not
to allow them to be a majority owner. INEKON
agreed even to this and offered to give up 17 % of
their 51 % in favour of an employee joint stock
company, provided the FNM would give 
this employee company 16%. Hence, INEKON
would have a 34-percent stake in NCHZ (its
majority stake changing in a controlling interest),
the employee joint stock company a 33% stake ,
the FNM 30%, and the RF 3%, respectively. In
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the end, the FNM did not sign the agreement and
requested that the original contract of 1994 be
rescinded first. 
In the meantime, NCHZ achieved roughly
a 40% increase in production and sales for 1995,
generating the highest profits in their history. The
excellent results which NCHZ achieved also with
the contribution of INEKON, were used as
arguments for the support of the privatisation
efforts given by the councillors of the City Council
and the trade unions of the company, who voiced
their dissatisfaction with the course of action taken
by the FNM  (Prca, 20 December 1995).
Things got even more complicated by the
FNM calling an extraordinary general meeting on
4 December 1995, on which the Fund increased
the equity of NCHZ. If this decision had come
into force, INEKON would lose its majority
position in NCHZ. The Regional Court in Bansk
Bystrica took account of objections raised by the
Board of Directors of NCHZ, challenging the
authority of the FNM to call the general meeting.
The court issued a preliminary injunction
blocking the activity of the new Supervisory
Board elected at the general meeting and blocked
also ntering the increase of the equity that would
change the property relations in the company to
the detriment of INEKON Praha. 
The dispute, going on for almost a year
between INEKON Praha, as the plaintiff, and the
FNM, as the defendant, over fulfilment of the
contract of purchase of 813,485 shares of
Novcke Chemick Zvody ended on 19
December 1995 with the Municipal Court in
Bratislava delivering the final judgement in
favour of INEKON. According to the courtÕs
verdict, the FNM is obliged to transfer all shares
in the account of INEKON within three days from
the date of the verdict is effective and pay a
penalty of SKK 18.8 million for failing to transfer
the shares in accordance with the contract of
purchase. The court in its verdict noted that they
found no reason for which the contract of
purchase should be declared void (sought by the
FNM), whereby the Court confirmed the
contractÕs validity and liability. The decision of
the court is also binding for the Bratislava
Security Center (SCPB). As this dispute concerns
shares and penalties amounting to almost SKK
1.25 billion, the FNM appealed from judgement
and the dispute will continue at the Supreme
Court of the SR.
According to the interview with J. Huäek, the
director of INEKON Praha, INEKON is ready to
reach agreement according to the original
agreement of October 6, 1995, i.e., to give up 17 %
of shares to the benefit of the employee joint stock
company. "I am very glad that the judge resisted
the pressure from the official sphere when the
advocate of the FNM invited the prosecutor to help
him finalise the case and she stuck to the law. I was
quite surprised by the conduct of the prosecutor,
who should defend the law, and I cannot imagine
how he could obstruct the law and bend it
according to the need.", Director Huäek went to
say, "that at present there is a virtual double-track
ruling in the company". During the year when
INEKON was involved in Novky, it was possible
ªto secure increased profits by 77% higher than in
1994, employment was increased and the wages
went up 25% in a year, the debt of the company
was reduced. For this reason the principle of
privatisation with our participation has won clear
support in the region, which was recently
expressed by the Municipal Council in Novky".
(Pravda, 21 December 1995)
Before Christmas 1995, the situation in NCHZ
again sharpened. According to the report of the
daily Prca, the trade union members do not want
to allow the members of the Supervisory Board
and the Board of Directors to enter the premises
of NCHZ, who were appointed by the FNM
unlawfully according to the court in early
December. The trade union council of NCHZ in
its statement, that was supported by economic
workers say: "We do not accept decisions taken
by the new Supervisory Board and newly
constituted Board of Directors. We request that
the original bodies of the joint stock company
resume management in our company and that
particularly during Christmas season unforeseen
situations be avoided and our company function
at least as before." (Prca, 22 December 1995)
A day before Christmas Eve, on 23 December
1995, the daily Prca reported continuing
tensions. The executive director J. Kostka
allegedly does not wish to comment the situation.
According to a well-informed source, the main
reason for not acknowledging the contract with
INEKON is the fact that it is a Czech firm. "What
is happening here can be compared to
blackmailing. The FNM organises one general
meeting after the other and we have not received
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any documents from any of them, the source
highlighted. The FNM blocked the NCHZ
business activities, including accounts. The
newspaper described the dramatic situation: "The
new Board of Directors that unions refused to
allow entry in the company, should come
allegedly on 28 December. There is a tightened
control at the gate carried out by the guards. If the
members of the Supervisory Boards and the
Board of Directors check in, the guards will not
allow them to enter the premises but will
accompany them to the House of Culture where
everything is ready. The current management
allegedly received only some conditions and
ultimatums that they are expected to satisfy by
Wednesday. Otherwise, they will all have to leave 
the executive management."
Two day later, on 30 December 1995, daily
Prca writes about the meeting on 28 December
1995, where representatives of the FNM, new
companyÕs Board of Directors, members of the
Supervisory Board, management, representatives
of INEKON from Prague and the HZDS chairman
in Novky took part. The members of the
companyÕs union got to the meeting only after two
hours. The meeting resulted in a promise by the
executive management of NCHZ and trade unions
to ensure further smooth running of the company.
The INEKON representative offered immediate
talks about the agreement between INEKON and
the FNM to end the dispute as soon as possible.
The employees of the company continue to have
interest in employee shares. After the ruling of the
Supreme Court of the SR, the FNM was obliged to
transfer 51% of the equity shares of NCHZ in the
account of INEKON. Under unclarified
circumstances, however, INEKON later lost a 10%
stake. Later, 49% of shares of NCHZ was gained
by the company PT-Nova through direct sale from
the FNM.
In April 1999, INEKON Praha accepted the
proposal of the Executive Committee of the FNM
and agreed to return 41% of the shares of NCHZ
Novky that were blocked in the account of
INEKON. According to the director Duäek,
INEKON pulled out of the contract in December
1997 but the shares of NCHZ could not be
returned to the fundÕs account because they were
blocked by the same fund. (SITA, April, 14
1999). In the account of the FNM, thus a 41%
stake of NCHZ was added.
On July, 9 1999, a general meeting was held in
which the companies of Fingroup, holding 35% of
shares, decided to increase the equity shares. Other
shareholders could not vote in this general
meeting, which would raise the groupÕs share to
50%. The FNM deemed this step unlawful and is
prepared to seek its revision. According to 
A. Bubenkov, the director of the section of the
founding activities and execution of shareholders
rights, the court banned holding the July general
meeting. If the court did not accept the FNM
arguments, tha Fund would definitely lose the
possibility to gain a majority in NCHZ, in which
case the majority could later be offered for sale
through a public tender (Pravda, August, 14 1999)
As was stated in the daily Prca: "The result is
that INEKON did not acquire majority in NCHZ
even now. The shares stolen by the Fund
appeared in other accounts and the shares that
INEKON was left with, were returned, while they
made tens of million crowns in penalties, which
the FNM had to pay according to a rather absurd
contract." (Prca, August, 18 1999)
THE CASE OF PRVç NOVINOVç 
SLUºBA (PNS)
PNS, a.s., Bratislava is the dominant
publication company dealing in distribution and
sale of newspapers and printed matter. The
companyÕs actual share is 65 %, when it
distributes 30 dailies and 670 magazines. On
February, 24 1998, the Board of FNM decided
sale of a 97% stake of this joint stock company in
favour of the printer giant Danubiaprint, close to
the ruling coalition. Danubiaprint was privatised
in August 1996 by people close to the ruling
coalition. The director and one of the
shareholders of Danubiaprint, S. Srnk, is the
President of the Supervisory Boards of the
companies R-Press and H-Press, that publish the
HZDS dailies Slovensk Republika and Hlas.
Danubiaprint prints all national dailies with the
exception of the daily SME.
Prv Novinov Sluìba (press distributor) thanks to
its dominant position in the distribution of periodicals
was a sensitive firm mainly in connection with the
actual political development and the unconcealed
efforts of the former ruling coalition to curb freedom
of speech and free competition in the area of
dissemination of information.
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The President of the Board of the FNM and the
deputy chairman of the coalition party ZRS, Æ.
Gavornk, in his interview for the daily Pravda
said two months before PNS was privatized:
"There will still be tumult around PNS.
Employees - union members wrote to me they
wanted their share. It is justified, but to privatise
PNS will not be just like that: It is a dominant
distributor of periodical press. It is difficult to
guess who will privatise it. The whole matter
must be approached in a sensitive fashion. Maybe
there will be an agreement reached on the
parliamentary ground to get PNS among strategic
enterprises, at least something similar seems to
emerge." (Pravda, 19 December 1997)
Despite his words, Board of the FNM SR led
by Æ. Gavornkom, sold a 97 % stake in PNS to a
company close to HZDS, which is at the same
time a printing enterprise having a dominant
share in printing periodical press and almost a
monopoly in national daily press. The chairman
of the Association of Publishers of Periodical
Press in Slovakia (ZVPTS) Miloä Nemeek in
this connection said: "I cannot imagine a more
unsuitable privatisation actor than a polygraphic
giant and publisher, with a clear political
background." (Slovenskø Profit, April, 21 1998).
Publishers maintain that there is no economic or
logical argument that could defend this decision
and that it is not accidental when the decision
about the controlling decisive press distributor is
scheduled for pre-election period. What is most
disconcerting is the fact, that explanatory report
gives one of the reasons for the FNM favouring
Danubiaprint (there were 25 bidders competing
for the privatisation of PNS) was "the link of the
press and the distributor". According to the
legislation on protection of economic
competition, the new transferee of PNS must,
within 15 days from the date the contract 
of purchase has been signed, seek approval of the
concentration from the Antitrust Office of the SR.
Perhaps the most serious fact is, that according
to the opinion of several experts and observers, the
FNM infringed the law in deciding privatisation of
97 % of shares, because after the ruling of the
Constitutional Court on unlawfulness of the
transfer of responsibilities for direct sales from the
Government to the FNM, the FNM should no
longer privatise. In this case it was not only a
violation of spirit of the Constitutional CourtÕs
ruling, but it was also a case of violating the letter
of the decision, since property had been privatised,
which even, subject to ⁄ 28 par. 5, could not be
privatised. This paragraph itself was not subject to
the Constitutional CourtÕs review. According to
this paragraph, only those assets can be privatised,
which cannot be sold under previous decisions of
privatisation. In the words of Vice-chairman of the
Executive Committee of the FNM J. Porvaznk,
"this concerns particularly cases where a joint
stock company was established but it was not
specified in more detail how shares would be sold,
or those cases, where originally shares were
approved for sale in the voucher privatisation but
after voucher privatisation had been abolished,
original decisions could not be implemented"
(Prca, 19 December 1996). The explanatory
report to the decision on the sale of a 97 % stake
in PNS itself refers to the fact that the only
decision on privatisation of PNS is the decision by
the Government of the SR of June, 20 1994, which
designated 46 % of the shares for voucher
privatisation, 17 % of the shares for tentative state
interest, 34 % of the shares for a permanent state
interest and 3 % of the shares for the RIF. Even if
we admitted a possibility of privatisation under ⁄
28 par. 5, it is apparent that the possibility is not
applicable to the 34 % stake, which was subject to
Government decision, designated for permanent
interest of the FNM . Despite this, the FNM
privatised 97 % of the PNS shares.
The undue concentration was the reason why the
FNM pulled out of the contract of purchase with
Danubiaprint early in February 1999. As a
consequence, the FNM again owned 76.54% of
PNS share and since May 1999, it has owned 100%
of PNS shares. Moreover, the Bratislava regional
court judged Danubiaprint bankrupt on May, 11
1999, because the company could not meet its
obligations over a long time and is currently in
liquidation. (Pravda, September, 9 1999)
On July, 22 1999, PNS, too, was declared
insolvent, owing Danubiaprint SKK 44 mill. and,
by January 1999, ran up debts of SKK 77 mill.
against publishers. The PNS Boards of Directors
appealed against the courtÕs decision on
declaration of insolvency to the Supreme Court of
the SR. The economic director of PNS Milan
Jablonickø estimated the total damage caused by
the former management at SKK 223 mill.
(Hospodrske noviny, November, 11 1999)
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THE CASE OF PSIS
By its decision of  March, 31 1995, the
Ministry of Finance of the SR revoked license of
Prv Slovensk Investin SpolonosØ (PSIS),
which ranked among the most important
investment companies in Slovakia. This
investment company managed assets worth
around SKK 7 billion and was, beyond doubt, the
best Slovak company operating in the area of
managing open end mutual funds. It was the best
in terms of the volume of these funds and in terms
of their appreciation. 
The largest mutual fund under the
administration of PSIS was Sporofond, pooling
more than SKK 2 billion from more than 42
thousand legal and physical persons. This
investment company (IC) founded two funds for
the second wave of voucher privatisation which
attracted most investment voucher holders within
the process of registration of nationals for the
second wave of privatisation, who pledged in
contracts to invest in PSIS funds. This company
was also known for its autonomy from the ruling
coalition of the day and the support for
independent press. The Government responded
by sending control from the Ministry of Finance
and subsequently revocation of the license.
Several facts, as well as the way in which 
the license was revoked, indicate that it was 
a political move, the purpose of which was to
liquidate a strong financial institution
independent of the Government. Through the
decision of Government, the assets administered
by PSIS were transferred under the administration
of two other investment companies, one of them
being the Harvard Investment Company (HIS),
known for its close contacts with some HZDS
officials. 
The decision of the MF SR to revoke PSIS the
license is significant mainly because it is 
a precedent of failure to respect inalienability of
the private ownership rights through a decision of
a state body, having an apparent political
undertone. The decision concerned the property
of considerable volume which has been
appreciating as private property for more than
four years. By the politically motivated decision
of the MF SR, an absolute loss of confidence of
private entities in investing through mutual funds.
After the news of revoking PSIS the licence and
transferring mutual funds under HIS, the
possibility was suspended of withdrawing
deposits. First, there were concerns over massive
withdrawals, second, HIS did not have the
necessary capacity and know-how to do these
operations. This in turn let to increased demand
for deposit withdrawals and, eventually, to a
situation where within a short time more than
one-third of the shareholders applied to have their
deposits returned, which, subject to the Act no.
248/1992 of the Collection of Laws, as later
amended, entails closing of the mutual fund and
paying out shares.
In August 1995, the former MP G. Kalisk
established a citizensÕ association - Sporofond
shareholders - to defend their ownership rights
against the intervention of the state power. Out of
42 thousand shareholders 1,535 responded to her
initiative. By the end of 1995, the association
lodged two cases of seeking indictment against the
state. One against the intervention in the exercise
of their ownership rights, the other seeking
damages, compensation for property loss incurred
as a result of devaluation of their fund, the impulse
of which came from the state intervention. The
former minister of privatisation, M. Janiina,
provided legal assistance.
At the end of 1995, the Supreme Court
revoked the decision on license withdrawal by the
Ministry of Finance for being unlawful.
According the state secretary of MF SR J.
Magula, the ministry was going to accept the
decision although they did not agree with it.
Magula said that both decisions of the Supreme
Court of the SR - in case of Bansk Bystrica
PSIPS fund and Bratislava PSIS company, were
in their favour, "guided clearly not from an
independent position". The court allegedly
interpreted laws in their own way, disregarding
effective laws and placing themselves in the role
of a law-making body. For example, the Supreme
Court of the SR, in his view, based its decision on
a faulty view that a bill of exchange is not a
security, although another law - the Securities Act
- unequivocally defines it as a security.
Even after the Supreme Court decision, the MF
SR protracted returning PSIS and refused to hand
over the administration of the mutual fund.
Although they first sent out positive signals and
announced issuing a report, in mid-February they
sent a new control to PSIS. Four days after the
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beginning, on February, 20 1996, the MF SR sent
PSIS a decision about instituting proceedings on
violation of laws concerning investment
companies and securities. According to PSIS
management the fact that the decision was made
only 4 days after the initiation of control clearly
indicates that the whole control was but a guise to
impose sanctions. PSIS fears that the target of a
new attack of the MF SR is to crush PSIS so that
they would be unable to claim damages from the
MF SR for the loss which has been incurred to
them by revocation of licence and which was, in
the meantime, rendered void by the Supreme
Court of the SR. 
After protracted handover of funds and
applying the Supreme Court judgements, which
ended as late as mid-February 1996, the Office
for Oversight over Capital Market initiated a new
control in PSIS. PSIS shareholders decided in late
April about the liquidation of the company. They
notified the Ministry of Finance about it on May,
31 1996. On the basis of control MF SR again
revoked license from PSIS. The decision was
delivered on June, 24 1996, by which time PSIS
had already been dissolved.
THE CASE OF SLOVENSKç POISŁOV¯A
Slovensk poisØov¸a (SP) (the Slovak
Insurance Company) was founded on November,
1 1991 when Slovensk Ættna PoisØov¸a was
transformed into a joint stock company. In July
1998, the largest shareholder of SP, the FNM ,
controlled 50.55% of shares. VSº Holding had
around 20% and the companies Vinlan and
Telemar, bothe close to VSº, owned 8.6% and 6
% of the equity shares, respectively.
Early in July 1997, efforts began to intensify of
SP shareholders (mainly VSº) to get a more
significant position in the company at the expense
of state. VSº strove not only to gain control over
the insurance whose balance value and the value
of technical reserve amounted to SKK 31 billion
but also to gain its property interest through
which they might control total assets amounting
to around SKK 100 billion. Through increasing
the equity shares, the law banning privatisation of
strategic enterprises and that banning SP
privatisation by the end of 2003, were intended to
be circumvented.
Originally the equity was to be increased by
SKK 1 billion to SKK 2.5 billion. Shareholders,
however, changed this proposal to SKK 375
million, i.e., they increased the equity by 25%.
This increase sufficed for the FNM to lose
majority in the event of not applying its priority
right and SP would get into the private hands of
privatisation actors close to the ruling coalition.
The FNM stake would drop to 40.4%. The
argument of the Government officials that
increasing the equity shares by SKK 375 mill.
would be beneficial for SP, does not hold because
SP effected SKK 2 billion, that is five time the
amount, to increase the equity of the devastated
IRB, which was controlled by the VSº group since
1996.
A similar scenario for the loss of state majority
occurred in a commercial bank between 1996-
1997 when the equity of Poätov Banka was
raised (from SKK 600 mill. to SKK 1,200 mill.)
and the share of state subjects (the Ministry of
Transport, the Slovak Post and the Slovak
Telecommunications) dropped from 87.5% to
43.5%. The possibility to increase the equity was
used only by the private firms close to VSº which
subsequently gained a majority interest. By the
way, the Minister of Transport, Post and
Telecommunications was Alexander Rezeä, later
chief of VSº.
In increasing equity in July 1998, all 375
thousand new shares of SP in the nominal value
of SKK 1,000 were subscribed, whereby the
ownership relations were changed in one of the
major financial institutions in the SR The
prediction thus came true of concealed
privatisation of SP. SP shareholders surprisingly
did not approve the change to the statutes of the
company - entry of the increase of equity shares
from the original SKK 1.5 billion to SKK 1.885
billion in the trade register at the extraordinary
meeting held on September, 4 1998. The FNM,
apparently against the logic of the preceding
action voted against the change to the statutes. Its
representative M. Bernthov voted for
increasing SP equity at the extraordinary general
meeting on July, 24 1997. Since shareholders did
not approve the increase of the equity, it was not
possible to motion a change to the trade register
about the increase of the equity and the whole
process thus could not be completed.
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After parliamentary elections and after small
shareholders of SP brought charge against SP and
also filed notice to suspend proceedings in the
matter of entering the change with the register
court, other changes occurred in SP on October,
15 1998. At the proposal of ARDS, which
represented the interests of VSº Holding, the
extraordinary general meeting revoked the
resolution proposing to increase equity of July, 24
1998 and annulled the whole process.
Shareholders achieved other change of the
statute though, according to which the change of
the volume of equity and the personal changes to
the Supervisory Board of SP will require the
approval of the shareholders holding two-thirds
of the shares - i.e., 1 mill. shares. Until then, these
changes were subject to the approval of a simple
majority of shareholders attending the general
assembly meeting. President of SP Karol Melock
argued for the proposal by pointing to the need to
defend minority shareholders. Although this
change significantly restrained the influence of
the FNM in SP, the Fund endorsed it. The
amendment of the Act on securing state interest in
the privatisation of strategically important state
enterprises and joint stock companies of 20
November 1998 de facto neutralised this decision
of the extraordinary general meeting.
THE CASE OF SLOVENSK LIEEBN
KòPELE PIEÆŁANY
The year 1996 saw privatisation of the most
lucrative and renowned Slovak Spa PieäØany. On
May, 23 1996, the FNM decided about the sale of
a 51 % stake of Slovensk Lieebn Kpele a. s.,
PieäØany (SLK) in favour of the employee joint
stock company, SpolonosØ Zamestnancov
PieäØanskøch Kpe…ov a.s. (SZPK). The purchase
price was SKK 302 mill., with the balance sheet
price of SKK 1.6 billion and the generally
prevailing opinion that the actual market price is
higher than the balance sheet price. SZPK was
founded and controlled by four members of top
management and the FNM decided to their benefit
despite the fact that city PieäØany offered a much
higher price for the spa and despite the Supreme
Control Office (NKò) alerting to multiple
violation of laws in SLK when SZPK was founded
and instituting criminal proceedings in the matter.
(Pravda, June, 3 1996).
In late January 1997, 51 % of the shares of SLK
PieäØany were transferred from the company
SZPK, a. s. to a joint stock company Vadium
Group a.s. founded by Karol Martinka, general
director of Devn Banka. One of four SZPK
founders and the trade union chairman Tibor
Krajovi said for the daily Pravda that it was a
shock for him and that the president of SZPK
Board of Directors told him that the shares were
transferred ªon the basis of some supplement to
the contract of purchase between the FNM and
SZPK that I knew nothing about." The employees
of SLK PieäØany wrote a letter to the state
officials of the SR in which they warned that the
new owners intended to "sell a large part of the
spa shares to their Russian partner" by the end of
1997 (Pravda, February, 5 1997).
In early February 1999, the FNM resumed in
its holding part of property interest in SLK
PieäØany, a.s. comprising 24.16% of the equity.
The property interest was returned on the basis of
an agreement on repudiating the contract with the
company Väeobecn Socilna PoisØov¸a Tatry
Bratislava. Vadium Group is still a majority
shareholder of PieäØany spa (owns a 68 % stake),
and have been recently transferring their assets to
other legal entities. In the asset stripping of world
famous spa a travel agency Cestovn Kancelria
Slovenskøch Kpe…ov (CKSK) has been playing
increasingly an important role since 1997
(Pravda, February, 17 1999).
Through this company based in Bratislava pass
almost all payments of foreign clients of the
Slovak curative spa (SLK PieäØany) for which they
take a commission of 15 %. This fact had an
impact upon considerable decline of the economic
performance of SLK. Within this cause, a charge
was brought against Ing. Karol Martinka,
president of SLK, for suspicion of committing
fraud. As was stated by J. Ivor, general director of
the section of investigation and criminal expertise
activities of the Ministry of Interior of the SR, the
accused K. Martinka in the capacity of President
of Board of Directors and the General Director of
Vadium Group together with other persons
unlawfully transferred 51 % of spa shares first to
the employee joint stock company — SpolonosØ
Zamestnancov PieäØanskøch Kpe…ov (SZPK), and
then to Vadium Group. In this connection J. Ivor
noted that he had incurred the FNM a loss of at
least SKK 602 mil (SITA, April, 12 1999). July
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1999 was an important milestone in the
development of this affair - on July, 7 a 68% stake
in the spa was transferred to the FNM from the
original buyer Vadium Group a.s. Bratislava. In
consequence, the state managed to get back almost
92.16 % of the shares.
THE CASE OF SLOVNAFT
On August, 10 1995, the Board of the FNM
decided on the sale of a 39 % stake of the joint
stock company Slovnaft in favour of Slovintegra,
a.s., founded by 19 managers of Slovnaft.
Formally, the sale was for SKK 6.4 billion, which
was then the market price of Slovnaft shares, and
which is, coincidentally, also the nominal price.
As a matter of fact, the sale was effected in a very
advantageous regime, which deprived the FNM
of the proceeds amounting to several billion
crowns. As it stands, the contract contains a
mechanism which reduces the actual price against
the officially stated price of 6.4 billion crowns to
a minimum. The contract says that if the new
shareholder pushed through that the company
Slovnaft spend a sum of several billion crowns in
the next few years in investments, a sum of SKK
3 billion crowns of the purchase price will be
condoned. This is a formal criterion because it is
clear from the investment efforts already under
way that Slovnaft will spend this sum on
investments. What is bewildering, the reduction
in the price is not linked to the investments of the
privatisation actor, but to the investments of the
privatised enterprise. 
Another reduction of price is offered, if the
new owners ensure that Slovnaft achieve a certain
level of profit in the following years. In which
case the price will be cut by SKK 2.4 billion.
Again, this is a formal criterion because with the
present economic performance of Slovnaft one
can assume that the profitability criterion will be
satisfied. 
In other words, the actual price for which 39 %
shares of Slovnaft were sold was 1 billion crowns
(!). The fact that this is the actual price is
evidenced by instalments being spread over 10
years, always at SKK 100 million. These
instalments are without interest. The first down
payment at SKK 100 million was due one month
after the contract had been signed and was
remitted in the autumn of 1995. Slovintegra
borrowed from Po…noBanka to pay it. The second
instalment was due only in 1997 and then each
year until the year 2005. 
The "charm" of this privatisation lies in that
the dividends which correspond to 39% of shares
which Slovintegra has thus got hold of are higher
than SKK 100 million. Hence, the dividends for
1995 which Slovintegra is going to get in 1996,
will pay back the credit from Po…noBanka, the
dividends for 1996 will pay the instalment to the
FNM in 1997, and so on, until the year 2005. 
In fact the only real investment the buyers of a
39% stake had to make was their contribution in
the equity shares of the joint stock company
Slovintegra (SKK 1 million). All the remaining
resources that they will effect in the privatisation
of this major property interest in one of the most
profitable factories in Slovakia, will actually be
the resources of the company, whose shares they
have privatised. 
One can make the best picture about the actual
value of the Slovnaft shares from the following
facts. Only few days before the above sale of 39%
of shares, the equity of this company was increased
and the shares of this increase were sold on foreign
markets and on the domestic market. Apart from
Slovak financial institutions, also the EBRD has
become an important Slovnaft shareholder within
this equity increase, with around 10% stake. These
shares were traded for SKK 1,000 per share, which
in a 39% stake would amount to SKK 6.4 billion.
One can claim that the FNM lost a sum of several
billion crowns in the above described way of
privatisation and at the same time the property in
this sum of several billion was given as a gift to
several people close to the ruling coalition. In this
respect we need to recall that part of present
privatisation actors, including S. Hatina, President
of Slovnaft, got in the leadership of Slovnaft
through the FNM, as the majority shareholder,
controlled by the parties of the ruling coalition. 
In the sale of the majority stake in Slovnaft to
the firm Slovintegra for one-sixth of the market
price, including the deductible investments, the
state lost even greater resources than in the case
of Nafta Gbely. The 39-percent stake cost
Slovintegra SKK 1 billion, which is SKK 155. 70
per share - i.e., 15% of its market value.
Slovintegra borrowed money to pay the first
instalment at SKK 100 million, but could pay
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back the loan after getting the first dividends! In
August 1996, Slovintegra paid the FNM the
remaining SKK 900 million. 
Later, after the FNM decision of July 1997,
Slovintegra increased its share in Slovnaft when it
acquired another 15% stake. The price was SKK
385.4 million , i.e., again around SKK 155 per
share. Slovintegra raised the money to buy this
stake by selling less than 3% of shares of Slovnaft
(400 thousand shares) for market prices - at SKK
900 per share. After this sale, Slovintegra settled
all its relations with the FNM, while keeping its
majority in Slovnaft. 
The new management of the FNM elected after
1998 parliamentary elections did not deem this
conduct beneficial for the state and hence
concluded a preliminary agreement with the
owners of Slovintegra on March, 4 1999 about
supplementary payment of part of the purchase
price at SKK 1 billion, or returning 10% of the
Slovnaft shares in the portfolio of the Fund.
Slovintegra would have still one share per a little
more than SKK 200. The Slovnaft shares are
traded at around SKK 640 on the stock exchange.
The Slovintegra management conditioned the
supplementary payment of the purchase price or
the return of shares in the portfolio of the FNM
SR with a written decree of the Government that
no additional request would be raised against
Slovintegra, but until October 1999, the
management had not fulfilled any of their
declared pledges.
THE CASE OF TRANSPETROL
The origin of the Transpetrol affair dates back
to the year 1995, when the Preäov regional court
ruled that the MF SR was obliged to pay the firm
ILaS Vranov SKK 43.26 million, with a 17.6 %
delay charge from January, 1 1997. The firm had
suffered loss due to a measure of the tax office.
The liability was gradually growing, and ILaS
sold it to the company C.S.I.-CD, which filed a
petition for executory sale. A 34.05 % of shares
(647 shares) of the monopoly Slovak oil
tansporter for the SR and CR, Transpetrol a.s. ,
with a 100% interest of the Ministry of Economy
of the SR ( ME SR) was transferred to the
accounts of seven private companies, on the basis
of the distress warrant of October, 9 1998. (Prca,
October, 28 1998)
The Act on securing state interests in strategic
enterprises and joint stock companies, (no.
192/1995) stipulates precisely which state
enterprises and join stock companies are
strategically important. Under this act, the shares
of Transpetrol cannot be subject to privatisation.
It is remarkable that the sum of SKK 65.4 million
, for which the distress warrant was given, should
correspond to a significant stake in an extremely
lucrative company whose net profit for 1997
exceeded SKK 433 million. The market price of
34.05 % of shares of Transpetrol is estimated at
SKK 2 billion. Another interesting thing about
the affair was that these shares did not belong to
the Ministry of Finance, whose obligations were
to be settled in this distress, but to the Ministry of
Economy. 
"This affair is unfortunately, a common way of
circumventing the Act on strategic enterprises,
when privatisation is attempted through a distress
warrant, said, "Minister of Finance, B.
Schmgnerov. She emphasised that the act does
not contain any guarantee in the case of strategic
enterprises and that "this gap in legislation is
being effectively used by those who want to get
hold of a significant interest in some companies".
(Novø as, October, 27 1998)
After the election, Transpetrol, as the issuer,
and the Ministry of Economy, as the owner,
lodged an objection against this course of action.
They pointed to the fact that under the statutes of
the company, the consent of the Board of
Directors was required for any transfer of shares.
This consent was not given. Moreover, the Act on
strategic enterprises was contravened, as were
certain regulations. The MF SR as the oversight
body acknowledged the objections and granted
the application. On 10 December 1998, The
Securities Centre (SCPB) put the account of the
ME SR in the state in which it had been before
one-third of shares were transferred to other
companies. By the action of the MF SR, the
private firms lost their shares in Transpetrol, and
Transpetrol was returned in the hands of the state.
The investigator of the Regional Investigation
Office of the police corps in Preäov in relation to
the transfer of shares of Transpetrol a.s. brought
a charge of fraud against two men that caused the
state damages amounting to SKK 647 million. 
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THE CASE OF VSº AND INVESTINç 
A ROZVOJOVç BANKA (IRB)
The story of the VSº and their largest and most
influential owner, Alexander Rezeä, is a story in
which almost all of the traits of the Slovak post-
communist economy and social transformation,
privatisation, in particular, were reflected in a
concentrated form. 
The Slovak public became aware of Alexander
Rezeä in the late 1994, when he was appointed to
the position of the Minister of Transport and
Communications in the third Government of V.
Meiar. His way to riches, power and influence
began in March 1994 when the second Meiar
Government approved the sale of 15% of shares
of Koäice VSº in favour of his company Manager
for a fraction of the market price. The Meiar
Government decided this after they had been
recalled from office (following the vote of non-
confidence for V. Meiar in the parliament) and
the company Manager arose and was
incorporated on the same day as the Government
adopted the privatisation decision. The
privatisation project was delivered to the
Government Office three days after the decision
regarding privatisation had been made. 
Another company of A. Rezeä bought further
15 % of VSº in July 1995, at the time he held the
position of minister, again for a price much lower
than the market price. His group acquired furher
shares by buying out shares that had been
privatised in the first wave of voucher
privatisation. They were bought with the finances
of VSº itself. At the time Rezeä was a minister,
and was theoretically responsible to his people.
When in 1997 Rezeä quit the Meiar Government
because of health problems, in his own words, he
controlled 47 % of VSº. 
Rezeä gained fame in Slovakia with some
other activities as well. He bought a highly
indebted football club, Sparta Praha, and he
owns also a Slovak club, 1. FC Koäice. He
finances other football clubs around Slovakia and
in his clubÕs money is not spared. Money is spent
in a very non-standard way, for example, for
bonuses for players of those teams, which play
against the major Rezeä clubÕs rival, in the
competition for the title. 
During the time Rezeä was in office as the
minister, his companies became important
shareholders in strategic banks, in which state
enterprises belonging under Rezeä ministerial
direction, (Dopravn Banka, Poätov Banka) had
major interests. Rezeä in the capacity of minister
in 1996 approved special discounts in rail tariffs
for his private company (VSº), hence only in this
way his private company was saved SKK 1
billion in a year (and the state railways lost).
Rezeä appointed his man to the management of
the railways, and he caused railways a loss of
SKK 3 billion in two years through unprofitable
contracts and activities that are currently being
examined by law enforcement bodies. 
In 1996 VSº took control of third largest
Slovak bank, Investin a Rozvojov Banka
(IRB). They acquired a majority stake,
contravening the law, without the consent from
the National Bank of Slovakia. The disagreement
of the NBS with the ownership concentration was
tackled by a few formal moves of shares effected
by the group around the VSº and particularly by
creating political pressure to pacify the NBS. 
On 17 December 1997, information leaked to
the public about the insolvency of the IRB. It is the
bank in which the FNM holds a 34% stake and in
which VSº owners, Meiar movement-allied
Alexander Rezeä group, became majority
shareholders in August 1996. 
Gaining control of the IRB by VSº was
unlawful because the accumulation of an
ownership in access of 15% requires prior
consent of the National Bank of Slovakia. The
NBS did not give this consent, prior or
subsequently. Nothing changed though in the
matter because the VSº only effected a few
formal transfers of shares and further controlled
around 43 percent of the IRB shares. The majority
shareholder did not even make it secret that they
needed the bank to finance high-risk operations,
particularly in former Yugoslavia. After they took
over control of the bank, they changed its
management and V. Vranay, the brother-in-law of
Rezeä Jr. became the President. 
Early in the year, optimistic statements were
published of the new management about the
consolidation program of the bank that was due to
be completed by the end of 1998. Later, however,
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the media brought information about the growing
loss of the IRB (SKK 1.3 billion for the first 10
months of the year) and in the autumn, V.Vranay
resigned from his position of the President 
of the IRB. 
In early December, IRB began having
problems covering its obligations, the NBS
stepped in interceding with other commercial
banks to provide IRB loans. It helped for 
a short time, but on 18 and 19 December the bank
did not open its subsidiaries branches. 
The NBS responded on 19 December by
placing the bank in receivership, supplied
liquidity to the bank to enable it to pay physical
persons accounts that were due. Other accounts
will be released only later. 
There was information leakage that the
situation in the IRB should be rescued by
increasing the equity of the bank on the 
part of Slovensk PoisØov¸a (the dominant
insurance company with the majority interest of
the FNM) by SKK one billion. On 19 December
in the morning (before receivership was imposed)
an extraordinary general meeting of IRB was
convened in which the increase should take place.
It did not take place, however, because only
shareholders holding 9.2 % of the votes (VSº and
FNM representatives did not participate) were
registered. The responsibility for IRB insolvency
lies with the majority shareholders of IRB, former
ruling coalition and also the bank supervision 
of the NBS. 
The IRB majority shareholders, companies
allied with VSº and their owners made no secrets
that they took control of the bank because they had
problems raising funds for risky operations. They
took control of the bank despite the NBS
disagreement and appointed management that was
liased not only economically but also through
family ties. 
The ruling coalition gave its signature 
to the present situation when in discussing the
state budget for 1998 decided about revoking
property loss reimbursement of IRB for non-
commercial credits granted in the past at SKK
782 million. This publicly well known fact was
the last step that triggered an attack on the bank
the problems of which had been known not only
to experts but also to the general public. It is
shocking that Miroslav Maxon, chairman of the
budget committee in the Parliament (HZDS) who
was at that time designated as the new Finance
Minister, presented the motion.
The responsibility of the NBS, particularly its
banking oversight, is in that after initial resistance
against concentration of IRB shares on the part of
VSº, the banking oversight allowed themselves to
be cheated by formal transfers of shares which
did not change anything about the threat, when
the subjects linked with the owners of VSº still
control around 43% shares in IRB. The failure of
the banking oversight of the NBS was also in that
the NBS was not able to place IRB in receivership
early enough. 
The Prime Minister Meiar in response to the
situation in the IRB said that the NBS was
responsible for all of its problems and said also that
the NBS wanted to sell IRB abroad for a symbolic
crown and that only his personal intervention
prevented this from occurring. This statement is
absurd because until receivership (19 December
1997), the sale of IRB shares could only be decided
by the shareholders, that is the Meiar-controlled
FNM  (35% shares) and the private companies
(mainly around VSº) which could decide about the
remaining shares. 
MeiarÕs attacks on the NBS are seen in 
the context of the NBS resistance, particularly its
governor Masr, against the Meiar movement-
advocated amendment of the Act on the NBS,
which would reduce the scope of autonomy and
the NBS independence of the Government. The
Government proposal of the amendment of the
NBS Act was defeated in December in the
parliament, but another attempt was scheduled for
February 1998. 
The recent events only confirm the non-
standard position of VSº, particularly Alexander
Rezeä. After the crisis in IRB in December 1997,
the NBS provided SKK 11 billion to the bank in
the form of a 90-day bill of exchange (whereby
the NBS interest in IRB increased to 24 billion
crowns). The NBS appointed an administrator
who on, March, 18 1998, called a general meeting
in which the NBS wanted to push through
changes to the statutes enabling the administrator
to sell part of the bank and renew its stability and
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provide liquidity (the administrator announced
that after clearing last year loss at SKK 3.06
billion, the book value of shares was minus SKK
1.2 billion). Majority shareholders (VSº and
FNM) voted against it and requested to call
another general meeting in which they wanted to
consolidate the bank themselves. We have to
note, however, that the NBS repeatedly urged
majority shareholders in 1997, i.e., VSº and the
FNM to increase the equity of the bank, whereby
they would increase its capital adequacy.
Majority shareholders refused this proposal in the
general meeting held in May 1997 and did not
even attend the general meeting called in
December 1997 after the attack on the bank. The
action of the FNM in concert with and in the
interest of VSº has been symptomatic.
What is startling about the proposal of VSº and
the FNM was that they were not in a good
economic situation particularly as far as their own
liquidity. The FNM had to borrow to redeem
bonds of citizens older than 70 years and it seems
that as a consequence of the unprofitable way of
privatisation for the FNM, it will have enormous
problems with liquidity, particularly in relation to
redeeming bonds after the year 2000 (see above).
VSº announced in late March 1998 that they had
generated profits of only SKK 595 million for
1997, which is 41.6% of the planned profit. The
liquidity crisis will apparently be intensified after
prices of VSº shares dropped over the course of
March by 40%. It was mainly due to the reaction
to the results of the extraordinary general meeting
where the influence of A. Rezeä fully surfaced
and he managed to appoint new management (and
the Board of Directors). A 29-year old son of
Rezeä became the President of VSº and the sonÕs
peers and friends without much management
experience became members of the Board of
Directors. As the daily Trend wrote, this was a
"victory of a football team of decisive ownersÉ
and the suppression of pragmatic managers". The
general meeting then increased the risks of further
development in VSº, the situation was not clear,
which together with the growing political risks
discouraged foreign investors without the demand
of which the market is falling. The non-
transparency within VSº also increased. As one of
the Koäice stock dealers stated for Trend,
"nobody knows exactly what VSº Holding owns
and what is outside, and it is controlled by the
members of the Supervisory Board through their
firms. So far, it is like investing in a black hole".
The problems for owners also arose because
VSº mortgaged shares for re-po credits and
according to the contracts, the decrease in value
of the shares means that the banks can ask to have
the loan returned or the difference paid. The
banks that granted loans to VSº owners have
these clauses in the contract but according to the
statement of some bankers, the banks feared to
exercise their rights for political reasons.
Another problem that the owners will 
face is that they used the difference between the
market price and the low price for which they
were buying shares from the FNM in a way where
they paid instalments to the FNM by selling part
of the acquired shares for the market price. This is
evident also from the request of the RezeäÕs
company Manager, addressed to the FNM and
asking to have instalments of July of the current
year put off to 31 December of the current year. 
The request literally says that "the company
Manager is not carrying out business and thus
raises funds for instalments through sale 
of shares". The argument frequently repeated by
the Meiar Government that the FNM sell to
Slovak subjects at a discount to avoid the assets
getting into foreign hands, is thus apparently
incorrect, because, as Trend notes, already 21.5%
of the shares are in the hands of foreign subjects
while they were bought for market prices from
those who are buying them for symbolic prices
from the FNM. 
In late April 1998, new information surfaced
about ªasset stripping" of the IRB by the
shareholders of the VSº group. The companies
linked to VSº borrowed SKK 100 million in IRB
in May 1997 and secured this credit with their
own IRB shares. The credit was due in November
1997, but it was not returned. In December, IRB
was placed into receivership. The bankÕs
uncovered loss is higher than the equity. The own
equity of the bank in March 1998 was minus SKK
9.5 billion. The shares that IRB holds as collateral
for the credit of SKK 100 million are then
worthless. Those who owned the bank, i.e.,
mainly the group around VSº and the FNM SR
contributed a great deal to their becoming
worthless. It is noteworthy that the NBS over the
course of 1997 asked majority shareholders of
IRB several times (i.e., VSº and the FNM) to
increase the equity in the bank. The request was
rejected, shareholders around VSº opted for
another course of action - they have simply
stripped out the bankÕassets. Instead of
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replenishing resources, they have drained
resources using the shares of the bank itself as
security that, as a result, became worthless. 
The Prime Minister apparently saw the
situation differently, when he, in Koäice, meeting
the Management of VSº made a following
statement in their direction, "You have done 
a great deal in consolidating banking where in
relation to IRB the reputation of VSº suffered. As
one of the participants in the talks from the very
beginning, when the problems arose, I would like
to confirm that the errors on the part of the VSº in
this bank were insignificant. Their roots were
planted even before VSº entered the bank and
there was reluctance to reveal the errors or to
eradicate them. We are therefore seeking a way
together with VSº to redress the situation in such
a way that you donÕt lose the property that you
have deposited there." (VSº - Oce… Vøchodu,
quoted according to daily PRAVDA, April, 
30 1998). 
This commitment of Meiar to do anything to
prevent the VSº group from suffering property
loss can be seen in the way in which IRB was
consolidated. The NBS which carries out
receivership and which only between December
1997 and the end of March 1998 pumped SKK 11
billion in the IRB, wanted to resolve the situation
by selling the bank to a solvent, most probably
foreign bidder who could sufficiently increase its
equity. The NBS, apparently under political
pressure, changed the view and agreed to
Slovensk PoisØov¸a, Slovensk Sporite…¸a and
the FNM to increase the equity in the IRB. These
are institutions which are busy enough having
their own problems, the point is that in this way,
VSº do not have to spend a single crown to
consolidate the IRB and at the same time they do
not lose control over it. After the increase, their
direct share will decrease, but their indirect share
and influence will increase through Slovensk
PoisØov¸a (in which they are majority
shareholders with the FNM) and through the
FNM which acts in concert with VSº, and which
is a majority shareholder in Slovensk Sporite…¸a. 
The accumulated problems caused by inability
to tackle the enormous dispersion of its own
activities in areas not connected with steel
making, murky supplier and consumer relations,
poor financial situation, and the October changes
in the Government which was not so tolerant of
the management of VSº caused that even on
November, 17 1998 - after a ten-day delay - the
company was not able to pay the principal of the
syndicated credit amounting to USD 35 million
granted to VSº by a consortium of foreign banks. 
As a result, the steel producer found itself in a real
danger of cross-default, that is a situation where
all creditors could ask to have their credits
prematurely repaid. Although the banks did not
proceed to exercise their right for premature
credit repayment, many financial institutions
blocked the accounts of VSº. 
VSº creditors held talks about the situation that
arose, also with the Slovak Government. VSº
later also joined the talks. Despite the information
embargo, information leaked in public that the
conditions of the Government (and probably the
banks) include changes in the management of the
company and VSº quitting the areas which are not
directly connected with steel making as the main
area of business.
VSº probably accepted the condition which
can best be seen from the statement by the
President of the company Jlius Rezeä that "all
that is not related to steel production is for sale."
It seems that the burden of 137 other companies
is even for such a giant company as VSº
too much. 
Even Slovensk PoisØov¸a (SP) became
uninteresting to VSº, which they had attempted to
get under their full control some time ago.
According to the information from the Securities
Centre (SCPB), the share of VSº in SP dropped
from 20.03% to 12.7% as a result of the transfer
of 110 thousand shares which occurred still on
October, 31. The buyer was Poätov Banka
whose share in SP reached 7.33%. What is
remarkable about the whole transaction was the
fact that the transaction was made through a
broker that collected SKK 40 million in
commission, which comprises 19% of the sum for
which VSº sold the shares. 
After consultations with financial and 
legal advisors, the Board of Directors and 
the Supervisory Board of the company realised
there was need for adequate personal changes.
The debts of VSº against banks reached almost
SKK 19 billion as of the year-end 1998. VSº
found themselves in "receivership of their
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creditors" (so-called regulatory receivership
which means that the creditors of VSº have
agreed on the control) and everything began to
suggest that A. Rezeä and co. were no longer
actual owners of the steel company but the banks.
The likelihood of radical personal and structural
changes has increased. The anticipated changes
finally took place at the extraordinary general
meeting of the company in 11 December 1998,
when all VSº representatives declared efforts to
attenuate the company and return to exclusively
steel making activities.
Ladislav Drabik and Gabriel Eichler, who had
worked for the Bank of America, and the former
U.S. Steel President Thomas Graham, became
new members of the Board of Directors. New
members of the Supervisory Board, after the
shareholder voting became Jn Turan, Jaroslav
Gruber, Albert Oberhofer, for the FNM SR Peter
Hu¸or. A. Rezeä also retained his position, when 
he became President of the Supervisory Board at
the first meeting. 
From the beginning, the new company
President, G. Eichler declared his commitment
for major changes. The development from
December 1998 also proves it. VSº divested of
part of shares in the Slovak Insurance Company,
over which they had wanted to gain control in
summer 1998. They disposed of two media - the
national daily Nrodn Obroda, and a regional
newspaper L. Further 30 firms are ready for
sale, most of them not in the best shape. The turn
came also to the former Rezeä family pride - the
football club Sparta Praha. The negotiation about
potential buyer began in the autumn 1998 and
continued through early 1999. The sale of 25
luxurious limousines in March this year was to be
a kind of a symbol. They were too many in the
company, according to G. Eichler. The steel
companyÕs "flying assets", VSº own turbo-jet,
should meet similar fate. 
G.Eichler has clearly indicated that the critical
situation of VSº is definitely not only due to the
world crisis in the steel industry, the favourite
argument used by the preceding management
headed by Jlius Rezeä, the son of Alexander
Rezeä. He commented the situation in the
following words: "We were not prepared for the
crisis at all. The management of the firm is bad.
There is no way one can manage something
without knowing basic information. Trade policy
was problematic, too, and there were flaws in
exclusive contracts for sales abroad." (Pravda,
February, 10 1999) Stealing in the company is
another, not insignificant factor, maintains G.
Eichler, which has boomed not only at the top or
middle levels but the lowest levels as well. 
The definite departure of A. Rezeä from the
management of the company took place at the
extraordinary general meeting on February, 19
1999, in which he resigned from all his functions;
many observers commented this move as his
resignation from the power influence in VSº. 
At the same extraordinary general meeting,
shareholders have noted resignation of the Board
of Director member Thomas Graham, and elected
John Harold Goodish to this position, who was 
in 1997- 1999 President of the United Engineers
and Consultants, Inc. Other members of the
Supervisory Board, elected by shareholders,
include Duäan Ætefni and Ætefan Æulek, who, on
February, 19 1999, became the BoardÕs president
at its first meeting. Other members include Peter
Hu¸or, Albert Oberhofer, Jaroslav Gruber and the
representatives of VSº employees, Jn Perìe…,
Frantiäek Æpika and Milan Ondä, elected 
to the Supervisory Board in the election on
February, 18 1999. 
The definite ending to the departure of the
former management was given by shareholders
when they approved to change the trade name to the
original VSº, leaving out "Holding" from the title. 
In November 1999, a change in power
distribution in the ownership structure occurred at
the expense of the state. The transfer of a 10.79 %
stake of the Väeobecn Akciov SpolonosØ
Koäice, which BCPB blocked from late 1998,
with regard to the previous re-po trades, ended
unexpectedly in the account of the firm Stavard,
a.s. Koäice on October, 26. The company sold it
by return abroad. The transfer was made despite
the shares being secured in Slovensk Sporite…¸a
(SLSP). According to Brigita Schm˛gnerov, the
Minister of Finance, "it is most likely that a
criminal fraud was committed which concerns
high-ranking functionaries of the BCPB." (Profit
46, 9 November 1999). In this connection,
General Secretary of the BCPB Marin Ssik
resigned from his position, which will not
compensate the lost shares to the state though.
President of VSº, a.s., Koäice Gabriel Eichler
confirmed that the management of the firm was
preparing to create a new company that should be
145 APPENDIXES
cleared of problem account items of the past.
Assets and liabilities, which will be approved by
the creditor banks and the state, should be moved
to the new company. The new "core" company
should be formed by 22 present subsidiaries and
should exclusively devote to steel production.
The VSº interests in different financial and
trading firms and sport clubs should be included
under "non-core". 
THE CASE OF ZSNP
On July 1998, the Board of the FNM approved
a sale of a 73.86 % stake in Zvod SNP ºiar nad
Hronom (ZSNP) (aluminium producer) to an
unknown company, ºiarske Hutncke
Konzorcium (ºHK) for SKK 1.065 billion,
including investments. Under the privatisation
decision of 1992, the FNM was obliged to retain
at least 48 % of shares. As I. Mikloä said, the
actual sum, which the FNM will get for the sale
of ZSNP, will only reach SKK 65 million, which
is the amount of the first agreed instalment. The
remainder may be discharged in the event the
company invests 1 billion crowns by the year
2003. The company will have to invest this sum
anyway. The real price of selling an enterprise of
SKK 20 billion thus amounted to only SKK 65
million, which amounts to SKK 15 per share
(SITA, July, 16 1999)
In 1995 ZSNP equity was increased. The FNM
then increased its property interest when it
capitalised its receivables against the company
(exchanged them for shares) in the total nominal
value of SKK 2 billion. The price for share that
the FNM paid, was SKK 1,000. From the
difference between this price and the price for
which the FNM sold its interest clearly follows
the non-profitability of the sale for the Fund and
thus also for the state. The FNM even took over
security for fulfilment of the obligations and
pledged to eliminate ecological damage of the
company in which it no longer will have shares.
These securities in relation to banks comprise
additional SKK 2 billion. On the basis of
privatisation contract, in the event of failing to
pay debts of the company, the assets would be
transferred again to the FNM, whereby the
company could divest of its responsibility for
fulfilling the obligations. "The buyer acquired the
property under better terms than for free," says I.
Mikloä (SITA, July, 16 1998)
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1990
August
¥ August, 28 1990 the Government of SFR
discussed and approved the Scenario for the
economic reform - part of proposed changes -
fast and extensive change in ownership
relations 
October
¥ Act No. 403/1990 Of the Collection of Laws
on mitigation of consequences of some
property-related wrongs (so-called Small
Restitution Act)
¥ Act No. 427/1990 Of the Collection of Laws
on transfer of state title to some things to other
legal and physical persons (so-called Small
Privatisation Act)
November
¥ Act No. 474/1990 Of the Collection of Laws
on responsibilities of SR bodies in matters of
transfer of state title to some things to other
legal and physical persons
December
¥ Implementing regulation No.568/1990 of the
Collection of Laws on public auctions in
transferring state title to some things to other
legal and physical persons and on the entry
fees to these auctions 
1991
February
¥ February, 14 - small privatisation launched
¥ Act No. 87/1991Of the Collection of Laws on
out-of-court rehabilitation (so-called Large
Restitution Act)
¥ Act No. 92/1991 Of the Collection of Laws on
conditions of transfer of state property to other
persons 
May
¥ Act No. 229/1991 Of the Collection of Laws on
the title to land and other agricultural property
¥ Act of SNR ( Slovak National Council) No.
253/1991 Of the Collection of Laws on
responsibilities of bodies of Slovak Republic
in matters of conveying state property to other
persons and on the National Property Fund of
the SR ( FNM SR)
June
¥ Government Decree of the SR No. 273/1991 of
the Collection of Laws on exemptions from ⁄
45 of the Act No. 92/1991 Of the Collection of
Laws - allowed state enterprises, state financial
institutions, etc. to conclude contracts on
recompense transfer of state property in
respect of which they have the right of
management, in addition to their regular
economic activity
September
¥ Government Decree of the SFR No.
383/1991 Of the Collection of Laws on issuing
and using investment vouchers
October
¥ Amendment of the Act No. 429/1991 Of the
Collection of Laws - a more comprehensive
specification of the course of action in public
auction
¥ Amendment of the implementing regulation of
the Ministry of Privatisation (MSPNM SR)
No. 473/1991 on public auctions
November
¥ Registration for first wave of voucher
privatisation (beginning)
¥ Amendment of the Act No. 501/1991 of the
Collection of Laws and the amendment and the
supplement to the Act No. 474/1990 Of the
Collection of Laws on specification of rights
and obligation of the privatisation
commissions
¥ Adoption of the Act No. 513/1991 of the
Collection of Laws - Commercial Code -
stipulating the position of entrepreneurs,
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commercial companies, commercial relations
as well as some other relations pertaining 
to carrying out business
December
¥ Act No. 561/1991 of the Collection of Laws
extends the relation to contracts of lease of
non-living space also to municipalities
1992 
February
¥ Act No. 92/1992 of the Collection of Laws - an
amendment of Act No. 92/1991 of the
Collection of Laws includes a new ⁄ 6a, which
provides that privatisation project submitted
after February, 29 1992 must contain the
assessment of the companyÕs commitments in
environmental protection
April
¥ Act No. 264/1992 of the Collection of Laws
contains provisions on transfer of title to real
property in such a way that the ownership
rights are transferred to the transferee on the
date it is entered in the register of real property.
¥ Act No. 248/1992 of the Collection of Laws 
on investment companies and investment
funds - governs the activity of investment
companies and investment funds, protection of
investors and state supervision over the
activity of investment companies and
investment funds
May
¥ May, 14 - voucher privatisation launched
June
¥ Parliamentary elections - Government change
- Government of HZDS and V. Meiar coming
in office
August
¥ Government Decree of the SR No. 430/1992
Of the Collection of Laws provides that the
price in conveying apartments to their tenants
or apartment houses to apartment tenants must
be determined by an authorised expert
September
¥ September, 1 - The Constitution of the SR
approved
¥ Government approved a new concept of
privatisation 
November
¥ Act No. 541/1992 of the Collection of Laws on
distribution of property of the Czech and
Slovak Federal Republic
¥ Act No. 542/1992 of the Collection of Laws on
dissolution of SFR
¥ Act No. 544/1992 of the Collection of Laws -
the amendment made provisions that made
Administrative Procedures not applicable to
the approval of privatisation project and
stipulated the transfer of obligation in a way
that does not require the creditorÕs agreement
December
¥ Act No. 600/1992 of the Collection of Laws on
securities defines the securities system,
securities contracts, securities market and the
protection of the financial market 
¥ Act No. 29/1992 of the Collection of Laws -
supplements the Act No. 253/1991 of the
Collection of Laws and No. 501/1991 of the
Collection of Laws - specifies the uses of the
FNM assets, which could be used also to
increase equity shares of commercial
companies in which the FNM was a
shareholder or a partner
1993
January
¥ January, 1 1993 - rise of the independent
Slovak Republic
March
¥ Government Decree of the SR No. 144/1993 
of the Collection of Laws - extends exemption
on the basis of which contract on recompense
transfer of state property can be concluded, 
to real estates designated as foreign 
state embassy, international Government
organisations or institutions, which subject to
international law, enjoy diplomatic privileges
and immunities, but prior consent of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the SR is
required 
June
¥ Government Decree of the SR No. 151/1993 of
the Collection of Laws - extends exemption to a
possibility of an enterprise to set up in the Czech
Republic a limited liability company and to
earmark funds at 100,000 Czech crowns for the
purpose
July
¥ Act No. 172/1993 of the Collection of Laws -
the amendment provided that the statutory
body, which approved the privatisation
project, can change the mode of privatisation
proposed in the privatisation project
October
¥ Act No. 278/1993 of the Collection of Laws -
on administration of state property - the change
related to ⁄45 par. 5, i.e., provisions
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paragraphs 1 and 2, were not applicable to the
property of foreign trade companies and their
special purpose organisations, as well as to
budgetary and contributory organisations
December
¥ Act No. 17/1993 of the Collection of Laws -
amends and supplements the SNR Act No.
253/1991 Of the Collection of Laws on
jurisdictions of SR bodies in matters of
conveying state property to other persons and
on the FNM, as later amended 
1994
March
¥ March, 1 1994 - the process of small
privatisation officially completed
¥ The sale of 1.5 % VSº shares for less than half
the market price approved in favour of the joint
stock company Manager
¥ Act No. 60/1994 of the Collection of Laws -
important amendment of the Act No. 92/1991
of the Collection of Laws, according to which
the same procedure is adopted as in the case of
property administered by SPF, but mainly in
relation to the rise of the Slovak Republic in
1993 includes the change contained in the SNR
Act No. 253/1991 of the Collection of Laws.
¥ Following President Michal Kov address in
the Parliament, vote of non-confidence for the
Government of Vladimr Meiar 
¥ The Government of Jozef Moravk coming
into office, the intensification of privatisation
process 
May
¥ The Government Decree No. 134/1994 of 
the Collection of Laws, on issuing and using
investment vouchers - provisions about 
issue and registration of voucher books,
privatisation waves and rounds, procedure in
ordering shares or handing over investment
points to an investment fund
July 
¥ Act No. 172/1994 of the Collection of Laws -
the amendment designates the beneficiary of
the net proceeds of the sale of vouchers (state
budget)
August
¥ Act No. 244/1994 of the Collection of Laws -
the amendment changes - extends the
possibility to use FNM property also for 
the transfer of privatised property for the
purposes of health, sickness and pension
insurance 
September
¥ Early parliamentary election
¥ Registration of nationals for the second wave
of voucher privatisation 
November
¥ November, 3-4 - first meeting of parliament
following September parliamentary elections,
massive personal changes in all central bodies
and extensive amendments of acts, installing of
absolute power and control of the ruling
coalition, particularly HZDS within this, removal
and new election of the FNM bodies with
exclusive representation of the ruling coalition 
December
¥ Act No. 369/1994 of the Collection of Laws -
amendment of the Act No. 92/1991 of the
Collection of Laws, consists in that, the
decision about the privatisation through direct
sale outside public tender or public auction is
made by the Board of the FNM at the proposal
of the Ministry or the Executive Committee of
the FNM and not the Government of the SR,
the amendment entailed the loss of control
over the process of privatisation 
¥ Act No. 370/94 Of the Collection of Laws, on
revoking decisions of the Government of the
SR pertaining to privatisation of enterprises,
parts of enterprises and property interests of
the state through direct sales - this act de facto
revoked privatisation decisions adopted by the
preceding Government 
¥ Act No. 374/1994 of the Collection of Laws -
supplementing the section on proceeds of sale
of vouchers
1995
March
¥ Ministry of Finance SR revoked licence of
PSIS - an investment company managing the
largest privatisation fund from the first wave of
privatisation 
May
¥ Constitutional Court ruling on the Act 370/1994 of
21 December 1994 which revoked some decisions
of Moravk Government on privatisation. It ruled
that the act was not consistent with the
Constitution of the SR and that the NR SR
overstepped there powers and did not have the
right to revoke Government resolutions
July
¥ KOZ (unions) passed a negative resolution
regarding the way privatisation is being
applied
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August
¥ FNM Board decided sale of a 39 % stake in a.s.
Slovnaft in favour of a.s. Slovintegra
September
¥ Act No. 190/1995of the Collection of Laws of
Statutes - amending Act No. 92/1991 Of the
Collection of Laws on conditions of state
property transfer to other persons - the Act
virtually abolished voucher privatisation and
replaced it with a kind of bond compensation,
and stipulated ways for bond use. It was
supposed to satisfy in some way participants of
the second way of voucher privatisation 
¥ Act No. 192/1995 of the Collection of Laws on
securing strategic interests of the state in
privatisation by excluding some enterprises
from privatisation 
December
¥ 20 December 1995 - Constitutional Court
decided that the provisions of ⁄ 24, par. 10 of
the Act No. 190/1995 of the Collection of
Laws, on conditions of state property transfer
to other persons, which obliges cities and
communities to accept bonds in payment of
part of the price for apartment transfer in
personal ownership, was not consistent with
the constitution 
¥ Supreme Court ruled the decision on revoking
license to PSIS by the Ministry of Finance
unlawful. 
¥ Amendment of the Act No. 304/1995 of the
Collection of Laws - provisions about issuing
bonds and organising trade in them
1996
January
¥ Prime Minister V. Meiar stating at an
economic conference that by the end of
January or mid-February 1996 at the latest,
privatisation of all banks except the NBS will
have been completed
February
¥ Act No. 56/1996 of the Collection of Laws -
the amendment changed "obligation" to ensure
employee participation and privatisation to a
"possibility". At the same time it introduces
jurisdiction for MSPNM in relation to
enterprises designated for liquidation
May
¥ FNM completed a sale of a 51 % stake in SLK,
a.s., PieäØany in favour of SZPK
July
¥ Act No. 214/1996 - amendment of the NR SR
Act No..192/1995 Of the Collection of Laws
on securing state interests in privatisation of
strategically important enterprises and joint
stock companies
August
¥ Beginning of trading in bonds
¥ FNM decided direct sale of the whole non-
privatised stake in Nafta Gbely for a symbolic
price
October
¥ Government adopted a measure to preclude
circumventing the minimum price of bonds -
suspending direct sales without financial
settlement, which until then comprised 84% of
all FNM SR bond sales
¥ FNM SR sold a 30 % stake in JCP Ætrovo to
KK Profin, s.r.o. Bojnice
¥ FNM SR decided a sale of a 51 % stake in a.s.
Ba¸a Zhorie to Ba¸a Zhorie 1 (sale in favour
of a high-ranking FNM SR official)
¥ FNM SR approved direct sale of NAD Trenn
in favour of v.o.s. Merkur
¥ Act No. 322/1996 Of the Collection of Laws -
another amendment of Act No. 92/1991 Of the
Collection of Laws on conditions of state
property transfer to other persons, as later
amended - introduces obligation to redeem
FNM bonds at 31 December 1997 to
bondholders reaching at October, 24 1996 the
age of 70
November
¥ Finding of the Constitutional Court No.
352/1996 of the Collection of Laws - declared
transfer of responsibilities in approving direct
sales from the Government to the FNM
unconstitutional
1997
January
¥ Vice-president of the Board and Chairman of
the Executive Committee of the FNM Milan
Rehk said that banks were likely to be
privatised in March
February
¥ Opposition in co-operation with deputies for
ZRS approved the amendment of the Act No.
192/1995 Of the Collection of Laws on
securing state interest in privatisation of
strategically important state enterprises and
joint stock companies according to which, by
2003 the property interests of the state ( FNM)
in four largest financial institutions cannot be
privatised (VòB, SP, SLSP and IRB)
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¥ State Secretary of the Ministry of Finance, P.
Stank, said that international institutions
previously endorsing blanket privatisation of
banks, reviewed their attitudes and
acknowledged a need for a slower and more
specific approach in case of SP and SLSP, but
deemed early privatisation of VòB and IRB
necessary
¥ At the proposal of the Government, President
of the SR M. Kov returned approved
amendment banning privatisation of key
financial institutions for parliamentary debate
¥ Chairman of ZRS, J. »uptk, (Deputy-
chairman of the Parliament) refused murky
privatisation practices and opposed again the
privatisation of banks
¥ Constitutional Court of the SR ruled that the
Government violated several provisions of the
Constitution of the SR and few other laws
when they adopted the Decree No. 139/1996
Of the Collection of Laws (replacing the
abolished second wave of voucher
privatisation with bonds)
March
¥ Act No. 92/1997 Of the Collection of Laws. -
amendment of Act No. 192/1995 Of the
Collection of Laws, on securing state interests
in privatisation of strategically important state
enterprises and joint stock company - NR SR
repeatedly approved the amendment of the Act
on privatising financial institutions, returned
by President of SR M. Kov, but withdrew
from the privatisation moratorium VòB and
IRB
June
¥ Act No. 210/1997 Of the Collection of Laws -
amendment of the Act on large privatisation
according to which responsibilities for
approving direct sales were given to the
Government (as a consequence of the
Constitutional Court finding No. 352/1996 Of
the Collection of Laws on unconstitutionality
of transferring this competence to FNM )
¥ NR SR approved the amendment of the Act on
measures in the area of radio and television
broadcasting, whereby privatisation of
transmission circle STV was precluded
July
¥ At the proposal of the Government, President
M. Kov returned the amendment of the act
banning privatisation of STV2 for
parliamentary debate
October
¥ The Government declared their approval of
deputy bill (ZRS), which would strengthen the
inability to privatise energy enterprises by
constitutional law
¥ October, 9 1997, Ivan Mikloä elected to the
Supervisory Board of the FNM, as the only
opposition representative during the 3rd
Government of V. Meiar
1998
January
¥ FNM SR borrowed funds in German marks to
redeem bonds, at 14-15% interest although current
interest rates in the world markets were under 4%
June
¥ Constitutional Court Finding No. 221/1998 Of
the Collection of Laws - declared favouring of
defined groups of persons in acquiring bonds
unconstitutional
July
¥ Beginning of HZDS petition drive for calling
referendum on non-privatisation of some
strategic enterprises
August
¥ By increasing equity shares of Slovensk
PoisØov¸a by SKK 375 million, the state lost
majority in SP through the FNM 
¥ Vladimr Meiar received petition sheets bearing
620 thousand signatures of citizens demanding
the calling of a referendum on the ban of
privatisation of some strategic enterprises
¥ First unsuccessful attempt to convene
extraordinary meeting of the Parliament (NR
SR) about the privatisation of SP
¥ Second unsuccessful attempt to convene
extraordinary meeting of the NR SR about the
privatisation of SP
September
¥ Ivan Mikloä resigning from the position of the
member of the FNM Supervisory Board, the
only opposition representative
¥ Parliamentary elections 
¥ Referendum on non-privatisation of some
strategic enterprises
¥ Igor Lenskø, chairman of the Central
Committee for Referendum, declared the
referendum void
October
¥ The instituting meeting of the Parliament
¥ Coalition Government constituted of SDK,
SOP, SMK, and SD» headed by Mikulä
Dzurinda
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November
¥ Act No. 364/1998 of the Collection of Laws -
amended Act No. 192/1995 Of the Collection
of Laws on securing state interests in
privatisation of strategically important
enterprises and joint stock companies,
included VòB among non-privatised
enterprises and abolished Article 1 of the Act
211/1997 of the Collection of Laws on
revitalisation of enterprises
December
¥ Possibility to exchange bonds for shares in
enterprises in which FNM has property
interests, announced by the FNM President
Kank. In his view the FNM will offer also
shares of some strategic enterprises in
exchange for bonds
¥ Existential problems of VSº, at the
Government intervention change to the
management of VSº. and action preventing
the companyÕs bankruptcy
¥ The Chairman of the Executive Committee
Ladislav Sklenr of the FNM making a
statement, that in case law is contravened or
conditions of contract unfilled or instalments
failed, the privatisation assets can be
transferred back in the FNM ownership
1999
March
¥ An agreement concluded between the FNM
SR and the owner of Nafta Gbely shares on
returning shares in the FNM holding
June
¥ Despite the agreement on returning the shares
of Nafta Gbely in the FNM ownership, sale of
shares by the original owner to a new owner -
beginning of a new "Nafta" scandal
¥ Prime Minister Dzurinda accusing statutory
officials of the FNM of negligence of duties
¥ Government submitting a motion in the NR SR
to recall »udovt Kank from the position of
President and Ladislav Sklenr from the
position of Vice-president of the FNM 
July
¥ FNM - pulling out of some contracts of assets
privatisation 
September
¥ Act No. 253/1999 Of the Collection of Laws —
amending Act No. 92/1991 Of the Collection
of Laws - listing enterprises having the nature
of natural monopolies and stipulating that their
privatisation will be decided always by the
Government after receiving advise of the NR
SR, defines a list of enterprises where
permanent state interest of 51 % must be
retained
October
¥ NR SR recalling »udovt Kank and Ladislav
Sklenr from their positions of President and
Vice-president in the FNM
November
¥ The ruling coalition unable to come to an
agreement on personal appointments to the
positions of President and Vice-president of
the FNM 
¥ Ministry of Transport, Post and
Telecommunications of the SR published a
classified advertisement declaring interest to
sell a 51% stake in Slovensk Telekomunik-
cie, a.s. Bratislava to a strategic investor 
¥ Prime Ministers of the Slovak and Czech
Republics signing their zero variant of
distributing former federal assets 
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Oto Æik: "Obstacles to the reform are mainly in
the peopleÕs mindset and old structures."
(HN No. 6, January, 9 1990)
M. Tuek, Investin Banka: "Before the
denationalisation, we will need to resolve the problem
of real appraisal and indebtedness of enterprises". 
(HN No. 16, April, 20 1991)
Mr. Æulc: "Small enterprises should be privatised
quickly, but large units should first be
denationalised and then slowly privatised".
(HN No.18, May, 4 1990)
J. Paln, VSº: "Employee shares and selected
form of sale of shares (not free market) should
prevail in the process of privatisation."
(HN No. 27, July, 3 1990)
Karel Kouba, Institute of Prognosis, Czecho-
Slovak Academy of Sciences: "We need to collect
first experience and after evaluating it
comprehensively, to speed up privatisation."
(HN No. 30, July, 25 1990)
M. Zelenø, School of Economics and New York:
"Employee shares will be a good motivation; and
anyway, everything that has some value in this
state is partly the property of workers as
compensation for low wages and standard of
living and destroyed environment of the past."
(HN No. 33, August, 15 1990)
V. Vlek, MF SFR: "In privatisation classical
methods will not be sufficient, else it would take more
than 100 years. To scare people by notions of
economic sell out or swallowing is silly, and as for
exporting part of profits, the question is if there would
be any profit at all without the foreign know-how". 
(HN No. 34, August, 22 1990)
L. Andräik, chairman of the Slovak Economic
Society, Slovak Academy of Sciences: "Everyone
has to be an owner and appropriator, that is not
quite possible through vouchers, if they get
distributed free, merits of the past in creating the
wealth itself will be blurred."
(HN No. 5, January, 7 1991)
R. Filkus: "Privatisation will lead to new
relations between supply and demand and to
reducing unemployment, this can only happen
through foreign capital, which definitely requires
internal stability".
(HN No. 14, January, 17 1991)
M. Borgula, Federal Assembly Deputy for the
Party of Slovak Democratic Left "Through
privatisation the Government want to create a
class of rich people that will elect them".
(HN No. 46, February, 23 1991)
F. Levcik, Vienna, "SFR, a testing territory for
monetarists to sell abroad at any cost even below
price, this is relative though, in the view of
foreign investorÕ s contribution, but a common
employee does not mind who pays his wages..." 
"Even if, after privatisation, the ownership will be
rather fragmented, eventually there will be
concentration."(HN No. 66, March, 19 1991)
G. Eichler, Bank of America, "The state cannot
take away hands from the companies and leave
them to their fate, for the time being, it must take
care of them, in order that it could sell them in the
future at best possible price, which will only be
achieved if they function well, this transition
period should not take more than 5 years."
(HN No. 143, June, 20 1991)
G. Lesyk, advisor of the Ministry 
of Finance: "A privatisation project should
contain how many percent the employees, the
state, the foreign investor will get and how much
will go to the voucher privatisation, if employees
want to participate in privatisation, they have to
submit a competitive privatisation project and if
they win, they will be deciding about the
companyÕs fate.
(HN No. 6, October, 7 1991)
V. Komrek, Institute of Prognosis,
Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences: "To halt the
National Property disappearing we need to review
privatisation that is irresponsible to the current
and particularly the future generations. "
(HN No. 12, October, 14 1991)
154APPENDIX 3: PRIVATISATION-STATEMENTS
Appendix 3: Privatisation-statements
Dagmar Likov
Roman Hofbauer, Minister of Transport,
Communications and Public Works of the SR:
"Nothing is worse than this protraction because
then a kind of pre-privatisation agony arises when
the enterprises are aware they will not be state-
owned anymore but are still not private".
(Republika, August, 19 1993)
Jlius Tth, Minister of Finance of the SR: "I see
the fundamental problem in whether that who
won with his privatisation project will get credit
from a commercial bank, or whether it will be
somebody selected by the banks."
(Slovenskø vøchod, August, 23 1993)
Duäan Slobodnk, Minister of Culture of the SR:
"Privatisation is possible but in a way where the
state would retain the so-called golden share, the
right of veto in potential decisions. It is a national
cultural obligation."
(Mlad Fronta Dnes, August, 23 1993)
Vadim Haraj, director of the section of
privatisation and business forms, MP SR: "The
scarcity of free capital resources in many cases
entails interest to privatise only selected -
lucrative - parts of assets."
(Ro…ncke noviny, October, 22 1993)
Ivan Lexa: "I do not believe that anybody could
throw doubt, on the substantive grounds, on the
privatisation under the Government of V. Meiar.
We were those who have applied in practice the
idea of privatisation on the basis of broad
involvement of employee collectives."
(Pravda, March, 16 1994)
Ivan Lexa: "I do not identify myself with the
Government that is coming into office because
they do not dare to name but the Government of
broad corruption. With the exception of
privatisation in the fashion - here a small factory
to you, there a small factory to youÉ they are not
capable of agreeing on anything constructive, for
obvious objective reasons." 
(Republika,  March, 17 1994)
Milan Janiina, Minister for Administration and
Privatisation of National Property of the SR: "I do
not believe that the common citizen was at the
core of V. Meiar Government interest, when
they were selling below price to their party
colleagues over the course of recent weeks."
"The Meiar Government conceived
privatisation in a fashion that only what could not be
sold will be included for voucher privatisation."
(Hlas »udu, June, 7 1994)
Peter Magvaäi, Minister of Economy of the SR:
"If the inflow of capital did not make trade more
dynamic, if privatisation did not make it more
dynamic, those would be things comprising and
end in itself."
(Pravda — Finann spravodajstvo, June, 29 1994)
Ivan Lexa: "Whoever will own banks and
financial institutions will decide about future
privatisation actors, give or refuse to give money,
and decide about the existential issues of the SR".
"Our concept of broad participation of employee
collectives still holds - in standard methods,
nobody has come up with any better. They only
made up a figure - first 100, then 88 billion -
which they promised to put in a massive, poorly
thought out voucher privatisation at such and
such date."
(Prca, August, 18 1994)
Ætefan Gavornk, President of the Board of the
FNM SR: "We as the FNM are very much
interested in voucher privatisation because the
proceeds of it are not revenue of the FNM,
therefore the more assets will go in voucher
privatisation the less revenues will go to the
FNM, the less benefit it will have of it."
(Prca, January, 17 1995)
Jn Duckø, Minister of Economy of the SR: "My
objections to investment funds are of different
kind. What I maintain is they get property very
cheaply, almost free, and I cannot see their
contribution to the prosperity of companies."
(Nrodn obroda, January 21 1995)
Milan Janiina: "I am not going to defend funds,
I am not their advocate. But on the other hand, I
would like to point to the present ruling power
has used the money people invested in voucher
privatisation, they have them somewhere
deposited and are gaining interest on them."
(SME, February, 21 1995)
Peter Bisk, Minister for Administration and
Privatisation of National Property of the SR: "In
my opinion the speed of privatisation should
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correspond to the objective that should be
achieved through privatisation."
(Profit, March, 14 1995)
Peter Magvaäi: "I am principally against
exclusive orientation of ownership of Slovak
enterprises only in the hands of domestic business
circles. Foreign investment can be a significant
source of consolidating our companies after
privatisation."
(Nrodn Obroda, April, 24 1995)
Jn Duckø, Minister of Economy of the SR: "It
is better to sell any group of entrepreneurs,
management, or employees a share of nominal
value of SKK 1,000 for SKK 200, than to sell it
to those interested abroad, about whom we know
they would be willing to pay SKK 1,000 but then
they would close the company and get the
market."
"For those companies that are privatised in the
second wave I recommended selling them always
with a part of shares remaining in the FNM SR. In
case of Koäice VSº, where the FNM sold all
shares, we will seek a way how to overcome it."
(Pravda, August, 24 1995)
Tomä Cinge…, member of the Commission for
Supervision over Privatisation: "The state should
be grateful if it can hand over a particular
enterprise, provided the new owner is willing to
take care of the given enterprise and its
employees."
"Not all enterprises privatised can be sold in
this way with profit. I spoke about those who are
really in all kinds of problems, and there is a
chance that the buyer will be able to stand on his
feet again - I would not hesitate and sell for one
crown."
(Nrodn Obroda,  October, 27 1995)
»udovt ernk, Deputy-chairman of the
Democratic Union: "The nation actually timidly
accepted that instead of several thousand crowns
they are getting a paper which is not covered by
anything, and is of considerably lower value, and
they are ready to sell it for a real two - three
thousand in order to get money "on the table". It
is an attitude of a Slovak waiting for thousand
years in the hall, clutching his little hat in his
hands, waiting what the nobility will throw his
way. ª 
(Prca, November, 5 1996)
Mikulä Dzurinda, deputy chairman of the
Christian Democratic Party: "The statement by
Vladimr Meiar is in a way a milestone because
it fully justifies our concerns we had expressed in
June last year when he announced he was
preparing something different and better than the
voucher privatisation. I was then talking about a
Government scam because it was clear to me that
the FNM was never going to have that much
money to fulfil his promises. " (reaction to the
statement by V. Meiar: If the FNM does not
have so much money, there is Government as
guarantor that will reach out for the state
budget.")
"An interesting thing, and to some extent also
a piquancy, consists in that the ruling power
attempts to solve one scam with another. The first
one is the bond compensation itself, which is
nothing and will come to nothing. The other is
represented by the promise of the Prime Minister
that if the FNM SR is unable to pay out money,
then the Government will do it. " 
"I am afraid that even the act on strategic
interests of the state is not sufficient guarantee to
prevent the ruling power from handing out free
even the most valuable things we still have in
Slovakia. "
"I do not claim that the voucher method is the
best there is in the world. But I do claim it is still
most equitable for citizens. It could be made
better, so that the citizen would not fall pray to
some swindlers in an investment privatisation
fund, much could have been done to prevent
rubbish being included in the property." 
(Prca, August, 22 1996)
Vladimr Meiar: "There is no protection of
citizens deposits in the Slovak banks, not even in
those where the state has still a dominant share."
(Slovak radio, February, 5 1996)
Ætefan Gavornk, President of the Board of the
FNM SR: "Banks have to be privatised, but so far,
we do not know how. "
(Pravda, February, 15 1996)
»ubomr Javorskø, Minister of Health of the
SR: "Privatisation is a very sensitive process. We
have found out that even if we gave a pharmacy,
to a pharmacist, some would turn it back in a
short time explaining they could not get a credit." 
"Today privatisation of pharmacies is criticised
by those who, within two years time, were unable
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to even put papers together to at least apply for
privatisatiion." 
(Pravda, January, 5 1996)
Ætefan Gavornk, President of the Board of the
FNM : "The Minister of Finance called me a dead
bug last June because of the insurance company,
and I called him a bug very much alive, and how
about today? He is already dead too."
"In my opinion, as if the whole project of
privatisation of banks lacked an honest intention." 
(Pravda, January, 29 1997)
Ætefan Gavornk, FNM SR: "To seek justice in
privatisation is not possible, it does not contain such
condition. Let us not be mistaken, privatisation
served the purpose of enforcing power."
"Here an opposite route was taken:
privatisation was fast - we even praised that - and
currants have been selected from the cake, so that
it would generate profit immediately. Now it is
too late to cry."
(Pravda, February, 1 1997)
Ætefan Gavornk, FNM SR: "If banks got
straight in private hands, but not in a fashion
where somebody is curing his sore, but if they got
privatised in a serious way, they would not be
today in the mess".
(Pravda, 19 December 1997)
V. Meiar, Prime Minister of SR: "Finishing
privatisation, not privatisation of financial
institutions, is a matter of expertise. It is bad
when a political impression distorts a Specialist
relation. If we say that banks are not to be
privatised, we need to say also how to change the
situation existing in the banks and how to fully
maintain perspective of their development."
"I take the signal not to privatise banks until
2003 as halting capital movements in these
financial institutions and directly eroding the
competitive environment in internal and
international markets."
(Nrodn Obroda, March, 1 1997)
Peter Stanek, State Secretary of the MF SR: "We
can call privatisation in countries of Eastern and
Central Europe without any scruples a Klondike
of 2Oth century, theft and sell out of all the riches
these nations have created over decades by
grudging, getting low wages or salaries and
working for the future."
"Unfortunately, they have created quite a few
representatives of empires that laugh at us and
brag how they acquired it all through "honest
work"."
(Prca, April, 2 1997)
Ivan Mikloä: "Most reasons of insufficient
success of the voucher privatisation from the
aspect of forming efficient ownership relations,
developing capital market, etc. consist not in the
voucher privatisation itself but in the failure to
tackle the processes after it has finished."
(Profit, March, 3 1998)
Ivan Mikloä: "That means that if Meiar today
claims what he claims the slogan holds: a thief
yells, catch a thief!"
(Novø as, May, 16 1998)
Jozef Kollr, Deputy-chairman of the Board of
Directors of »udov Banka Bratislava:
"Consolidation of banks is only a prior
preparation for the target phase, which should be
privatisation. Only through privatisation
economy will get new capital and in case of banks
those will be successfully consolidated."
"Nobody on the Slovak market has sufficient
capital to privatise two largest banking institutions.
I see the entry of a foreign investor as a must."
(SITA , November, 18 1998)
Ætefan Gavornk, FNM SR: "It was stupid to
pass property to others, who have turned out to be
villains and "tunnelers" of enterprises into the
bargain, only not to those of the oneÕs cloth. It is
a principal duty of each party to reckon with a
possibility that in the next election term they
might not make it to the parliament and take care
of their deputies, functionaries, activists. Save us
God if ZRS loses election and will have to move
to the trenches. Then it will probably fall apart
once for all."
(Pravda, July, 30 1998)
Ivan Mikloä: "The published data confirm that
many representatives of the ruling coalition that
cannot privatised because of conflict of interest,
do so through relatives and other dummies."
(Nrodn Obroda, June, 17 1998)
Ivan Mikloä: "It turned out that the negative side
of the voucher privatisation were some funds and
investment companies abusing their position. It
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happened that funds had been ransacked, 
they pushed insufficiently restructuring of
companies." 
(Novø as, May, 16 1998)
"The process of distributing shares 
of companies through voucher privatisation is a
method hard to beat - as to speed, transparency
and the reduction of scope for favouritism,
corruption and subjectivism, as well as from the
aspect of massive participation in privatisation ."
(Profit, March, 3 1998)
V. Meiar: "Privatisation in Slovakia is basically
coming to an end, further development takes the
route of investing in technologies. Foreign
investments are one of the conditions for
restructuring and we have plenty of bids. We are
in a situation where the supply essentially meets
the needs of Slovakia. They come from all over
the world."
(Trend, May, 6 1998)
Jaroslav Volf, chairman of NR SR Committee
for Economy, Enterprise and Privatisation: "The
register of privatised assets has got on the election
agenda, because there was social order for it,
people rightly wanted to get to know privatisation
actors and owners. I had warned then that it
would not be that easy to make such a register and
publish it. It encounters not only legal problems
but it is also difficult to fulfil it physically."
"Almost the entire privatisation ran through 
direct sales to a pre-designated bidders without
anybody else knowing about it, or applying for it,
and now also as an unsatisfied bidder to complain
about it."
(Prca, April, 19 1999)
Peter Mihk, chairman of the Slovak Chamber
of Trade and Industry: "It finally surfaces that
even if we declare an objective to keep property
in Slovak hands, the so called domestic capital-
generating class would currently very much like
to get rid of the acquired property."
(Pravda, September, 28 1999)
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BCPB — Bratislava Stock-Exchange [Burza
cennøch papierov Bratislava]
SFR — Czechoslovak Federative Republic
[esko-slovensk Federatvna Republika]
FZ SFR — Federal Assembly of SFR
[Federlne Zhromaìdenie SFR]
FMF — Federal Ministry of Finance [Federlne
ministerstvo financi]
FNM — National Property Fund [Fond
nrodnho majetku]
HZDS — Movement for a Democratic Slovakia
[Hnutie za Demokratick Slovensko]
KB — Consolidation Bank [Konsolidan
Banka]
KS — Czechoslovak Crown [Koruna
eskoslovensk]
KDH — Christian Democratic Movement
[KresØansko Demokratick Hnutie]
MSPNM SR — Ministry of Administration and
Privatisation of National Property of SR
[Ministerstvo pre sprvu a privatizciu
nrodnho majetku SR]
MF SR — Ministry of Finance of SR
[Ministerstvo financi SR]
MTZ — Material technical base [materilno
technick zklad¸a]
NR SR — National Council of SR [Nrodn
rada SR]
NCHZ — Chemical Enterprise Novaky [Novcke
chemick zvody]
OIV — Owners of Investment Vouchers
[majitelia investinøch kupnov]
RIF — Restitution Investment Fund [Reätitunø
investinø fond]
SB — State Budget
SCP —  [Slovensk Celulzky a Papierne],
Ruìomberok — (cellulose and paper producer)
SCPB — Bratislava Securities Center [Stredisko
cennøch papierov Bratislava]
SDK — Slovak Democratic Coalition [Slovensk
Demokratick Koalcia]
SD» - Party of Democratic Left [Strana
Demokratickej »avice]
SDSS — Social Democratic Party of Slovakia
[Socilno-Demokratick Strana Slovenska]
SKK — Slovak Crown [Slovensk koruna]
SMK — Party of Hungarian Coalition [Strana
Maarskej Koalcie]
SPF — Slovak Lands Fund [Slovenskø
pozemkovø fond]
SP — Slovak Post [Slovensk Poäta]
SPP — Slovak Gas Industry [Slovenskø
plynrenskø priemysel]
SR — Slovak Republic [Slovensk republika]
SSE — Central Slovak Energy Utilities
[Stredoslovensk energetick zvody]
ST — Slovak Telecom [Slovensk
telekomunikcie]
SVP — Slovak Water-management Enterprise
[Slovenskø vodohospodrsky podnik]
VSE — Eastern Slovak Energy Utilities
[Vøchodoslovensk energetick zvody]
VP — Voucher Privatisation [Kupnov
privatizcia]
ZRS — Workers Association of Slovakia
[Zdruìenie Robotnkov Slovenska]
ZSE — Western Slovak Energy Utility Station
[Zpadoslovensk energetick zvody]
ZSNP — aluminum producer [Zvody
Slovenskho nrodnho povstania] - (aluminum
producer)
ZŁS — Heavy Machinery Assembly Enterprise
[Zvody Łaìkho Strojrstva]
ºSR — Slovak Railways [ºeleznice SR]
òS — Constitutional Court [òstavnø sd]
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